Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Denial of a motion to compel arbitration; Federal Arbitration Act (9 USC § 1 et seq.); Johnson Assocs. Corp. v. HL Operating Corp.; Whether defendants waived their arbitration rights through a pre-litigation letter; Shy v. Navistar Int’l Corp.; Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams.; A pre-litigation letter distinguished from a party’s representations in other settings; Highlands Wellmont Health Network v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc.; Principle that once litigation begins a party is typically bound by its action; Kay v. Minacs Group (USA), Inc. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Eubanks v. CBSK Fin. Group, Inc.; MacDonald v. General Motors Corp.; Public policy strongly favoring settlement of disputes without litigation; Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co.; Whether plaintiff was prejudiced by the letter; Kramer v. Hammond (2d Cir.); Whether a showing of prejudice is necessary for an “express waiver”; General Star Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Administratia Asigurarilor De Stat; Gilmore v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. (2d Cir.); Gordon v. Dadante (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Policy favoring arbitration when ambiguity exists; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.
The court reversed the district court, holding that the pre-litigation letter defendants (collectively Oro) sent to plaintiff-Borror did not constitute a waiver of their right to arbitration under the parties’ contract. They entered into a property management contract that contained an arbitration clause. Oro accused Borror of breaching the contract, and sent it a letter threatening future litigation unless Borror notified Oro within six days that it preferred arbitration. Within a week after receiving the letter, Borror sued in federal court. Oro then moved for arbitration. But the district court ruled that Oro waived its contractual right to arbitration through its pre-litigation letter. The main dispute was whether that letter constituted “conduct ‘completely inconsistent’ with its arbitration rights[,]” a necessary finding to establish a waiver. The court held that it was insufficient where “letters between parties as a prelude to more formal dispute resolution is a time-honored tradition.” It noted that the purposes of the letters are varied (e.g., “puffery” or a means to express the parties’ concerns), but without knowing a party’s intentions when drafting the pre-litigation letter, it was “understandably reluctant to give those letters the same legal force as . . . representations in other settings” such as an admission during discovery. The court did not consider Oro’s letter to be “‘completely inconsistent’ with" their arbitration rights. Oro, in fact, identified in the letter “the possibility of arbitration, even if it otherwise indicated a preference for litigation. And as soon as Borror filed its complaint, Oro moved to compel arbitration.” The court concluded that any other result would deter settlements before litigation or arbitration. It also noted that Borror could not show that it was “materially prejudiced by Oro’s actions.” The court rejected Borror’s argument that prejudice need not be established when considering an “express” rather than an “implied” waiver, noting that even if this were the case, “Oro did not expressly waive its arbitration rights.” Remanded.
Claims arising from a pretrial detainee’s suicide; 42 USC § 1983; Watkins v. City of Battle Creek; “Deliberate indifference” to serious medical needs; U.S. Const. amends. VIII & XIV; Linden v. Washtenaw Cnty. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Estelle v. Gamble; Psychological needs; Horn v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Court; Comstock v. McCrary; The objective component; Farmer v. Brennan; Miller v. Calhoun Cnty.; Perez v. Oakland Cnty.; The subjective component; Downard for Estate of Downard v. Martin; Gray v. City of Detroit; Galloway v. Anuszkiewicz (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Grabow v. County of Macomb (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Nallani v. Wayne Cnty. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Effect of a prior suicide attempt while in jail; Collins v. Seeman (7th Cir.); Effect of a defendant’s failure to follow jail policy; Bonner-Turner v. City of Ecorse (Unpub. 6th Cir.); A supervisor’s liability; Winkler v. Madison Cnty.; Bellamy v. Bradley; Taylor v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr.; Gregory v. City of Louisville; A municipality’s liability; Gregory v. Shelby Cnty.; Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.; City of Canton v. Harris; Molton v. City of Cleveland; Crocker ex rel. Estate of Tarzwell v. County of Macomb (Unpub. 6th Cir.)
