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Beyond redlining: The current state of housing discrimination

 
 

by Robin Wagner   |   Michigan Bar Journal

 

“We treat everyone equally because we are required to do so by the Fair Housing Act, so we did nothing wrong.”

I hear this from property managers and leasing agents defending conduct that has resulted in lawsuits and administrative actions alleging housing discrimination. This simplistic formulation most likely came from fair housing training the individual received through their employment in residential real estate management, but the takeaway — treat everyone the same — is woefully incorrect and can lead to liability, fair-minded as it sounds.

The Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 USC 3601 et seq., is arguably the most powerful and far reaching of the federal civil rights statutes passed in the 1960s,1 yet it is the least understood and utilized of the civil rights laws — housing discrimination lawsuits account for only 2% of all civil rights lawsuits filed in federal courts.2 Michigan’s civil rights acts, the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA)3 and the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PDCRA)4, also contain housing rights provisions that largely track the federal statute.5 This article introduces some features of the Fair Housing Act that make it such a powerful tool to address civil rights violations by requiring more than merely treating everyone equally.

The FHA prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, or disability.6 The law, along with its largely analogous Michigan statutes, is a remedial statute “applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and enforceable by a complete arsenal of federal authority.”7

As a remedial statute, the FHA encompasses disparate impact claims,8 provides for more generous standing than the typical federal guidelines,9 broadly defines who may be liable for discrimination to include third-party providers of services such as advertisements and tenant screening,10 and allows for fee shifting and unlimited punitive damages,11 among other features. One feature of the FHA that can lead defendants to undervalue their liability is that while the economic damages from housing discrimination may be modest, perhaps amounting to only the costs of moving or increased rent somewhere else, the discrimination by itself is the basis of the compensatory injury and is highly valued because of the remedial nature of the statute.12 It is also often misunderstood that the FHA focuses broadly, not narrowly, on residential dwellings intended to be used as homes and land and portions of buildings intended for residential use.13 This can and has included homeless shelters and residential homes for persons with disabilities, such as recovery and sober homes for individuals with substance use disorders, which are often subject to unlawful not-in-my-backyard responses from municipalities.14

One extraordinary weapon in the arsenal of federal authority created by the FHA is a national network of independent enforcement agencies that receive funding through U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development along with state funding to provide education on fair housing, process complaints of housing discrimination, and investigate fair housing violations through various means including testers — trained individuals who make inquiries on behalf of themselves and others according to specific guidelines that identify discrimination based on protected characteristics.15 Testing evidence is particularly potent in identifying discrimination that might otherwise go undetected. An individual whose apartment rental application is denied might not be able to prove by their own experience that they were turned down due to race, disability, or family status, whereas testing pairs where one person is single and the other is single with a small child, for instance, sent to inquire about available units may yield compelling evidence of discrimination based on familial status.

WHAT’S WRONG WITH TREATING EVERYONE EQUALLY?

The FHA antidiscriminatory mandates are far more nuanced than simply “treat everyone the same.” As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained, “the phrase ‘equal opportunity,’ at least as used in the FHA, is concerned with achieving equal results, not just formal equality.”16

Because the statute reaches to the “consequences of an action, rather than the actor’s intent,” it provides for disparate impact liability.17 This means, for instance, that an apartment complex’s blanket rule limiting occupancy to two individuals per bedroom can be shown to cause the consequence of having fewer families with smaller children able to rent because it tends to exclude a couple with an infant from living in a one-bedroom unit or a family of five from living in a two-bedroom unit, while governing occupancy codes only limit occupancy of bedrooms by the size of the room.18

Second, FHA violations often take the form of failures to provide accommodations or allow for modifications to a residence for persons with disabilities. This area of the law requires far more than treating people equally; rather, it affirmatively requires the housing provider — be it the landlord, homeowner, condominium association, municipality, application screener, or other entity whose conduct is covered by the FHA — to change a policy or exempt an individual with a disability from a rule or policy if doing so may be necessary to afford that person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.19 Zoning ordinances are included as rules or policies to which exceptions must be granted; this is most typically seen as relief from single-family restrictions so the home can be used as a recovery residence or group facility for individuals with disabilities.20 Service animals and emotional support animals are also considered necessary supports for individuals with disabilities and generally, it will be necessary for a housing provider to make an exception to its rules to allow these animals to ensure the person with the disability has an equal opportunity to enjoy their home.21

Third, the FHA’s broad grant of standing to any “aggrieved person” applies not only to an individual on a lease or mortgage application, but roommates, children, and anyone else who has been injured as a result of a discriminatory housing practice or believes a person is about to be injured by a discriminatory housing practice.22 This means neighbors have standing to sue a realtor who engaged in racial steering that affected the stability of their neighborhood23 and testers can sue under the FHA because the discrimination they uncovered diverted resources and obstructed the mission of organizations fighting for fair housing laws.24

Fourth, it is illegal to discriminate in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental, or in the provision of services and facilities 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b), 3604(f)(2). This section of the FHA has been broadly interpreted to apply to post-acquisition rights,25 meaning that harassment, discriminatory conduct, or failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for an individual already living in the dwelling is also covered by the FHA.

