Features

Proper billing of law firm charges

November 2025

by Sheldon G. Larky | Michigan Bar Journal

When law firms send clients bills, clients need to be properly charged based upon what is being done. This is especially true when a legal assistant, paralegal, secretary or clerk is doing some tasks. As stated in Missouri v Jenkins, “[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them.”¹

Here are examples which should not be billed at attorney or paralegal rates, but rather at clerical or secretarial rates:

Receiving and filing correspondence;²
Delivering, picking up and photocopying documents;³
Filing and organizing documents as well as obtaining transcripts;⁴
Sending and receiving faxes, requesting and receiving medical records, serving papers, and hand-delivering courtesy copies of filings to the courthouse;⁵
Faxing, emailing, filing, scanning, assembling and conforming;⁶
Serving amended deposition notices;⁷
Administering a complex litigation matter;⁸
Reviewing documents and helping to prepare chart exhibits;⁹
Reviewing and completing trial binders;¹⁰
Unloading and organizing trial documents;¹¹
Communicating with process servers and court reporters, preparing forms, drafting an appearance, and creating spreadsheets;¹²
Reviewing court notices; scheduling; notifying clients and counsel of deadlines; preparing filings; maintaining files; copying, printing, labeling, and emailing documents; and communicating with court staff;¹³
Communicating with opposing counsel’s secretary;¹⁴
Searching for an address or telephone number;¹⁵

Courts generally consider “purely clerical or secretarial tasks, performed by whomever, are overhead and customarily included in the attorney’s hourly fee.”¹⁶ However, this may be overcome by specifying in a retainer agreement rates for clerical and secretarial charges.

How about travel time? Generally, courts are reluctant to approve lawyer fees for traveling and have discretion to reduce or eliminate their charge whether or not the attorney actually works while traveling.¹⁷

The rationale for these tasks is none require legal knowledge.

If a law firm intends to charge for legal assistant fees, MCR 2.626 permits inclusion of a legal assistant’s time and labor who contributes nonclerical legal support under the supervision of an attorney provided the legal assistant meets one of five criteria set forth in Article I § 6 of the State Bar of Michigan Bylaws.¹⁸

As stated in Mayer, “[T]he court rules do not allow for an attorney fee award to include fees generated by a legal assistant who, rather than doing legal work under the supervision of a lawyer, is performing run-of-the-mill clerical work.”¹⁹ The legal assistant’s work must be that which has traditionally been done by an attorney.²⁰ “Because wages of legal assistants are considered fixed and MCR 2.626 does not indicate otherwise, an award for the time and labor of legal assistants’ fees cannot exceed the actual charge.”²¹

For paralegal fees the court should ask if the work was sufficiently complex to justify the efforts of a paralegal, as opposed to an employee at the next rung lower on the pay-scale ladder. To qualify, the evidence must establish: (1) that the legal assistant is qualified through education, training, or work experience to perform substantive legal work; (2) that substantive legal work was performed under the direction and supervision of an attorney; (3) the nature of the legal work that was performed; (4) the hourly rate being charged for the legal assistant; and (5) the number of hours expended by the legal assistant.²²

An example in which legal assistant fees were approved can be found in L&M Brikho’s Market, Inc v Emerson-Prew Inc, where the paralegal’s activities included a telephone conference with an expert witness and review and analysis of the file, the court saying the work would otherwise, in the absence of the paralegal, be performed by the attorney.²³

If legal assistant fees are challenged, the proponent must establish the legal assistant meets the criteria stated in MCR 2.626. Failure to do so will result in their rejection.²⁴ Simply arguing a legal assistant meets the criteria is not sufficient; there must be either live testimony or admissible documentary evidence.²⁵

What about sole practitioners who do not have an employee and are obligated to do the activities listed above? Should they charge the same fee as when legal tasks are being performed? Probably not.

It is appropriate to distinguish between legal work, in the strict sense, and investigation, clerical work, compilation of facts and statistics and other work that can often be accomplished by non-lawyers but that a lawyer may do because he has no other help available. Such non-legal work may command a lesser rate. Its dollar value is not enhanced just because a lawyer does it.²⁶

Being aware of proper legal, paralegal, legal assistant, secretarial and clerical charging is the safest way for fees being sustained and not reduced or eliminated if later challenged.

ENDNOTES

1. Missouri v Jenkins, 491 US 274, 299, n 10; 109 S Ct 2463; 105 L Ed 2d 229 (1989) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2. B & G Mining, Inc v Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 522 F3d 657, 666 (CA 6, 2008).

3. In re Meese, 907 F2d 1192, 1203 (CA DC, 1990).

4. Nadarajah v Holder, 569 F3d 906, 921 (CA 9, 2009).

5. Lilly v City of New York, 934 F3d 222, 234 (CA 2, 2019).

6. McKenna v City of Philadelphia, 582 F3d 447, 457 (CA 3, 2009).

7. Miller v Kenworth of Dothan, Inc, 117 S Supp 2d 1247 (MD Ala, 2000).

8. In re Armored Car Antitrust Litigation, 472 F Supp 1357 (ND Ga, 1979).

9. Hall v Lowder Realty Co, 263 F Supp 1352, 1365 (MD Ala, 2003).

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. Segovia v Fuelco Energy LLC, memorandum opinion and order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, issued May 28, 2021 (Case No. SA-17-CV-1246-JKP).

13. Meadows v Latshaw Drilling Co, LLC, memorandum opinion and order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, issued Jan 21, 2020 (Case No. 3:15-CV-1173-N).

14. Trotter v Columbia Sussex Corp, order of the United States District Court for the South ern Division of Alabama, issued Jan 29, 2010 (Case No. 08-0412-WS-M), slip op at 17.

15. Minter-Smith v Mukasey, order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, issued May 22, 2008 (Case No. 3:03CV1-1057-DPJ-JCS)

16. Martin v Mabus, 734 F Supp 1216, 1226 (SD Miss, 1990).

17. Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v Babcock & Wilcox Co, 526 F3d 824, 828 (CA 5, 2008).

18. BJ’s & Sons Constr Co v Van Sickle, 266 Mich App 400, 411; 700 NW2d 432 (2005); Mayer v Gregerson, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 26, 2018 (Docket No. 336850), slip op at 4.

19. Mayer, supra n 18 at 5.

20. Joerger v Gordon Food Serv, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 182; 568 NW2d 365 (1997).

21. RVP Dev Corp v Furness Golf Const, Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued Aug 3, 2024 (Docket Nos. 241125 and 241126), slip op at 10.

22. Joerger, supra n 20 at 82-183, quotation marks and citations omitted.

23. L&M Brikho’s Market, Inc v Emerson-Prew, Inc, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued Nov 13, 2007 (Docket No. 269806), slip op at 5.

24. Martin v Martin, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 20, 2021 (Docket No. 352210), slip op at 7.

25. See, e.g., Wexford Parkhomes Condo Ass’n v Kajma, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued Feb 6, 2020 (Docket No. 345611); Farmington Square Condo Ass'n v Mitan (Mitan II), unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 11, 2025 ( Docket No. 366946) slip op at 12-13.

26. Johnson v Georgia Hwy Express, Inc, 488 F2d 714, 717-718 (CA 5, 1974).

Sheldon G. Larky is a West Bloomfield ADR provider. Larky acts as a fee dispute arbitrator for the Attorney Grievance Commission and as an expert witness for justification in legal fee matters. For the State Bar of Michigan, he is a member of the Standing Committee of the Client Protection Fund, a member of the Representative Assembly and a representative to the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates.