The Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions solicits comment on the following proposal by August 1, 2026. Comments may be sent in writing to Christopher M. Smith, Reporter, Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions, Michigan Hall of Justice, P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909-7604, or electronically to MCrimJI@courts.mi.gov.

PROPOSED

The Committee proposes a new instruction, M Crim JI 20.38d (Child Sexually Abusive Activity - Causing or Allowing Without Producing Materials) to address violations of MCL 750.145c that do not involve possessing, creating, or distributing child sexually abusive material. See People v Willis, 322 Mich App 579 (2018), lv den 504 Mich 905 (2019). This instruction is entirely new.

[NEW] M Crim JI 20.38d

Child Sexually Abusive Activity – Arranging for Without Producing Materials

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of arranging for a child to engage in sexually abusive activity. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant [arranged for / financed] a child under 18 years old to engage in child sexually abusive activity [or (attempted / prepared / conspired) to do so].¹

(3) Child sexually abusive activity includes
 

[Choose any of the following that apply:]²

(a) sexual intercourse, which is genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal penetration, whether the intercourse is real or simulated, and whether it is between persons of the same or opposite sex, or between a person and an animal, or with an artificial genital, [and / or]

(b) erotic fondling, which is the touching of a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, female breasts, or the developing or undeveloped breast area of a child for the purpose of sexual gratification or stimulation of any person involved, but does not include other types of touching, even if affectionate, [and / or]

(c) sadomasochistic abuse, which is restraining or binding a person with rope, chains, or any other kind of binding material; whipping; or torturing for purposes of sexual gratification or stimulation, [and / or]

(d) masturbation, which is stimulation by hand or by an object of a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, female breasts, or the developing or undeveloped breast area of a child for sexual gratification or stimulation, [and / or]

(e) passive sexual involvement, which is watching, drawing attention to, or exposing someone to persons who are performing real or simulated sexual intercourse, erotic fondling, sadomasochistic abuse, masturbation, sexual excitement, or erotic nudity for the purpose of sexual gratification or stimulation of any person involved, [and / or]

(f) sexual excitement, which is the display of someone’s genitals in a state of stimulation or arousal, [and / or]

(g) erotic nudity, which is showing the genital, pubic, or rectal area of someone in a way that tends to produce lewd or lustful emotions.

(4) Second, that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the person was less than 18 years old or failed to take reasonable precautions to determine whether the person was less than 18 years old.³
 

[Add the following paragraph if appropriate:]⁴

(5) Third, that the child sexually abusive activity involved

 

[Choose any of the following that apply:]

(a) a child who has not yet reached puberty, or

(b) sadomasochistic abuse, which [I have already defined / is restraining or binding a person with rope, chains, or any other kind of binding material; whipping; or torturing for purposes of sexual gratification or stimulation], or

(c) sexual acts between a person and an animal,5 or

(d) a video or more than 100 images of child sexually abusive material.

 

Use Notes

1. Use bracketed language only where the defendant is charged with “attempt[ing] or prepar[ing] or conspir[ing] to arrange for . . . or finance any child sexually abusive activity . . . .” See MCL 750.145c(2).
2. The statute prohibits both real and simulated sexual acts. Where the acts are simulated, the instructions should be modified accordingly.
3. The statute lists several alternatives for this element of the offense in MCL 750.145c(2), (3), and (4):
   . . . if that person knows, has reason to know, or should reasonably be expected to know that the child is a child or that the child sexually abusive material includes a child or that the depiction constituting the child sexually abusive material appears to include a child, or that person has not taken reasonable precautions to determine the age of the child.
   Generally, the language of the instruction will suffice. However, in appropriate cases, the court may select some or all of the other statutory language for this element.
4. Paragraph (5) applies when the prosecution seeks the enhanced sentence set forth in MCL 750.145c(2)(b). It need not be given when sadomasochistic abuse is the only type of child sexually abusive activity being alleged because, in that scenario, the jury will have already found the facts pertaining to the sentence enhancement.
5. MCL 750.145c uses the term bestiality but does not define it. In People v Carrier, 74 Mich App 161, 165-166; 254 NW2d 35 (1977), the Michigan Court of Appeals indicated that bestiality encompasses sexual acts between a man or woman and an animal. These acts are not limited to anal copulation.

PROPOSED

The Committee proposes a new instruction, M Crim JI 36.9 (Soliciting a Person to Commit Prostitution) to address the crime set forth in MCL 750.448. This instruction is entirely new.