The court held that defendant-Cox, the jail classification officer, was improperly granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to her father’s (Troutman) serious medical needs where Cox was aware of Troutman’s prior suicide attempt but still moved him to a barred single cell without obtaining the required medical clearance. But it affirmed summary judgment for defendants-jail director (Bolton) and municipality (Louisville Metro). Troutman, a pretrial detainee, committed suicide after being placed in solitary confinement despite a prior suicide attempt in his holding cell. Plaintiff sued under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to Troutman’s serious medical needs. Records from his incarceration indicated that jail personnel were aware that he had attempted suicide in his holding cell, had attempted suicide previously, had suffered a traumatic brain injury the year before, and exhibited other suicide risk factors. After an initial clearance from medical, he was moved into the general population. But Cox placed him into a single cell after altercations with other prisoners without first obtaining medical clearance, as required. He “agreed that placing an inmate with a bedsheet in a barred solitary cell presented an opportunity for a suicidal inmate to commit suicide.” The court concluded that his “failure to follow the jail policy of waiting to receive clearance from medical may itself be considered as circumstantial evidence of Cox’s subjective knowledge.” It held that there was sufficient evidence to bring plaintiff’s claims against Cox to the jury, which can decide if, as Cox argued, he was entitled to rely on a previous medical assessment that permitted Troutman’s placement “anywhere in the jail.” But as to Bolton, the court found plaintiff’s claims that he “inadequately performed his responsibilities—for instance, by failing to put in writing the policy of requiring medical clearance before transfer to solitary—” were insufficient for § 1983 supervisory liability. As to plaintiff’s claim that Louisville Metro’s “policies and procedures were the moving force behind the denial of adequate medical care to” Troutman, the court found that Louisville Metro had policies in place, and negligence as to how they were carried out was insufficient to support liability.
Action seeking PIP benefits under the No-Fault Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq.); Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Effect of fraud on an insurance policy; Bazzi v. Sentinel Ins. Co.; Shelton v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.; Whether the misrepresentation was material; Mina v. General Star Indem. Co.; Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Michigan Comm’r of Ins.; A contracting party’s duty to understand the contract; Montgomery v. Fidelity & Guar. Life Ins. Co.; Rescission; Titan Ins. Co. v. Hyten; Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of MI v. ACE Am. Ins. Co.; Pioneer State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright; Hammoud v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.; Whether an insured may seek benefits through the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF); MCL 500.3172(1); MCL 500.3173a(1); MCL 500.3174; MCL 500.3113; Michigan Head & Spine Inst., PC v. Michigan Assigned Claims Plan; Retroactivity; Clay v. Doe; WA Foote Mem’l Hosp. v. Michigan Assigned Claims Plan
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-insurer (Progressive) summary disposition of defendant’s claim for PIP benefits, but did err by granting defendant-MAIPF’s two motions for summary disposition. Thus, it affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Plaintiff’s wife sought PIP benefits on his behalf after he was injured in an accident with an unnamed driver. After discovering plaintiff was driving her car with a suspended license when the accident occurred, Progressive declared her policy void. Plaintiff then sought PIP benefits through MAIPF, which did not assign the claim. Plaintiff sued defendants for PIP benefits, but the trial court granted summary disposition for defendants and denied his motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for Progressive because the balance of the equities favored allowing him to obtain PIP benefits under his wife’s policy. It found there was no question of material fact that his wife knew her statement on the policy (that she had disclosed all adult members of her household) was false, and that it was material. It concluded that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion by holding that the balance of the equities weighed in favor of granting Progressive’s request to rescind the policy.” However, the court agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred by granting MAIPF’s summary disposition motions. “[B]ecause the Progressive policy was void ab initio and properly rescinded, and plaintiff’s claim was not obviously ineligible for assignment, plaintiff was entitled to seek assignment of his claim for PIP benefits” through MAIPF. And because the court “has held that a plaintiff may seek PIP benefits from MAIPF if MAIPF declines to assign an otherwise valid claim to a servicing insurer, plaintiff was entitled to seek PIP benefits (as monetary damages) directly from MAIPF if it failed to assign his valid claim.”
Other acts evidence; Prior acts of domestic violence; MCL 768.27b; People v. Propp; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; People v. Cameron; People v. Mills; People v. McGuffey
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the probative value of evidence of defendant’s prior act of domestic violence against the victim was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Thus, it affirmed his convictions and sentences, but remanded for the limited purpose of correcting a clerical error in the amended judgment of sentence. He was convicted of second-degree murder, FIP of a firearm, FIP of ammunition, and two counts of felony-firearm in the shooting death of his girlfriend. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence of his prior act of domestic violence against the victim. “Defendant argues that the evidence was unduly prejudicial because it essentially portrayed him as having been violent against [the victim] in the past.” His argument simply showed “that the evidence, under the facts of this case, was prejudicial for the same reasons that it was relevant. However, that is not a basis for finding that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial.” The prosecution “focused on the proper purpose for which the evidence was admissible. Moreover, in its final instructions, the trial court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury, explaining the limited, proper use of the evidence, thereby limiting any potential for unfair prejudice.” Defendant failed to show “any basis for overcoming the presumption that the jury followed these instructions.”
Other acts evidence involving a minor; MCL 768.27a; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; People v. Watkins; Prosecutorial error; People v. Dobek; People v. Seals; Improper vouching; People v. Thomas; Presumption that jurors follow their instructions; People v. Kowalski; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Randolph; People v. Leblanc; Prejudice; People v. Fyda
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that evidence of sexual acts committed by defendant during a second period in which the victim resided in his home was admissible despite the trial court’s pretrial order excluding it. It also held that defendant was not prejudiced by an isolated improper comment from the prosecution, or by defense counsel’s failure to object. He was convicted of multiple counts of CSC I and CSC II for sexually abusing his adopted granddaughter. On appeal, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when, “rather than engaging in curative measures, it instructed both parties that they could not further address sexual acts committed by defendant during the second period that the victim resided in defendant’s home.” Not only was the evidence “admissible under MCL 768.27a, notwithstanding the prosecution’s failure to timely disclose its intentions of using such evidence, but defense counsel’s line of questioning implicitly undermined the credibility of the victim’s allegations.” Where defense counsel “opened the door, the prosecution was permitted to examine the victim about the second period of time that she resided in defendant’s home.” It also found that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The proffered “evidence and the charged conduct were similar: both occurred between defendant and the victim, in defendant’s home, while the victim was living there.” Moreover, there was a “temporal relationship between” this evidence and the charged conduct. Finally, the court found that although the prosecution “improperly vouched for the victim’s credibility by implying that she had some special knowledge of the victim’s” truthfulness, a new trial was not warranted because the comment “was not outcome-determinative, and because a curative instruction, if requested, would have alleviated any prejudice.” And it was “not reasonably probable that the outcome of the proceedings would have differed if defense counsel objected . . . .” Affirmed.
Admission of the victim’s oral statements to the police under MCL 768.27c(1); Notice requirement in MCL 768.27c(3); People v. Jurewicz; Evidence of other acts of “domestic violence”; MCL 768.27b(1); MCL 768.27b(6)(a)(i); People v. Rosa; MRE 403; People v. Cameron; People v. Watkins; Presumption jurors follow their instructions; People v. Mullins; Due process argument as to propensity evidence; Bugh v. Mitchell (6th Cir.); Admission of a diary entry by the victim; The recorded recollections hearsay exception; MRE 803(5); Denial of a directed verdict on charges of CSC I, unlawful imprisonment, & AWIGBH; MCL750.520b(1)(c); People v. Lockett; MCL 750.349b; People v. Chelmicki; “Restrain”; MCL 750.349b(3)(a); MCL 750.84(1)(b); People v. Stevens; “Strangulation or suffocation”; MCL 750.84(2); “Assault”; People v. Starks; “Battery”; People v. Reeves; Waiver; People v. Kowalski; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 3 & 10; MCL 777.33(1)(e); MCL 777.40(1)(b); People v. Needham; “Vulnerability” & “exploit”; MCL 777.40(3)(c) & (b); “Domestic relationship”; People v. Jamison
