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Judges, advocacy organizations, and maintaining public trust

 

by Delaney Blakey   |   Michigan Bar Journal

Ethical Perspective

At the heart of recently published Ethics Opinion JI-158 is a complex question. Specifically, under what circumstances may a judge hold membership in an advocacy organization without breaching their ethical duties? Specifically, the opinion considers judicial membership in the Fraternal Order of Police, but general advice on judicial membership in advocacy organizations is provided. The opinion asks whether judicial membership in advocacy organizations is consistent with a judge’s duty of impartiality under the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct (MCJC). Opinion JI-158 informs us that judicial membership in advocacy organizations may be permissible but with important caveats.

For judges, fear not! This opinion offers guidance: You don’t have to sever all community and organizational ties in order to achieve the appearance of propriety. But context matters, and you do need to think proactively about whether your affiliations could be seen as jeopardizing your impartiality. In a time when public trust in institutions is under strain, and when judges’ affiliations (personal, political, or organizational) are becoming increasingly scrutinized, an opinion like JI-158 helps clarify what is and isn’t acceptable. It emphasizes that ethical obligations for judges are not just about avoiding wrongdoing; they’re about preserving the public’s confidence in the legal system.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

In JI-158, the State Bar’s Standing Committee on Judicial Ethics addressed a set of facts involving a judge with a membership in the Fraternal Order of Police before whom police officers frequently appeared. Although that specific scenario is unique, the underlying principle is broad. The role of a judge is such that they must not only be fair, but they must also appear to be fair. Public confidence in the judiciary is the currency of legitimacy. If people believe a judge is biased (or potentially biased) because of their organizational memberships or affiliations, then the system loses credibility.

The opinion reminds us that under MCJC Canon 2, a judge must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety. Canon 2(A) requires judges to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in their integrity and impartiality, while Canon 2(B) emphasizes that judges must conduct themselves in ways that earn and maintain public trust. Canon 2(F) adds that judges must be particularly cautious about memberships in organizations that could cast doubt on their ability to act consistent with the law.

That said, the opinion makes clear that membership in a fraternal or advocacy organization is not automatically prohibited. The mere fact of belonging to such a group does not, by itself, violate the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. Judges are members of their community and should be allowed to be involved in that community. What matters is whether, under the circumstances, that membership could undermine the appearance of impartiality or otherwise conflict with the judge’s judicial duties.

Context is critical to the analysis. Factors such as how often the judge handles matters involving the organization’s interests, the nature of the judge’s role in the organization, the public positions the organization takes, and whether membership creates an obligation to support those positions all inform whether there is a concern. In short, the more the organization’s advocacy or activities intersect with the judge’s official work, the greater the risk of an appearance problem.

When there is a potential conflict, or when a judge’s membership might reasonably call their impartiality into question, the opinion advises that recusal or disclosure may be appropriate. Disclosure allows parties to make informed decisions and raise any concerns if warranted. Finally, if continued membership in an organization truly undermines a judge’s obligation under the MCJC to remain impartial, independent, and fair, withdrawal from the organization may be the responsible and necessary course of action.

SOME HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS

Scenario A: A state trial judge who handles a lot of criminal cases is an active member of the local FOP lodge. The lodge frequently lobbies for increased police powers and provides amicus briefs in criminal justice reform cases.

Here, the judge’s membership is in an organization that directly relates to many cases in their courtroom. The public might reasonably question whether the judge can adjudicate impartially when police interests (or officers) appear. According to JI-158, this membership poses a high risk of undermining confidence in the judge’s impartiality. Recusal or withdrawal is likely appropriate.

Scenario B: A circuit judge whose docket is primarily civil cases involving contract disputes, and who rarely handles any matter involving law enforcement, is a general (non-leadership) member of the FOP but has no involvement in its lobbying efforts or public policy advocacy.

This is a much lower risk scenario. The judge’s docket doesn’t overlap materially with the organization’s interests, and the judge’s role is minimal. Under JI-158, membership could be permissible because the appearance of bias is minimal, but the judge should remain mindful and consider disclosure if a case is presented where the organization’s interests are implicated.