[NEW] M Crim JI 36.9

Soliciting a Person to Commit Prostitution

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of soliciting, accosting, or inviting another person to commit prostitution or any other lewd or immoral act. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant intentionally communicated with [identify person] verbally, by gesture, or by any other means.

(3) Second, that when communicating with [identify person], the defendant proposed that [identify person] commit [an act of prostitution / a lewd act].
[Prostitution means performing sexual acts for money or for anything of value. / A lewd act is conduct that is sexual in nature and is shocking to the sensibilities of a reasonable person, is outside of reasonable societal standards of decency, and would be offensive to a reasonable person.]

(4) Third, that when the defendant communicated with [identify person], [he / she] did so [in a public place / in or from a building / in or from a car].
[A public place is anywhere that people are generally allowed to be without being given permission.]

(5) Fourth, that the defendant was at least 16 years old when [he / she] proposed the [act of prostitution / lewd act].

[Use the following paragraph only if the defendant was under 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offense:]¹
(6) Fifth,² that the defendant was not forced or coerced into proposing the [act of prostitution / lewd act]. You may, but you do not have to, infer from the defendant’s youth that [he / she] was forced or coerced into committing the offense by another person engaged in human trafficking.³

Use Notes

1. For a violation of MCL 750.448 committed by a defendant under 18 years of age, MCL 750.451(6) establishes a presumption that the defendant was forced or coerced into committing the offense by another person engaged in human trafficking in violation of MCL 750.462a et seq. The prosecution may overcome this presumption by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person was not forced or coerced into committing the offense.
2. Do not read this paragraph if the state petitioned the family division of the circuit court to find the defendant to be dependent and in danger of substantial physical or psychological harm under MCL 712A.2 but the defendant failed to substantially comply with court-ordered services. In this scenario, the defendant is not eligible for the presumption under MCL 750.451(6).
3. Human trafficking for purposes of MCL 750.451(6) refers to the crimes set forth in MCL 750.462a–.462h. If appropriate, the jury should be instructed on the relevant form of human trafficking. See M Crim JI 36.1–36.6.

PROPOSED

The Committee proposes a new instruction, M Crim JI 38.7 (Obtaining Blueprint or Security Plan to Commit a Terrorist Offense) to address the crime set forth in MCL 750.543r. This instruction is entirely new.

[NEW] M Crim JI 38.7

Obtaining Blueprint or Security Plan to Commit a Terrorist Offense

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of obtaining [a blueprint / an architectural or engineering diagram / a security plan / (identify type of plan or diagram)] to commit a terrorist offense. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant obtained or possessed [a blueprint / an architectural or engineering diagram / a security plan / (identify type of plan or diagram)] of [identify vulnerable target].¹

(3) Second, that when the defendant obtained or possessed the [blueprint / architectural or engineering diagram / security plan / (identify type of plan or diagram)] of [identify vulnerable target], [he / she] intended to

[Select from the following according to the charges and evidence:]²

(a) commit the crime of [identify violent felony]³ [which I have previously described to you / knowing that it would be dangerous to human life and trying to use intimidation or coercion on civilians or to influence or affect the conduct of the government].⁴

(b) commit the crime of hindering prosecution of terrorism [which I have previously described to you / by intentionally assisting a person to commit an act of terrorism or aiding someone who is wanted as a material witness in connection with an act of terrorism].⁵

(c) commit the crime of soliciting or providing material support for an act of terrorism [which I have previously described to you / by providing, raising, soliciting, or collecting resources, documents, equipment, facilities, substances, property, assets, or materials to commit an act of terrorism].⁶

(d) commit the crime of making a threat to commit an act of terrorism [which I have previously described to you / by communicating a threat to commit an act of terrorism to another person].⁷

(e) commit the crime of making a false threat to carry out an act of terrorism [which I have previously described to you / by making a false statement that an act of terrorism had occurred, was occurring, or would occur].⁸

(f) commit the crime of using the Internet to disrupt government or public institutions [which I have previously described to you / by using the Internet or a telecommunications device or system or other electronic device or system to disrupt the functions of the public safety, educational, commercial, or governmental operations within this state].⁹

Use Notes

1. Whether a specific building or location is a vulnerable target appears to be a matter of law. The court may use the name of the vulnerable target instead of its generic description when instructing the jury, e.g., “City Hall” instead of “a building . . . operated by . . . a local unit of government” or “The First Presbyterian Church” instead of “a church . . . or other place of religious worship.” MCL 750.212a(2) describes vulnerable target:

(2) As used in this section, “vulnerable target” means any of the following: (a) A child care center or day care center as defined in section 1 of 1973 PA 116, MCL 722.111.