Finding that the prosecution complied with MCL 768.27c(3), the court held that there was no error in its use of the victim’s statements to the police to impeach her. It further held that other acts evidence was properly admitted under MCL 768.27b. Defendant’s claim that the victim’s diary entry was erroneously admitted under MRE 803(1) failed given that it was admitted under MRE 803(5). The court also held that his motion for a directed verdict on the CSC I, unlawful imprisonment, and AWIGBH charges was properly denied, and that OVs 3 and 10 were properly scored at 5 and 10 points, respectively. Thus, it affirmed his convictions of CSC I under MCL 750.520b(1)(c), unlawful imprisonment, AWIGBH, and domestic offense, as well as his sentences (as a second-offense habitual offender) to 14 to 25 years for CSC I, 8 to 22 years for unlawful imprisonment, 5 to 15 years for AWIGBH, and 48 days for domestic violence. While he asserted that the prosecution did not provide the 15 days’ notice of its intent to use the victim’s statements as required by MCL 768.27c(3), the record showed the prosecution disclosed the evidence months before trial, clearly meeting the requirement. The court next held that testimony about violence defendant perpetrated against his former father-in-law and ex-wife met “the threshold requirement of admissibility under MCL 768.27b . . . .” In addition, the 2009 incident was “similar to the charged crime in that it shows defendant’s propensity to resort to violence when he is displeased. The act occurred within 10 years of the charged offenses. Three separate witnesses testified to the 2009 incident making the evidence more reliable. Finally, there was need for evidence beyond the victim’s testimony” here given that she “denied much of the alleged violence committed against her when testifying at trial.” The 2016 incident was also “similar to the charged crime because both involved violence committed by defendant and directed at his romantic partner—first his then wife and later his then girlfriend.” His actions in 2016 showed “his propensity to commit domestic violence when he is angry at his romantic partner. The 2016 incident occurred only two years before the charged crimes occurred.” The trial court also gave a limiting jury instruction, and there was no due process violation in admitting this evidence.
Action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); MCL 15.232(d) & (e); Federation of Teachers & Sch. Related Pers., AFT, AFL-CIO v. University of MI; Privacy exemption; MCL 15.243(1)(a); Mager v. Department of State Police; Bradley v. Saranac Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ.; Rataj v. Romulus; Civil action exemption; MCL 15.243(1)(v); Taylor v. Lansing Bd. of Water & Light; Redaction & production of nonexempt records; MCL 15.244(1); Bitterman v. Oakley; Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Department of State Police; Abandonment of an argument on appeal; Berger v. Berger; Attorney fees & costs; MCL 15.240(6); Scharret v. Berkley; “Must”; Allard v. State Farm Ins. Co.
The court held that the trial court did not err by finding names and addresses were exempt under the FOIA, but did err by failing to order defendant-city to produce all nonexempt records. Thus, it affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Plaintiff-attorney sent a FOIA request to defendant seeking records related to vendor invoices received by defendant for services such as grass cutting, weed and debris removal, or other maintenance services for privately-held properties located in defendant’s city, including two specific properties. Defendant denied the request, indicating the records were exempt from disclosure under the FOIA’s privacy and civil action exemptions. The trial court granted partial summary disposition for defendant. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by concluding the names and addresses contained in the requested records were exempt from disclosure under the privacy exemption. While “the records themselves would demonstrate how defendant’s government operates, the specific disclosure of names and addresses of property owners would not further that understanding.” However, it remanded for entry of an order requiring defendant to produce the nonexempt portions of the records. It also found that plaintiff met his burden as to whether he was entitled to attorney fees and costs “because the lawsuit was reasonably necessary to compel disclosure, and . . . had a substantial effect on obtaining the records.” Thus, it also remanded “for determination of reasonable attorney fees and costs.”
