Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Sufficiency of the evidence; AWIGBH; Intent; Jury instruction on the offense of aggravated assault as a lesser included offense; Sentencing; Scoring of 25 points for OV 3
Concluding that 1) there was evidence to support defendant’s AWIGBH conviction, 2) his jury instruction claim failed, and 3) the trial court properly assessed 25 points for OV 3, the court affirmed. He was convicted of AWIGBH and assault and battery. He was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender to 8 to 20 years for AWIGBH and 3 months for assault and battery. Defendant argued, among other things, “that the evidence only demonstrated that he possessed the intent to inflict an aggravated injury, which was insufficient to establish that he intended to inflict great bodily harm.” The court noted that multiple “witnesses described defendant as aggressive, intimidating, and irate.” The director of the half-way house where defendant was then a resident (T) “described defendant as loud, aggressive, and intimidating, stating: ‘[I]t was obvious due to the aggressive nature of [defendant] that he was looking to engage with someone.’” The case manager, G, echoed T’s concern. “He described defendant as threatening and was worried defendant would attack him during their argument. [G] stated defendant punched the victim hard with a closed fist in rapid succession. [G] testified that it was apparent defendant was preparing to strike the victim a third time when” T intervened. T “explained that he intervened quickly because it was evident that the situation was escalating.” Also, T and G “testified that the victim did not have his hands raised and never fought back.” Dr. L “explained that only ‘severe force’ could cause the ‘blowout fracture’ that the victim suffered. Defendant’s challenges, including what inferences could be drawn from the evidence, are related to the weight and credibility of the evidence, which were issues for the jury to resolve.” The court noted that the “jury was free to accept or reject the theory of either party in light of the evidence presented at trial, and we will not interfere with the jury’s role of determining issues of weight and credibility.” Further, the court noted that “we are required to resolve all conflicts in the evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—in favor of the prosecution[.]” Applying these standards, it concluded that “there was sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the specific intent to do great bodily harm.”
Sufficiency of the evidence to support torture & CSC I convictions; MCL 750.85(1); “Severe mental pain or suffering” (MCL 750.85(2)(d)); CSC I under MCL 750.520b(1)(c); People v Waltonen
The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find that the victim (NG) “suffered severe mental pain and suffering” due to defendant-Klyk’s “threats and that the threats satisfied MCL 750.85(2)(d)(iii) and (iv). As such, the evidence was sufficient to support Klyk’s torture conviction.” It further held that the evidence was sufficient to support his CSC I conviction under MCL 750.520b(1)(c). He was also convicted of unlawful imprisonment, AWIGBH, and third-offense domestic violence. The record showed “NG was unable to recall at trial whether Klyk threatened her during the incident, but she thought she was going to die.” A police witness (W) “testified, and his body camera footage confirmed, that NG told him immediately after the incident that Klyk threatened to kill her and her ex-husband.” Another police witness (S) “testified that NG told her that Klyk threatened to kill NG while he assaulted her and that, afterward in the kitchen, Klyk ‘continued to tell her how much he hated her, and how much he wanted to kill her.’ In addition, the record shows that Klyk threatened the imminent death of NG’s ex-husband. NG testified that Klyk told her in the kitchen that she should not drop her daughters off at her ex-husband’s house because he was going to be ‘skinned’ and ‘dead in the mudroom.’ [S] corroborated NG’s testimony. [S] testified that NG told her that Klyk warned NG not to ‘bring her kids, daughters, back to their stepdad [sic] on the day that they usually do because she would find [him] dead in the garage or skinned alive.’” While the record did “not establish when NG was scheduled to drop her daughters off at their father’s house, it can be inferred from [S’s] testimony that NG and her ex-husband exchanged parenting time on a routine basis.” As to the CSC conviction, the record showed there was “a sufficient nexus between the sexual penetration and Klyk’s unlawful imprisonment of NG. Klyk sat on NG’s chest and pinned her arms to the bed before he slapped and strangled her. He then tied her left wrist to the bed using a strap, hit her with the broken clip of the right strap, and strangled her again. Thereafter, he untied her left wrist and directed her to lie at the side of the bed before he sexually assaulted her. Contrary to Klyk’s argument that his actions were separate, distinct acts, they constituted ‘a continuum of interrelated events.’” Affirmed.
