Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Motion to vacate an arbitration award; Whether res judicata & collateral estoppel precluded plaintiff’s personal protection insurance (PIP) claim; Whether the PIP claim could have been resolved at the trial on uninsured or underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits
Holding that the arbitration panel and the trial court did not err in concluding that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not preclude plaintiff’s PIP claim, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion to vacate the arbitration award and granting plaintiff’s motion to enforce it. “Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident after he was allegedly struck by an unidentified hit-and-run driver who fled the scene.” He sued defendants, who insured his vehicle, for PIP benefits and UM/UIM “benefits. The parties agreed to arbitrate plaintiff’s PIP claim, while his UM/UIM claim proceeded to trial. A jury” found that he was not entitled to UM/UIM benefits. The arbitration panel awarded him “damages for his PIP claim, rejecting defendants’ arguments that the UM/UIM verdict precluded the PIP claim under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.” As to the former, the court found that it was illogical to conclude the “PIP claim could have been resolved at the UM/UIM trial given that both parties agreed to resolve the PIP claim in arbitration. Indeed, plaintiff initially brought both . . . claims in the same action before the trial court ordered the claims be split, consistent with the parties’ arbitration agreement. Defendants” did not explain how he “could have resolved the PIP claim during the UM/UIM case after the trial court ordered the parties to arbitrate the PIP claim. Thus, [his] PIP claim was not barred by res judicata.” As to collateral estoppel, the court found that the verdict did “not address an essential question of plaintiff’s PIP claim; i.e., whether any accident occurred as a result of [his] use of his motor vehicle, or whether [he] was injured. Instead, the jury only determined that plaintiff was not hit by a hit-and-run vehicle whose owner and operator could not be identified—an element that was only required in the UM/UIM case. Because a question of fact essential to [his] PIP claim was not actually litigated and determined by the judgment in the UM/UIM case, collateral estoppel does not apply.”
Legal malpractice; Proximate cause; Charles Reinhart Co v Winiemko; Summary disposition; Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.119(F)(3); Motion to amend the complaint; Failure to submit any written proposed amendments; Motions to compel discovery & responses to subpoenas; Failure to attach a copy of the proofs of service to the motion
The court held that the trial court did not err in ruling no genuine issue of material fact existed and that plaintiff “failed to establish the proximate-cause element” of her legal malpractice claim. Further, it did not err in denying her motions for reconsideration, to amend the complaint, and to compel discovery and responses to subpoenas. Defendant had represented plaintiff in a divorce case. Plaintiff’s claim was based “on the theory that defendant had failed to adequately investigate” her ex-husband’s (S) ownership interests in certain businesses (DR Novi and DRS). The court found that she failed to establish “any error in the trial court’s determinations or in its ultimate ruling that summary disposition was appropriate. To prove that [S] had a previously undisclosed ownership interest in DRS, plaintiff relied on her expert’s affidavit and checks [S] received from bank accounts belonging to” two entities. But the founder (H) of DRS Novi and DRS explained that “the names on the bank accounts from which the checks were drawn . . . were divisions within DR Novi, not within DRS. Although that organizational structure is confusing, no evidence contradicts the statement in [H’s] affidavit that those checks came from a department of DR Novi.” Thus, they were not evidence that S “had an ownership interest in DRS.” The court concluded that “plaintiff’s expert’s affidavit does not create a genuine issue of material fact. The expert’s opinion rested on the fact that [S] received checks from DRS,” but the trial court correctly determined that this “opinion was based on ‘the incorrect assertion . . . that the checks received by [S] were drawn on a DRS account.’ [It] then concluded that because the expert’s opinion was predicated on incorrect facts, it did not create a genuine issue of material fact on” proximate cause. Precedent supported that conclusion. The court held that the trial court was correct “that there was no genuine issue of fact as to [S’s] lack of ownership interest in DRS.” Given that plaintiff’s claim depended on S having “an undisclosed ownership interest in DRS and so the divorce settlement was inequitable, the trial court did not err” in granting defendant summary disposition. Further, the divorce judgment’s “disclosure of assets” provision, which enabled “plaintiff to reopen the divorce case and pursue the division of any hidden assets,” showed that she did not suffer any injury. Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Stipulation to join the two cases for trial; Joinder; Reliance on People v Tobey & People v Daughenbaugh; MCR 6.120(C); MCR 6.120(B)(1)(b) & MCR 6.120(B)(2)
