Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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42 USC § 1983; Qualified immunity & summary disposition standards; False arrest; Malicious prosecution; Monell v Department of Soc Servs claim
Applying the “ordinary” standards for summary judgment to the two-step qualified immunity analysis, the court affirmed summary judgment for defendant-Deffendoll on plaintiff-Alford’s false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims, holding that Deffendoll had probable cause to both arrest and charge him. Officers Deffendoll and defendant-Smith stopped Alford’s vehicle, resulting in three state drug charges. He was jailed and his parole revoked before the charges were dismissed. Alford sued the officers and defendant-county under § 1983, asserting claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution against the officers and a Monell claim against the county. The district court granted all defendants summary judgment. On appeal, the court explained that “the Supreme Court has instructed that ordinary summary-judgment standards apply at both steps” of the qualified immunity inquiry. As to the false arrest claim, the court held that Deffendoll had “probable cause to arrest Alford for simple possession of heroin” under Tennessee law. While Alford claimed, among other things, that the drugs belonged to his passenger, the drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in the vehicle’s cab. “A reasonable officer could have concluded that” he and his passenger jointly possessed the items. The claim against Smith failed “because, as the district court found, Alford did not adequately demonstrate that Smith was an arresting officer.” Next, although the district court erred by applying an incorrect analysis for determining probable cause in the context of a malicious prosecution claim, the court agreed that Deffendoll was entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because he had probable cause to charge Alford under Tennessee law. It also held that Alford’s Monell claim failed where there was no constitutional violation.
Rezoning application denial; 42 USC § 1983 action alleging a “regulatory taking”; Penn Cent Transp Co v City of NY; Substantive due process claim; Rational relationship to a public purpose
The court affirmed summary judgment for defendant-City of Worthington on plaintiff-Lifestyle Communities’ claim that the City committed a “regulatory taking” by denying Lifestyle’s rezoning application, holding that the claim failed under the Penn Central factors. Lifestyle bought property in the City, intending to build a mix of residential and commercial spaces. The City did not approve the development plan or the request to rezone. Lifestyle sued under various theories, but the district court ruled for the City on all claims. On appeal, as to the regulatory-taking claim, the court assumed without deciding that Lifestyles had a cognizable property interest. It then applied the Penn Central factors and held that the district court did not err in granting the City summary judgment. As to the economic impact of the regulation factor, “even a significant loss of property value, absent more, will not suffice to prove a taking.” As to the distinct investment-backed expectations factor, the City never promised Lifestyle “it would approve development consistent with the Comprehensive Plan.” Further, circumstances showed “that broad compliance with the Comprehensive Plan would be necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve rezoning approval. And even if the” City Council approved the “development, a referendum could still reverse that decision. Given this context, a reasonable investor would not expect that approval from Worthington and its residents was guaranteed.” The final factor, the character of the government action, also weighed against Lifestyle. The City’s actions did “not resemble a physical invasion” and also had “legitimate public purposes. Among other reasons,” City residents opposed Lifestyle’s “proposal due to its lack of greenspace and increased traffic to the area. Both are legitimate public purposes.” Further, there was no “unreasonable delay.” The court found that Lifestyle “may have suffered a loss in property value and had to endure a fairly typical bureaucratic waiting period. But as a matter of law, this is insufficient to establish a regulatory taking.” As to the dismissal of its due process claim, a “‘local zoning ordinance survives a substantive due process challenge if there exists a rational relationship between the terms of the ordinance and a legitimate governmental purpose.’” The complaint did not plausibly allege the property’s current zoning “bears ‘no rational relationship to any public purpose.’”