Professional negligence claims against an architect; MCL 600.5805(13); MCL 600.5839; Broz v. Plante & Moran, PLLC; Stephens v. Worden Ins. Agency, LLC; Elements of malpractice; Simko v. Blake; Absence of a direct professional relationship; Roberts v. Salmi; Dyer v. Trachtman; Mieras v. DeBona; Requirements for a professional to be held liable to a third party for professional negligence; Beaty v. Hertzberg & Golden, PC; Obligation of every person engaged in any undertaking to use due care & not unreasonably endanger the person or property of others; Clark v. Dalman; Duty; Finazzo v. Fire Equip. Co.; When a plaintiff may assert a tort action based on a contract to which plaintiff was not a party; Fultz v. Union-Commerce Assoc.; Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co., LLC; “Intangible economic losses”; Rinaldo’s Constr. Corp. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co.; Motion to amend the complaint; Breach of contract claim as a third-party beneficiary; MCL 600.1405; Brunsell v. Zeeland; Fraudulent misrepresentation & silent fraud; Titan Ins. Co. v. Hyten; Lucas v. Awaad; Promissory estoppel; Zaremba Equip., Inc. v. Harco Nat’l Ins. Co.
The court held that the complaint did not establish the elements of professional negligence, and that plaintiffs failed to show that defendant-architect firm owed them a duty such that they could assert a tort claim based on breach of defendant’s contract with a non-party. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion to amend the complaint to add claims for breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary, fraud, and promissory estoppel. Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant and denial of the motion to amend. One of the plaintiffs hired a general contractor (non-party OYK) for a construction project. OYK in turn contracted with defendant to provide architectural services. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant owed them a duty as architects to follow all relevant codes required for the facility to be built. The court noted that the complaint did not show “that plaintiffs were engaged in a professional relationship with defendant; rather, plaintiffs allege that they contracted with OYK, who in turn contracted with defendant. Nor do plaintiffs allege circumstances that might justify the imposition of a limited duty despite the absence of a professional relationship; plaintiffs do not allege a special relationship with defendant nor the lack of another legal remedy.” However, the court noted that even outside a professional relationship, “Michigan’s common law imposes on every person an obligation to refrain from unreasonably endangering others.” Thus, it considered whether, while “plaintiffs were not a party to the professional relationship between OYK and defendant, there nonetheless existed a legal duty on the part of defendant to plaintiffs as a non-contracting third party, the breach of which could result in tort liability.” Plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s negligent performance of its architectural duties caused them economic damages “because they had to expend money to cure the defects in the design and construction of the surgical facility. Defendant’s duty, however, only included the duty to use ordinary care to avoid physical harm to foreseeable persons and property, and did not extend to intangible economic losses.” Thus, they failed to show “the type of damages that defendant had a duty to avoid to a third party[.]”
Quiet title; Beulah Hoagland Appleton Qualified Pers. Residence Trust v. Emmet Cnty. Rd. Comm’n; Invalid or absent notary’s acknowledgment; In re Duke Estate; Recording requirements; MCL 565.201(1)(c) & (5); A defective notarization where plaintiff had a good-faith belief it was properly notarized; MCL 565.603 & .604; A forged deed; Special Prop. VI, LLC v. Woodruff; Presumption signatures on a deed are valid; Boothroyd v. Engles; Overcoming this presumption; Mtynarczyk v. Zyskowski; An incorrect legal description; Sufficiency of identifying a property by its street address; Tandy v. Knox; MCL 560.255; Status as a bona fide purchaser for value; MCL 565.29; Notice of a possible interest in the property; Imputing notice of properly recorded documents to subsequent buyers; Richards v. Tibaldi; Principle that notice does not require actual knowledge; Penrose v. McCullough; The grantor-grantee indexing system; MCL 565.28(1) & (2); First Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Department of Treasury; Claim that incorrect plat & lot information rendered a deed invalid for purposes of providing notice; Distinguishing In re Brandt (WD MI); An incorrect legal description in a mortgage; In re Hudson (WD MI); Deed reformation; Johnson Family Ltd. P’ship v. White Pine Wireless, LLC; Parol evidence; Farabaugh v. Rhode
The court held that plaintiff met her burden in her quiet title action to establish a prima facie case of title to the property at issue. Further, defendant-IDG Holdings could not be considered a bona fide purchaser for value because it had constructive knowledge of facts triggering further inquiry into plaintiff’s possible interest, and such an inquiry would have revealed the conveyance to her as well as her occupancy of the property. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling quieting title in plaintiff. IDG attacked the validity of her 2015 deed, asserting that it was a bona fide purchaser when it acquired the property in 2016. It contended that she never acquired a valid interest in the property because her quitclaim “deed contained an erroneous legal description of the property, and because the grantor’s and the notary’s names were forged.” The court disagreed. It first noted there was no evidence suggesting “that plaintiff had, or should have had, any reason to believe that the named notary was not the person who actually notarized the deed.” In addition, the notarization appeared on its face “to comply with all statutory requirements. Thus, even if the notarial acknowledgement was forged, that forgery does not affect the validity of the conveyance as between the grantor and plaintiff, nor does it affect the deed’s recordability.” There also was no competent evidence that the grantor’s signature was forged. While “the deed contained an inaccurate legal description of the property, it also described the property by reference to its common address, and the evidence demonstrated that the parties intended for the deed to be operative with respect to the property at that common address. The trial court was permitted to reform the deed to comport with this intent.” The court also concluded that IDG failed to prove a superior interest in the property. Plaintiff’s deed was properly recorded, and the fact that it contained the correct address “should have induced a reasonable person to make further inquiries into the possibility of competing interests. Indeed, IDG Holding’s own evidence, a ‘DataTrace’ report, shows that plaintiff’s name appeared in the chain of title and was identified as the taxpayer of record for the property.”