(b) A health care facility or agency as defined in section 20106 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.20106.

(c) A building or structure open to the general public.

(d) A church, synagogue, mosque, or other place of religious worship.

(e) A public, private, denominational, or parochial school offering developmental kindergarten, kindergarten, or any grade 1 through 12.

(f) An institution of higher education.

(g) A stadium.

(h) A transportation structure or facility open to the public, including, but not limited to, a bridge, a tunnel, a public highway, or a railroad.

(i) An airport. As used in this subdivision, “airport” means that term as defined in section 2 of the aeronautics code of the state of Michigan, 1945 PA 327, MCL 259.2.

(j) Port facilities. As used in this subdivision, “port facilities” means that term as defined in section 2 of the Hertel-Law-T.

Stopczynski port authority act, 1978 PA 639, MCL 120.102.

(k) A public services facility. As used in this subdivision, “public services facility” means any of the following facilities whether publicly or privately owned: (i) A natural gas refinery, natural gas storage facility, or natural gas pipeline.

(ii) An electric, steam, gas, telephone, power, water, or pipeline facility.

(iii) A nuclear power plant, nuclear reactor facility, or nuclear waste storage facility.

(l) A petroleum refinery, petroleum storage facility, or petroleum pipeline.

(m) A vehicle, locomotive or railroad car, aircraft, or watercraft used to provide transportation services to the public or to provide for the movement of goods in commerce.

(n) A building, structure, or other facility owned or operated by the federal government, by this state, or by a political subdivision or any other instrumentality of this state or of a local unit of government.

2. Generally, this offense will be paired with another crime found in the Anti-Terrorism Act, and the court will provide the elements of that other offense. If not, use the second option found in each of the following paragraphs.

3. MCL 750.543b(h) provides that a violent felony is one that has an element of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against an individual, or of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a harmful biological substance, a harmful biological device, a harmful chemical substance, a harmful chemical device, a harmful radioactive substance, a harmful radioactive device, an explosive device, or an incendiary device. Whether alleged felonious conduct amounts a “violent felony” appears to be a matter for the court to determine.

4. MCL 750.543b(a), .543f; M Crim JI 38.1.

5. MCL 750.543h; M Crim JI 38.2.

6. MCL 750.543k; M Crim JI 38.3, 38.3a.

7. MCL 750.543m; M Crim JI 38.4.

8. MCL 750.543m; M Crim JI 38.4a.

9. 9. MCL 750.543p; M Crim JI 38.5.

PROPOSED

The Committee proposes new jury instructions for four election-related crimes found in MCL 168.932(b): M Crim JI 43.4 (Unauthorized Opening of a Ballot Box or Voting Machine), M Crim JI 43.4a (Damaging or Destroying a Ballot Box or Voting Machine), M Crim JI 43.4b (Possessing, Concealing, or Withholding a Ballot Box or Voting Machine), and M Crim JI 43.4c (Adding or Removing Ballots or Voting Totals in a Ballot Box or Voting Machine). These instructions are entirely new.

[NEW] M Crim JI 43.4

Unauthorized Opening of a Ballot Box or Voting Machine

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of unauthorized opening of a ballot box or voting machine. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant [broke open / violated the seals of / violated the locks of] a [ballot box / voting machine]. [A ballot box is a container used for transporting and storing voted ballots. / A voting machine is a system or device by which votes are recorded and counted.]¹

(3) Second, that the [ballot box / voting machine] was in use during the [identify election and year].

(4) Third, that the defendant [broke open / violated the seals of / violated the locks of] the [ballot box / voting machine] [during the progress of the (identify election and year) / after the closing of the polls in the (identify election and year) but before the final results of that election had been determined].

(5) Fourth, that when the defendant [broke open / violated the seals of / violated the locks of] the [ballot box / voting machine], [he / she] did not have the legal authority to do so.

Use Note

The Michigan Election Law chapter does not define ballot box or voting machine. However, MCL 168.24j categorizes ballot box as a type of ballot container, which MCL 168.14a(a) defines as “a container that is used for transporting and storing voted ballots[.]” Additionally, MCL 168.794 provides definitions for electronic tabulating equipment, electronic voting system, and voting device, among other terms.