Finally, as with many other civil rights laws, it is also a violation to threaten, harass, or otherwise interfere with an individual’s rights under the act.26 This typically takes the form of a retaliation claim but can also protect a housing providers’ employee who refuses to act in an unlawful way. An example might be if the plaintiff learned their lease had not been renewed because of their race after that resident complained about inferior maintenance services.

Section § 3613(c) of the FHA provides for a broad range of remedies available in a civil lawsuit. The court can order the sale or lease of comparable housing when available or order the defendant to take steps to improve its compliance with the law such as posting fair housing signs and providing training to its staff. Actual damages in fair housing lawsuits can include any out-of-pocket costs incurred in the process such as moving and equipment rentals, mileage and transportation, and the difference in rent if a more expensive apartment was found. The law also allows for compensation for humiliation and mental anguish suffered by the victims of discrimination as well as unlimited punitive damages.27 Finally, this is a fee-shifting statute, meaning that the prevailing party may recover attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs.28

In conclusion, property managers, housing providers, and others working in areas related to residential property should be aware that fair housing rights extend far beyond just treating everyone equally.


 

ENDNOTES

  1. These laws include the Civil Rights Acts of 1960 (primarily voting rights), 1964 (public accommodations, education, and employment), 1965 (voting rights), and 1968 (housing) and their subsequent amendments. See, e.g., Constitutional Amendments and Major Civil Rights Acts of Congress Referenced in Black Americans in Congress, History, Art & Archives, US House of Representatives [https://perma.cc/BB9N-BBRV]. All websites cited in this article were accessed December 2, 2021.
  2. For the 12-month period ending March 31, 2020, 43,981 federal lawsuits were filed alleging civil rights violations and only 864 of them involved housing discrimination. By contrast, employment discrimination, including disability rights in the employment context, comprised 15,405 federal lawsuits, which was 35% of all civil rights cases filed in that period. Table C-2, US District Courts, Civil Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, US Courts (March 31, 2020), available at .uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-2/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2020/03/31> [https://perma. cc/2BX5-4R2Q].
  3. MCL 37.2101 et seq.
  4. MCL 37.1101 et seq.
  5. Currently pending before the Michigan Supreme Court is an application for leave to appeal that addresses the question of whether Michigan’s civil rights laws protect an individual’s post-acquisition housing rights. Kooman v Boulder Bluff Condominiums Units 73-123, 125-146, Inc,  Mich  ; 964 NW2d 376 (2021). The author represents the four fair housing centers in Michigan as amici curiae, supporting plaintiffs-appellants in their assertions that the housing rights sections of the ELCRA and PDCRA apply to post-acquisition violations.
  6. 42 USC 3604, amended in 1988 to apply to persons with a physical or mental impairment, with a history of such an impairment, or perceived to have a disability. The familial status protections have a carve out for senior living environments, provided that they comply with certain regulatory requirements. 24 CFR 100.300 et seq. It is also important to note that the ELCRA protects against housing discrimination based upon religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, familial status, or marital status, making it more inclusive than the FHA, MCL 37.2502, and the PDCRA applies to persons with disabilities with language similar to the FHA. Compare MCL 37.1103 with 42 USC 3602(h) and MCL 37.1502 and MCL 37.1506a with 42 USC 3604(f).
  7. Jones v Alfred H Mayer Co, 392 US 409, 417; 88 S Ct 2186; 20 L Ed 2d 1189 (1968). See also Havens Realty Corp v Coleman, 455 US 363, 380; 102 S Ct 1114; 71 L Ed 2d 214 (1982) and Eide v Kelsey-Hayes Co, 431 Mich 26, 36; 427 NW2d 488 (1988) (recognizing “the manifest breadth and comprehensive nature of” the Michigan civil rights acts).
  8. Texas Dept of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project, 576 US 519; 135 S Ct 2507; 192 L Ed 2d 514 (2015).
  9. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91, 103 n 9; 99 S Ct 1601; 60 L Ed 2d 66 (1979).