The court held that “because defendant’s absconding and possession charges were related under MCR 6.120(B), his trial counsel’s stipulation to join the two cases for trial did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. And even if it did,” he could not show that it was “reasonably probable that the outcome of the charges against him would have been different but for the stipulation.” Thus, he did “not overcome the strong presumption that he received effective assistance of counsel.” He was convicted of meth possession and absconding on bond. He believed that “had his trial counsel objected—rather than stipulated—to the joinder of his cases, MCR 6.120 would have required the trial court to sever them.” In support, he relied primarily on Tobey and Daughenbaugh. “But those matters are no longer good law—our Supreme Court has expressly held that MCR 6.120 superseded Tobey, and similarly ‘reject[ed] the analysis of Daughenbaugh in accordance with the plain language of MCR 6.120.’” The court found that even “looking past this void in defendant’s argument, MCR 6.120(C) does not mandate separate trials in this case.” The court noted that his “absconding case arose directly out of his bond condition violation—i.e., his failure to appear—in the possession case. As such, the two offenses were based on a series of connected acts under MCR 6.120(B)(1)(b). What is more, [he] does not claim, nor does the record indicate, that any other relevant factor weighed against joinder.” Thus, joinder of the two cases was “appropriate under MCR 6.120(B). Because ‘[f]ailing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,’ defendant has thus failed to overcome the strong presumption that his trial counsel’s assistance was effective.” The court added that even “assuming the cases should have remained separate under MCR 6.120(C) and that defense counsel’s stipulation to the joinder fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” under the circumstances, defendant could not establish “the outcome would have been different.” In arguing to the contrary, he noted “that the prosecution did not file a notice of intent to use other-acts evidence as required under MRE 404(b)(3).” But he did not provide any “legal authority indicating that the prosecution needed to do so once the cases were joined, nor that its failure to do so would necessarily render misjoinder prejudicial.” Finally, he offered “no explanation as to why the jury instructions here were insufficient to cure any misjoinder-related error.” Affirmed.
Search & seizure; Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act (interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications); 18 USC § 2518(10)(a)(i); Standing for a motion to suppress evidence; “Aggrieved person” (§ 2510(11)); Waiver or forfeiture of an argument
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.]. The court held that defendant-Liggins did not have standing for his motion to suppress evidence based on an improperly obtained Arizona wiretap where he was not an “aggrieved person” under Title III. A jury convicted him of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute illegal narcotics (including at least 100 grams of heroin) and aiding and abetting another person in possessing with the intent to distribute at least 100 grams of heroin at his first trial. On remand for a new trial, he moved to suppress cash, heroin, and testimony on the basis the wiretap obtained by the Arizona officers to monitor another individual’s communications violated the federal wiretap laws. After his motion was denied, he conditionally pled guilty, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. The government did “not dispute that Arizona authorities violated Title III’s procedures when they obtained a wiretap order.” Title III allows an “aggrieved person” to move to suppress an illegally intercepted communication’s contents or evidence derived from it. The issue was whether Liggins qualified as an aggrieved person. The court first rejected his claim that the government waived or forfeited the argument that he did not, holding that it had issued a “general remand in the first appeal” that reopened “all issues for a fresh round of proceedings before a new judge.” Additionally, the court concluded the government did not waive or forfeit anything. Turning to the merits, it considered whether Liggins qualified as an “aggrieved person” under §§ 2510(11). It noted that “circuit courts have split over the meaning of this definition.” It concluded that it did not need to “choose between the competing legal approaches because Liggins would not qualify as an ‘aggrieved person’ under any view.” It noted he “did not ‘participate[]’ in the calls[,]” and no evidence suggested that they “took place ‘on his premises’ or that they used his cellphones.” In addition, “nothing in the wiretap application, order, or anything else suggested that Liggins was one of the ‘targets’ of the investigation.” Affirmed.