[NEW] M Crim JI 43.4a

Damaging or Destroying a Ballot Box or Voting Machine

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of damaging or destroying a [ballot box / voting machine]. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant damaged or destroyed a [ballot box / voting machine]. [A ballot box is a container used for transporting and storing voted ballots. / A voting machine is a system or device by which votes are recorded and counted.]¹

(3) Second, that when the defendant damaged or destroyed the [ballot box / voting machine], [he / she] acted willfully. Willfully means that the defendant knowingly created the danger and intended to cause damage or destruction.

Use Note

The Michigan Election Law chapter does not define ballot box or voting machine. However, MCL 168.24j categorizes ballot box as a type of ballot container, which MCL 168.14a(a) defines as “a container that is used for transporting and storing voted ballots[.]” Additionally, MCL 168.794 provides definitions for electronic tabulating equipment, electronic voting system, and voting device, among other terms.

[NEW] M Crim JI 43.4b

Possessing, Concealing, or Withholding a Ballot Box or Voting Machine

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of [possessing / concealing / withholding] a [ballot box / voting machine]. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant [possessed / concealed / withheld] a [ballot box / voting machine]. [A ballot box is a container used for transporting and storing voted ballots. / A voting machine is a system or device by which votes are recorded and counted.]¹

(3) Second, that when the defendant [obtained possession of / concealed / withheld] the [ballot box / voting machine], [he / she] did not have the authority to do so.

Use Note

1. The Michigan Election Law chapter does not define ballot box or voting machine. However, MCL 168.24j categorizes ballot box as a type of ballot container, which MCL 168.14a(a) defines as “a container that is used for transporting and storing voted ballots[.]” Additionally, MCL 168.794 provides definitions for electronic tabulating equipment, electronic voting system, and voting device, among other terms.

[NEW] M Crim JI 43.4c

Adding or Removing Ballots or Voting Totals in a Ballot Box or Voting Machine

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of adding or removing ballots or voting totals in a ballot box or voting machine. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant [added to / subtracted from] the [number of ballots legally deposited in the ballot box / totals on the voting machine]. [A ballot box is a container used for transporting and storing voted ballots. / A voting machine is a system or device by which votes are recorded and counted.]¹

(3) Second, that when the defendant [added to / subtracted from] the [number of ballots legally deposited in the ballot box / totals on the voting machine], [he / she] acted forcibly or fraudulently.

Use Note

The Michigan Election Law chapter does not define ballot box or voting machine. However, MCL 168.24j categorizes ballot box as a type of ballot container,” which MCL 168.14a(a) defines as “a container that is used for transporting and storing voted ballots[.]” Additionally, MCL 168.794 provides definitions for electronic tabulating equipment, electronic voting system, and voting device, among other terms.

The Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions has adopted amendments to M Crim JI 15.14 (Reckless Driving), M Crim JI 15.14a (Reckless Driving Causing Death or Serious Impairment of a Body Function), and M Crim JI 15.15 (Moving Violation Causing Death or Serious Impairment of a Body Function) for improved readability and greater consistency with the statutes defining these offenses. The proposed changes were inspired by Footnote 7 in People v Fredell, ___ Mich ___ (December 26, 2024) (Docket No. 164098). The amended instructions are effective September 1, 2026.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 15.14

Reckless Driving

(1) [The defendant is charged with the crime of / You may also consider the lesser charge of¹] reckless driving. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant operated² a vehicle³ on a highway [or a frozen public lake, stream, or pond] or other place open to the general public [including but not limited to any designated parking area].⁴

(3) Second, that the defendant operated the vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Willful or wanton disregard means more than simple carelessness but does not require proof of an intent to cause harm. It means knowingly disregarding the possible risks to the safety of people or property.

Use Notes

1. Use when instructing on this crime as a lesser included offense.
2. The terms operate and operating are defined in MCL 257.35a.
3. The term vehicle is defined in MCL 257.79.
4. A highway is the entire area between the boundary lines of a publicly maintained roadway, any part of which is open for automobile travel. People v Bartel, 213 Mich App 726, 728- 729; 540 NW2d 491 (1995). The phrase “open to the general public” is discussed in People v Nickerson, 227 Mich App 434; 575 NW2d 804 (1998), and People v Hawkins, 181 Mich App 393; 448 NW2d 858 (1989).