Action for first-party personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under the No-Fault Act; Domicile; MCL 500.3114(1); Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch; Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co
The court held that the trial court erred by denying defendant-insurer’s motion for summary disposition and holding that it was the highest priority insurer for plaintiff’s (the minor victims’ father) PIP claim. Plaintiff sued defendant seeking PIP benefits for his children, who were injured in a car crash that happened while their aunt was driving. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition, finding it was the highest priority insurer for the claim. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that because the minors were domiciled with their parents as a matter of law, they were not entitled to PIP benefits under their aunt’s insurance policy. The “minors had two residences on the date of the accident—the hotel and” their aunt’s home. However, they “could only have one domicile.” On the date of the accident, their “parents were married and had legal custody of the children.” As such, they “were domiciled with their parents as a matter of law.” And it was undisputed that the parents were not domiciled in the aunt’s “household on the date of the accident.” Because the “minors were not named insureds under [the aunt’s] policy and were domiciled with their parents on the date of the accident,” the aunt’s policy was inapplicable to their PIP claim. Reversed and remanded.
Exclusion of expert testimony, FRE 702; Pluck v BP Oil Pipeline Co; Baker v Chevron USA Inc (Unpub 6th Cir); Failure to meet disclosure requirements; FedRCivP 26(a)(2)(B)
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding plaintiffs’ expert’s (Dr. S) causation testimony as to defendant-mining company’s alleged negligence per se resulting in flood damage where the testimony did not meet FRE 702’s requirements and failed to comply with the disclosure requirements in Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s failure to comport with mining regulations caused flooding that destroyed homes and other properties. S was plaintiffs’ only causation expert. Without his testimony, the district court concluded they were unable to make their prima facie case of negligence per se, and granted defendant summary judgment. Plaintiffs argued that it abused its discretion by excluding the testimony. As to exclusion under FRE 702, the court considered Pluck, a benzene contamination case, and Baker, another benzene contamination case involving relevant facts analogous to those here. The court held that like “the district courts in Pluck and Baker,” the district court in this case “did not abuse its discretion and instead correctly spotted red flags in the proffered expert opinion on causation. Here, [S’s] testimony was deficient in all three reliability areas: it unreliably applied unreliable methods to insufficient and even irrelevant data.” The lack of site-specific data made his report of questionable relevance. He also did not conduct flood modeling, which “is ‘the accepted methodology to determine whether land disturbances caused or exacerbated flooding.’” And he neglected to exclude potential alternative causes of plaintiffs’ damages. The court concluded that S’s report raised “various red flags that caution against certifying his opinion: reliance on ‘anecdotal evidence, improper extrapolation, failure to consider other possible causes, and, significantly, a lack of testing.’” It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding S’s expert testimony under FRE 702. It also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of S’s opinion under Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Defendant asserted four grounds for excluding his report under this rule – (1) it was incomplete, (2) “it reached conclusions without identifying their supporting reasoning[,]” (3) plaintiffs failed to produce all of S’s “considered facts, data, or exhibits[,]” and (4) they failed to “produce a comprehensive list of all the cases in which” he had testified. The district court reasoned that all “these grounds were proper bases for exclusion under Rule 26,” and the court agreed. Affirmed.
Removal of a trustee; MCL 700.7706(2); A breach of trust; MCL 700.7901(1); Removal pursuant to MCL 700.7706(2)(c)
The court did not find the probate court’s removal of appellant-Hardaway as trustee outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Thus, it affirmed the probate court’s order removing her as trustee and appointing appellee-Fraser as special fiduciary. Hardaway argued that “there was no statutory reason to remove her as trustee, no evidence supporting her removal, and her removal violated the terms of the trust.” The court disagreed. “The probate court found that the parties’ behavior was ‘outrageous’ and the home was sellable. [Its] findings were supported by the record.” Although the probate “court did not expressly identify any of the statutory grounds for removal identified in MCL 700.7706(2), examining the record, it is apparent that the removal was pursuant to MCL 700.7706(2)(c). Under that subsection, the court may remove a trustee if, ‘because of . . . persistent failure of the trustee to administer the trust effectively, the court determines that removal of the trustee best serves the purposes of the trust.’” There was no dispute “that the home is the primary asset in the Trust.” It was also “undisputed that Hardaway locked” appellee-King (her sibling) “out of the home one day after” the settlor of the Trust (Earnest) passed, and King “locked Hardaway out of the home several months later. The settlement agreement was entered on [12/15/23]. Relevantly, it stated that King would provide Hardaway with a key to the home, Hardaway would prepare the home for sale, Hardaway would provide a timeline for listing the home for sale, and King would be paid $80,000 from the proceeds of the sale.” It was “undisputed that the home was not listed for sale until [5/28/24]. Over five months had elapsed between the entry of the settlement agreement and the listing of the home, which was nearly one year after Earnest’s death. Hardaway had a duty to expeditiously administer the trust, but persistently failed to do so.”