Absolute immunity from civil liability; The Child Protection Law (MCL 722.625); Beauford v Lewis; Spikes v Banks; Martin v Children’s Aid Soc’y; Amendment of the complaint; Open discovery
The trial court did not err in granting summary disposition in favor of defendant-Alternatives for Children and Families (a foster child placement agency) and in denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. It also did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition before the close of discovery. Defendant purportedly placed “plaintiff’s decedent, nine-year-old OH, . . . a special needs child with non-verbal autism,” in R’s foster home. Plaintiff claimed that this placement occurred despite knowledge of R’s “history of failing to supervise children in her care.” Also, it was asserted that R “did not receive any training in how to supervise a child with autism. [R] purportedly took OH to a party [], where she allegedly left him to roam without supervision, despite their presence near a lake. Six days later, OH’s body was recovered from the lake. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in failing to train, educate, and license foster homes and parents.” Defendant claimed it was entitled to absolute immunity. In Beauford, Spikes, and Martin, the court “determined that ‘advisors and agents’ of the family court were entitled to absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out of their work. This holding was warranted because the family court proceeding allowed for a sufficient remedy for any wrongful action by the social worker. And this holding was supported by policy; it was designed to grant social workers the freedom to honestly address a situation without the threat of civil litigation.” Plaintiff contended “that the trial court erred because it concluded that social workers were entitled to absolute immunity in light of their ‘status’ without regard to whether their actions or omissions were governed by absolute immunity.” The court noted that “the trial court expanded or altered its view that ‘status’ was the primary consideration and correctly denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration in light of the facts and circumstances of the decisions addressing absolute immunity.” Plaintiff next contended “that the trial court erred in ‘extending’ social worker absolute immunity to defendant because there was no evidence of ‘close oversight’ by the family court of defendant’s training of foster parents and its placement of a special needs child.” The court found that “even plaintiff recognized that a petition was filed to remove OH and his siblings from their parents’ care. With regard to OH, the parents did not obtain services for his autism. OH was sent to school with poorly-fitting, dirty clothes. He did not have appropriate footwear for the inclement weather conditions. School staff tried to aid OH because he was being bullied by his peers for his poor hygiene and body odor.” On 2/23/15, “the family court ordered CPS to take the children into protective custody, and the children were placed with DHHS for care and supervision. DHHS contracted with defendant to provide services including placement and supervision. And defendant prepared a report dated [6/1/15], delineating OH’s placement and indicating that he was happy. Plaintiff presented no documentation or affidavits from the participants or attorneys in the family court proceeding to reflect that the court did not review the materials submitted.” Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Placement with relatives; Guardianship under MCL 722.875b; Barriers to reunification; Child’s best interests
Concluding that § (c)(i) existed and that the trial court did not err by finding termination was in child-AJD’s best interests, the court affirmed. The initial disposition occurred on 2/15/24 and the trial court terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights on 5/1/25. “The time between these dates exceeds 182 days.” Thus, the first requirement of § (c)(i) was satisfied. According to the petition, her “initial barriers to reunification included her substance use, emotional stability, and unstable housing. Although respondent participated in various forms of substance abuse therapy throughout the case, she tested positive for Xanax twice and for meth[] 17 times. [She] also repeatedly refused to take accountability for her substance abuse, only admitting to using [meth] one time in 2024 and claiming that every other positive drug screen was a false positive.” The trial court did not err by concluding that she “had not addressed her substance abuse issues by the time of termination.” It also did not err by finding that her “emotional instability was still a barrier to reunification.” And it did not err by finding her “unstable housing situation was still a barrier to reunification.” Finally, the trial court did not err by holding “that there was no reasonable likelihood that these conditions would have been rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” Respondent argued “that the trial court should have given her more time to address her barriers to reunification.” Given her “unstable housing, continued emotional instability, consistent positive drug tests, and refusal to take accountability for her substance use, the trial court did not” err in “finding by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s barriers to reunification continued to exist.”
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (j); No reasonable likelihood that conditions leading to adjudication will be rectified; Reasonable likelihood of harm; Incarceration status; Child’s best interests; Ability to keep the child safe; Parent-child bond; Need for permanence, stability, & finality; Relative placement; Guardianship
Holding that §§ (c)(i) and (j) existed and that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the child’s (TRP) best interests, the court affirmed. There “was clear and convincing evidence that 182 days elapsed since the issuance of the initial dispositional order, and [the father] failed to rectify the conditions that led to the adjudication.” Moreover, there was “evidence from which the trial court could conclude that the conditions that brought TRP into care would not be rectified within a reasonable time.” The court held that considering “that TRP had already been a court ward for 3½ years, expecting him to wait several more years for respondent to work on services would be unreasonable.” Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence to terminate his rights under § (c)(i). Also, considering “the totality of the record, there is clear and convincing evidence from which the court could conclude that TRP would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care after [he] was released from prison.” Given the “record, the trial court did not err when it found clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights under” § (j). The court found that it was “speculative to conclude that TRP would be safe in [his] care because they would be under the watchful eye of the paternal grandmother.” The record also showed that his “incarceration was not the sole reason, or even the main reason, that the [trial] court terminated his parental rights. Indeed, [it] stated that it was not terminating [his] parental rights because of his incarceration.” Based on the evidence, it “correctly found that that there existed clear and convincing evidence that respondent was given a treatment plan and, during the years TRP was in care, respondent had opportunity to participate in services but failed to do so.” In addition, “the trial court reasonably found that the ability to keep TRP safe was a factor that weighed in favor of terminating” his rights. It also disagreed “that the trial court improperly weighed the existence of a parent-child bond.” The court further concluded that the trial court “appropriately considered TRP’s need for permanence, stability, and finality and found that these factors weighed in favor of” termination. The trial court additionally “weighed several factors and then appropriately found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination was in TRP’s best interests despite the fact that he was placed with a relative.” Finally, it “did not err in declining to implement a guardianship.”