Express easement dispute; Determining an easement’s purpose; Little v. Kin; Ambiguity; Royal Prop. Group, LLC v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc.; Conveyance of a right of way; Harvey v. Crane; Use of more general words; Blackhawk Dev. Corp. v. Village of Dexter; An unlimited conveyance of an easement as a grant of unlimited reasonable use; Kirby v. Meyering Land Co.; Overburdening; Bang v. Forman; Schadewald v. Brule; Schumacher v. Department of Natural Res.; The trial court’s reference to a zoning statute (MCL 125.3206(1)); Applicability of Livonia v. Department of Soc. Servs.; Easement improvements; A mere increase in the number of persons using an unlimited right of way; Henkle v. Goldenson; Principle that if a dominant estate with easement rights is divided, all resulting parcels take a share in the easement as long as an unreasonable burden is not imposed on the servient estate; Morse v. Colitti; Changes in the manner, frequency, & intensity of the grantee’s use over time; Michigan Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc.; Exclusion of extrinsic evidence; MCR 2.613(A)
While the court concluded that the trial court erred in looking to a zoning statute in a private easement dispute, it held that the error was harmless. The trial court provided multiple alternative grounds for its decision to deny plaintiffs injunctive relief and to allow defendants to expand the existing roadway’s width and grade it with gravel. The express easement at issue burdened plaintiffs’ property. Defendants planned to build four assisted-living facilities on one of the properties (the Lakeshore property) it benefited. The grant provided “for a ‘right of way,’ absent conditions or restrictive language.” Thus, the court found it could “only be reasonably construed as creating a broad easement right. It cannot plausibly be read to prohibit commercial uses or to create an easement with ingress and egress limited to particular purposes—such as single-family residential purposes—as” plaintiffs asserted. But despite its broad language, it was unambiguous, and the trial court did not err in excluding extrinsic evidence to determine its scope. While the proposed evidence may have been relevant to “whether defendants’ planned development would overburden the easement beyond what was contemplated when” it was created, the court concluded that its exclusion did not warrant relief because plaintiffs’ substantial rights were not affected. The potential evidence was cumulative. Next, in rejecting plaintiffs’ argument “that defendants’ planned facility was commercial in nature, the trial court cited MCL 125.3206(1) and Livonia . . . .” While the fact that defendants’ proposed use did not violate zoning laws was not determinative of the easement questions here, the court held that the trial court correctly determined “the deed did not limit defendants’ use of the easement to ‘residential’ purposes or prohibit ‘commercial’ activities, making it largely irrelevant whether defendants’ facility is ‘residential’ or ‘commercial’ in nature.” In addition, the basic holding in Livonia – “that a group home ‘constitutes a residential use of property’—has application to private agreements” as to property use. The court found that the trial court did not clearly err in ruling “that defendants’ subdivision of the dominant estate to build four assisted-living facilities and the associated increase in traffic on the easement did not overburden the servient estate.” Affirmed.