Scenario C: An appellate judge whose work occasionally involves reviewing criminal appeals is a board member of a domestic-violence advocacy organization that actively lobbies for statutory changes and files amicus briefs.

Here, the advocacy organization takes public positions on issues that could come before the Court. JI-158 suggests that membership in such a group could cast doubt on impartiality, especially if the judge is in a leadership role, and the organization is active in arenas the court sees. The judge would need to carefully examine whether withdrawal, recusal in relevant cases, or at least disclosure is required.

Scenario D: A judge is a member of a charitable legal aid organization (non-advocacy, non-political) designed to help provide legal services to underserved populations and does not take public positions or intervene in cases.

Under JI-158, this kind of membership is more clearly allowed. Indeed, the MCJC even contemplates that judges can “serve as a member, officer or director of an organization…devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice” Canon 4(A)(3). The judge should still review whether the organization appears frequently in the judge’s court, whether the judge refers cases to the organization, and other similar concerns, but the likelihood that such membership would be ethically permissible is high.

PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR JUDGES

JI-158 doesn’t say, “judges... must never join advocacy organizations.” It says, “be careful, be thoughtful, evaluate the facts, and in some cases, recusal or withdrawal from the organization may be appropriate.” Drawing on JI-158, here are some practical questions for judges evaluating their own organizational memberships:

  • Does the organization take public stances on legal/political issues?
    If yes, that amplifies the risk that membership might lead to the appearance of impropriety.
  • How often do those issues come before you or your court?
    If you frequently rule on cases that relate to the organization’s interests, the possibility of bias (or perception thereof) increases. A judge who hears many police-related cases is in a very different situation from a judge hearing civil contract disputes. The opinion explicitly draws this distinction.
  • What role do I have in the organization?
    Passive membership is less risky than leadership, sponsorship, lobbying, or public advocacy. The more visible and influential the role, the higher the risk.
  • Does my membership create an obligation to support that organization’s positions?
    If membership implies ongoing advocacy or a public stance, that may conflict with a judge’s obligation to remain independent and impartial. Further, holding a leadership or lobbying role in the organization may increase ethical concerns.
  • If risk is present, consider disclosure and/or recusal.
    Even if full withdrawal isn’t necessary, transparency helps maintain public confidence. Don’t wait until someone raises a question of propriety. Sometimes, simply disclosing the membership is not enough — recusal might be needed. The judge must evaluate whether their ability to be impartial might reasonably be questioned.
  • If the risk is serious, consider withdrawing from the organization.
    If the membership really undermines the ability to appear impartial, the judge may need to step away from the organization. If the membership is deeply tied to the judge’s docket or involves activities that overlap with court cases, stepping away from the group may be the cleanest route to preserving trust.

THE BOTTOM LINE

Judges often belong to professional associations, service clubs, community groups, and fraternal organizations as part of civic engagement. These memberships aren’t inherently problematic. But as society becomes more aware of organizational affiliations, judges are under growing scrutiny about whether their private associations might influence their judicial work. The topic arises especially in hot-button or politically charged areas. For example, if a judge is a member of an organization that takes a strong stance on abortion, gun rights, law enforcement oversight, drug policy, or other public policy issues, scrutiny may be more intense.

In sum, judges are part of their community. They can, and should be encouraged to, belong to organizations, engage in civic life, and have affiliations just like everyone else. But because judges hold a unique role in our system of justice, their affiliations carry extra weight. JI-158 reminds us that it’s not just about being fair but also about appearing fair and sending a strong message of impartiality and integrity to the public.

If a judge’s membership in a fraternal or advocacy group creates the appearance of bias or actual bias, especially when the group’s mission overlaps with the judge’s docket or the judge holds a leadership role, then ethical issues arise. The responsible path is for the judge to evaluate, disclose, recuse if needed, and withdraw from the organization when appropriate. Context and public perception matter enormously. The judiciary’s legitimacy depends not just on what judges do but also on how their associations reflect on the fairness of the system they serve.