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 15.14a

Reckless Driving Causing Death or Serious Impairment of a Body Function

(1) [The defendant is charged with the crime of / You may also consider the lesser charge of ¹] reckless driving causing [death / serious impairment of body function to another person]. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant operated² a vehicle³ on a highway [or a frozen public lake, stream, or pond] or other place open to the general public [including but not limited to any designated parking area].⁴

(3) Second, that the defendant operated the vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Willful or wanton disregard means more than simple carelessness but does not require proof of an intent to cause harm. It means knowingly disregarding the possible risks to the safety of people or property.

(4) Third, that the defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused [the death of (name deceased) / (name injured person) to suffer a serious impairment of a body function⁵]. To cause the [death / injury], the defendant’s operation of the vehicle must have been a factual cause of the [death / injury], that is, but for the defendant’s operation of the vehicle, the [death / injury] would not have occurred. In addition, the [death / injury] must have been a direct and natural result of operating the vehicle.⁶

Use Notes

1. Use when instructing on this crime as a lesser included offense.
2. The terms operate and operating are defined in MCL 257.35a.
3. The term vehicle is defined in MCL 257.79.
4. A highway is the entire area between the boundary lines of a publicly maintained roadway, any part of which is open for automobile travel. People v Bartel, 213 Mich App 726, 728- 729; 540 NW2d 491 (1995). The phrase “open to the general public” is discussed in People v Nickerson, 227 Mich App 434; 575 NW2d 804 (1998), and People v Hawkins, 181 Mich App 393; 448 NW2d 858 (1989).
5. The statute, MCL 257.58c, provides that serious impairment of a body function includes but is not limited to one or more of the following:

(a) Loss of a limb or loss of use of a limb.
(b) Loss of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb or loss of use of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb.
(c) Loss of an eye or ear or loss of use of an eye or ear.
(d) Loss or substantial impairment of a bodily function.
(e) Serious visible disfigurement.
(f) A comatose state that lasts for more than 3 days.
(g) Measurable brain or mental impairment.
(h) A skull fracture or other serious bone fracture.
(i) Subdural hemorrhage or subdural hematoma.
(j) Loss of an organ.

6. If it is claimed that the defendant’s operation of the vehicle was not a proximate cause of serious impairment of a body function because of an intervening, superseding cause, the court may wish to review People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 438-439; 703 NW2d 774 (2005) (a “causes death” case under MCL 257.625(4)). Schaefer was modified in part on other grounds by People v Derror, 475 Mich 316; 715 NW2d 822 (2006), which was overruled in part on other grounds by People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184; 783 NW2d 67 (2010).

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 15.15

Moving Violation Causing Death or Serious Impairment of a Body Function

(1) [The defendant is charged with the crime / You may consider the lesser charge¹] of committing a moving traffic violation that caused [death / serious impairment of a body function]. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant operated a vehicle.² To operate means to drive or have actual physical control of the vehicle.³

(3) Second, that the defendant operated the vehicle on a highway or other place open to the general public [including but not limited to any designated parking area].⁴

(4) Third, that, while operating the vehicle, the defendant committed a moving violation by [describe the moving violation].

(5) Fourth, that by committing the moving violation, the defendant caused [the death of (name deceased) / (name injured person) to suffer a serious impairment of a body function⁵]. To cause the [death / injury], the defendant’s moving violation must have been a factual cause of the [death / injury], that is, but for committing the moving violation, the [death / injury] would not have occurred. In addition, the [death / injury] must have been a direct and natural result of committing the moving violation.⁶

Use Notes

1. Use when instructing on this crime as a lesser offense.
2. The term vehicle is defined in MCL 257.79.
3. The terms operate and operating are defined in MCL 257.35a.
4. A highway is the entire area between the boundary lines of a publicly maintained roadway, any part of which is open for automobile travel. People v Bartel, 213 Mich App 726, 728- 729; 540 NW2d 491 (1995). The phrase “open to the general public” is discussed in People v Nickerson, 227 Mich App 434; 575 NW2d 804 (1998), and People v Hawkins, 181 Mich App 393; 448 NW2d 858 (1989).
5. MCL 257.58c provides that serious impairment of a body function includes but is not limited to one or more of the following:

(a) Loss of a limb or loss of use of a limb.
(b) Loss of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb or loss of use of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb.
(c) Loss of an eye or ear or loss of use of an eye or ear.
(d) Loss or substantial impairment of a bodily function.
(e) Serious visible disfigurement.
(f) A comatose state that lasts for more than 3 days.
(g) Measurable brain or mental impairment.
(h) A skull fracture or other serious bone fracture.
(i) Subdural hemorrhage or subdural hematoma.
(j) Loss of an organ.