  10. 42 USC 3604 speaks to unlawful conduct but not who the actor might be, and 42 USC 3604(c) applies to anyone who “make[s], print[s], or publish[es]” any discriminatory statement or advertisement regarding a “dwelling.” Connecticut Fair Housing Ctr v CoreLogic Rental Property Solutions, 478 F Supp 3d 259 (D Conn, 2020), recently held that disparate impact liability could apply to a third-party provider of tenant screening services that was used to deny rental applications to individuals with criminal histories because of the disparate impact this screening had on people of color, who are incarcerated at disparately high rates.
  11. 42 USC 3613(c). Mortgage providers, for instance, are under increased scrutiny and facing lawsuits for refusing to lend based on a protected characteristic and providing disparate appraisals because of the race of the homeowners or potential buyers seeking the loan. For example, see Appraisals, Fair Housing Center of Central Indiana <https://www.fhcci.org/programs/education/appraisals/> [https://perma. cc/5RLN-AKG2].
  12. See, e.g., Preferred Properties, Inc v Indian River Estates, Inc, 276 F3d 790, 800 (CA 6, 2002) (upholding award of $31,500 in compensatory damages and $125,000 in punitive damages and holding that conduct subject to punitive damages need not be “egregious” because “[r]elief for discriminatory housing practices requires only that a seller be engaged in unlawful discrimination.”)
  13. 13 42 USC 3602(b).
  14. Lakeside Resort Enterprises, LP v B. of Supervisors of Palmyra Twp, 455 F 3d 154, 158-59 (CA 3, 2006) (alcohol treatment center where patients stayed for 2 weeks); Schwarz v City of Treasure Island, 544 F 3d 1201, 1214–15 (CA 11, 2008) (halfway houses); Turning Point, Inc v City of Caldwell, 74 F 3d 941 (CA 9, 1996) (homeless shelter); and Project Life, Inc v Glendening, unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, decided September 4, 2002 (Case No 011754) (boat used as a group home).
  15. Michigan has four active fair housing centers: Fair Housing Center of Metropolitan Detroit [https://perma.cc/QTZ9-UWWG]; Fair Housing Center of Southeast and Mid-Michigan [https://perma.cc/WDR5-M9MT]; Fair Housing Center of Southwest Michigan <https://www.fhcswm.org> [https://perma.cc/TCT3-X5CU]; and Fair Housing Center of West Michigan, [https://perma.cc/46FE-H53M].
  16. Smith & Lee Associates, Inc v City of Taylor, Mich, 102 F3d 781, 795 (CA 6, 1996).
  17. Texas Dept of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project, 576 US at 534.
  18. Fair Housing Enforcement — Occupancy Standards Notice of Statement of Policy, 63 Fed Reg 70256 (December 18, 1998).
  19. 42 USC 3604(f)(3)(B).
  20. Smith & Lee Associates, Inc (holding that request for a variance for a 12-person group home in a single-family home zone was reasonable accommodation).
  21. See, e.g., Anderson v City of Blue Ash, 798 F3d 338 (CA 6, 2015). See also “Assessing a Person’s Request to Have an Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair Housing Act,” US Dept of Housing and Urban Development: FHEO -202001 (January 28, 2020), p 10, available at <https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PA/ documents/HUDAsstAnimalNC1-28-2020.pdf>  [https://perma.cc/HT6A-U792]. The reason for this application of the rule is that under the law, these animals are not pets; rather, they are more like crutches, wheelchairs, or strobe light fire alarms that are directly related to therapeutic or accessibility requirements of the individual with a disability. That said, there is a growing backlash against emotional support animals because of the unfortunate boom in online prescriptions services, and these services often fail to provide the level of documentation necessary to make substantiate a legal claim. It is important to ensure that in the case of emotional support animals, there is a clear explanation provided to the housing provider for how the animal supports a specific disabling condition of the individual.
  22. 42 USC 3602(i) and Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 409 US 205; 93 S Ct 364; 34 L Ed 2d 415 (1972).
  23. Gladstone Realtors v Village of Bellwood.
  24. Havens Realty Corp v Coleman.
  25. See, e.g., Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v City of LaGrange, Georgia, 940 F3d 627, 631-33 (CA 11, 2019) (discussing cases). At the time this was written, the Michigan Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal the question of whether the PDCRA similarly applies to post-acquisition requests for reasonable accommodations and modifications. See note 4 and discussion, supra.
  26. 42 USC 3617.
  27. 42 USC 3613(c)(1).
  28. 42 USC 3613(c)(2).