Search & seizure; Motion to suppress drug evidence found in defendant’s car; Whether an officer’s order for defendant to exit his vehicle was used as a “pretext” for a canine search; Katz v United States; United States v Jones; Whether the evidence should have been excluded based on issues with the chain of custody; Denial of an evidentiary hearing on the chain of custody claim
The court affirmed the district court’s denial of defendant-Fellmy’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. It held that he was not unlawfully seized when asked to exit his vehicle during a lawful stop, and that any contact the police dog made with his car during an open-air sniff for drugs was “incidental” and did not constitute a search under Jones. Police received an anonymous tip that Fellmy had drugs in his car. When he failed to use a blinker, an officer stopped him and made him exit the car. A drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs. He was charged with possession of meth with intent to distribute. The district court denied his motion to suppress, and a jury convicted Fellmy. He argued that the drug evidence should have been suppressed because he was seized when ordered to exit his car as a “pretext” for a canine search. But the court explained that an order to exit a vehicle is allowable during a lawful stop, and the “officers’ subjective motivation doesn’t matter.” Fellmy admitted that he committed a traffic violation; thus, the police stop was lawful. He next argued that the dog sniff constituted an unconstitutional search. But the court concluded the officers did not “perform a search under Katz. Officers don’t violate a driver’s reasonable expectation of privacy when they walk a trained drug dog around a lawfully stopped car to sniff for drugs.” The court noted that the officers didn’t instruct the dog to put her nose into the car, and the district court found that she leaned toward the already open window instinctively to sniff. She “merely made incidental contact with the car while performing the challenged sniffs.” The court also held that the dog’s “conduct in performing the free-air sniff around Fellmy’s vehicle didn’t constitute a search under Jones.” Thus, it concluded “the officers didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of [the dog’s] brief contact with Fellmy’s car during her open-air sniff for drugs.” The court also rejected his argument that the evidence should have been excluded based on issues with the chain of custody. Differences in the weight of the drugs reflected “that the drugs’ packaging was changed at various stages while weighed in police custody and testing.” And his motion for a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the issue was properly denied where he failed to offer any evidence of tampering in his motion.
Medical malpractice; Expert admissibility; MRE 702; Danhoff v Fahim; Reliability of expert methods; MCL 600.2955; Edry v Adelman; Daubert gatekeeping; Chapin v A & L Parts, Inc; Competing expert interpretations
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding plaintiff’s family-medicine expert under MRE 702. Decedent went to the ER in 2016 with breathing difficulty, and a CT showed “focal airspace consolidation” with differential considerations including “pulmonary infarct or focal pneumonia.” He was treated for pneumonia, improved within days, and later was diagnosed with lung cancer “in the same area” about two years later and died. The trial court granted defendants summary disposition after excluding plaintiff’s only standard-of-care expert, Dr. T, reasoning his opinion was unreliable because he relied on experience and “common sense” and the literature did not support him. On appeal, the court held that the trial court’s reliability analysis improperly treated the Daubert hearing as “a judicial search for truth,” and reiterated that a court’s gatekeeping role is “to filter out expert evidence that is unreliable,” not to “admit only evidence that is unassailable,” because “the courts are not in the business of resolving scientific disputes.” The court also concluded other materials were enough to show Dr. T’s view was “rationally derived from a sound foundation,” even if defendants’ experts “value[d] the available research differently” and “ascribe[d] different significance to that research.” Because Dr. T’s testimony was admissible, plaintiff was not left without expert proof on the standard of care, and the summary disposition order could not stand. Reversed and remanded.
Removal under the federal officer removal statute (28 USC § 1442(a)(1)); Motion to remand to state court; Whether defendants were persons who acted under a federal officer & could invoke the statute; The Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA)
The court held that defendants-Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs) were entitled to have plaintiff-State of Ohio’s claims relating to prescription drug pricing practices removed to federal court under the federal officer removal statute. Ohio sued several healthcare firms under Ohio law for allegedly conspiring to drive up prescription drug prices, engaging in unlawful pharmaceutical clawbacks and fee adjustments, and for violating the state’s antitrust statute. Defendants removed the case to federal court under § 1442(a)(1), but the district court remanded the case to state court. On appeal, the court first held that defendants were entitled to invoke the statute because they were persons “acting under an officer of the United States.” The Office of Personnel Management has broad administrative and rulemaking authority over the health insurance program for federal employees created by the FEHBA. “The Office mandates many of the terms in” PBM subcontracts with private carriers “and controls the PBMs’ conduct as a result.” The court concluded that this “contractual control satisfies the statute’s ‘act[ing] under’ prong when the PBMs negotiate with drug manufacturers.” While Ohio contended its complaint challenged “only the PBMs’ conduct with respect to non-federal clients[,]” the court noted that “when the PBMs bargain with drug manufacturers and pharmacies, they conduct a single negotiation on behalf of all of their clients.” The court found that because “the targeted negotiations were handled holistically . . . the complaint necessarily targets federal conduct.” It also determined that the complaint challenged “conduct ‘for or relating to’ an ‘act under color of [federal] office.’” The conduct Ohio sought to regulate “has a straightforward ‘connection or association’ with the work that the PBMs perform for the carriers and the Office of Personnel Management to further the agency’s FEHBA duties.” In addition, the court found that defendants offered “a pair of plausible federal preemption defenses.” Reversed and remanded.