6. If it is claimed that the defendant’s operation of the vehicle was not a proximate cause of serious impairment of a body function because of an intervening, superseding cause, the court may wish to review People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 438-439; 703 NW2d 774 (2005) (a “causes death” case under MCL 257.625(4)). Schaefer was modified in part on other grounds by People v Derror, 475 Mich 316; 715 NW2d 822 (2006), which was overruled in part on other grounds by People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184; 783 NW2d 67 (2010).

The Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions has adopted amendments to M Crim JI 20.24 in response to People v Levran, ___ Mich App ___ (December 3, 2024) (Docket No. 370931). The amended instruction is effective September 1, 2026.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 20.24

Definition of Sufficient Force

[Choose any of the following that are applicable:]

(1) It is enough force if the defendant overcame [name complainant] by physical force.

(2) It is enough force if the defendant threatened to use physical force on [name complainant], and [name complainant] believed that the defendant had the ability to carry out those threats.

(3) It is enough force if the defendant threatened to get even with [name complainant] in the future, and [name complainant] believed that the defendant had the ability to carry out those threats.

(4) It is enough force if the defendant threatened to kidnap [name complainant], or threatened to force [name complainant] to do something against [his / her] will, or threatened to physically punish someone, and [name complainant] believed that the defendant had the ability to carry out those threats.

(5) It is enough force if the defendant was giving [name complainant] a medical exam or treatment and did so in a way or for a reason that is not recognized as medically acceptable. A medical exam or treatment that includes inserting fingers into the vagina or rectum is not in itself criminal sexual conduct. You must decide whether the defendant did the exam or treatment in a manner or for purposes that are not recognized as medically ethical or acceptable.¹

(6) It is enough force if the defendant, through concealment or by the element of surprise, [was able to overcome / achieved sexual contact with]² [name complainant].

(7) It is enough force if the defendant used force to induce the victim to submit to the sexual act or to seize control of the victim in a manner facilitating commission of the sexual act without regard to the victim’s wishes.

Use Notes

1. See People v Levran, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (December 3, 2024) (Docket No. 370931).

2. Use the bracketed expression “achieved sexual contact with” when criminal sexual contact in the fourth degree is charged. See MCL 750.520e(1)(b)(v).

The Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions has adopted amendments to M Crim JI 37.11 that add a missing mens rea element and make other stylistic changes. The amended instruction is effective September 1, 2026.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 37.11

Removing, Destroying, or Tampering with Evidence

(1) [The defendant is charged with / You may also consider the less serious offense of1] intentionally removing, altering, concealing, destroying, or tampering with evidence to be offered at an official proceeding [not involving a criminal case where (identify crime where the punishment was more than 10 years) was charged¹]. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that there was some evidence to be offered in a present or future official proceeding.

An official proceeding is a hearing held before a legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental agency, or a hearing held before an official authorized to hear evidence under oath, including a referee, a prosecuting attorney, a hearing examiner, a commissioner, a notary, or another person taking testimony in a proceeding.

(3) Second, that the defendant removed, altered, concealed, destroyed, or otherwise tampered with that evidence.

(4) Third, that when the defendant removed, altered, concealed, destroyed, or otherwise tampered with that evidence, [he / she] did so on purpose and not by accident.

(5) Fourth, that the defendant knew that the evidence would be offered in a present or future official proceeding at the time [he / she] removed, altered, concealed, destroyed, or otherwise tampered with it.²

[(6) Fifth, that the evidence would be offered in a criminal case where (identify crime where the punishment was more than 10 years) was charged.]³

Use Notes

1. Use this language when there is a dispute whether the charge involved the aggravating factor found in MCL 750.483a(6)(b) and the court is instructing the jury on the necessarily lesser included offense that does not require proof of the aggravating factor.
2. The Michigan Court of Appeals has assumed without deciding “that the word ‘knowingly’ in the statute likely includes knowledge of an official proceeding.” People v Walker, 330 Mich App 378, 388; 948 NW2d 122 (2019). The Michigan Court of Appeals has also indicated that this element “may be proved with ‘[m]inimal circumstantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 301; 642 NW2d 417 (2001)).
3. Use this paragraph where the aggravating element has been charged.