Become a mentor! The Mentor Center needs experienced attorneys to offer support & advice to young attorneys.
 
  • News and Moves

    Robert J. Andretz
    Michael P. Ashcraft Jr.
    Andrew W. Barnes
    Mohammad G. Beydoun
    Jeffrey Bullard Jr.
    John R. Colip
    Jennifer E. Consiglio
    Matthew S. Derby
    Zachary J. Diederichs
    Mowitt (Mitt) S. Drew III
    Jennifer Dukarski
    William M. Engeln
    Jordan D. Florian
    Audrey J. Forbush
    Fraser Trebilcock Davis Dunlap & Cavanaugh P.C.
    Andrew S. Gipe
    Michael F. Golab
    Michael D. Hanchett
    Laura E. Johnson
    Garett Koger
    Bill Lentine
    Scott K. Lites
    MDTC
    Daniel P. Makarski
    Fadee A. Nakkash
    Sarah L. Nirenberg
    Amber D. Peters
    Rachel Roseman
    Kelly L. Travis

 

Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.

 

 

Case Summary


Cases appear under the following practice areas:

  • Attorneys (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Insurance

    e-Journal #: 78943
    Case: Maurer v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Patel, Borrello, and Shapiro
    Issues:

    First-party action for PIP benefits; Attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1); Moore v Secura Ins; Ross v Auto Club Group; Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.119(F)(3)

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court did not err in ruling that defendant-insurer (Farm Bureau) unreasonably refused to pay plaintiff-Maurer the PIP benefits in dispute, and in awarding plaintiff her attorney fees pursuant to MCL 500.3148(1). She was in an accident in 2000 and underwent surgery in 2002 as a result. Defendant paid for that surgery. Plaintiff asserted “she improved for a time after the surgery, but then her symptoms worsened. She relied on pain medication for years. Ultimately, she underwent another surgery in 2018. Farm Bureau refused to pay the expenses that Maurer incurred for continued pain management, the 2018 surgery, and post-surgical attendant care.” Plaintiff filed this action and a jury found in her favor. The trial court then determined defendant “unreasonably withheld PIP benefits,” and ordered it to pay plaintiff $54,820 in attorney fees. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in doing so and in denying its motion for reconsideration. The court disagreed. Defendant relied on reports from two of its own doctors (O and M) to whom it sent plaintiff for exams. The court found that the failure of O and M “to offer anything more than conclusory statements and recommendations distinguishes this case from the cases” cited by defendant. The court concluded a reasonable fact-finder could determine that an insurer would not rely on O’s and M’s “reports to justify refusing all payments associated with Maurer’s care because the assessments were conclusory, ignored significant medical evidence to the contrary,” including imaging evidence, “and were contrary to the opinions of Maurer’s treating physicians.” During the litigation, defendant compelled plaintiff to undergo another medical exam by another of its own doctors, a neurosurgeon (K), and it cited K’s opinion that the 2018 surgery was unrelated to the accident. But the court noted that K “did not examine Maurer until 2019, which was after Farm Bureau had already made the decision to stop paying for Maurer’s care. So Farm Bureau could not have relied on his opinion at the time of its decision.” Thus, the court found the trial court did not clearly err in giving K’s testimony “little weight in assessing whether Farm Bureau acted reasonably at the time when it cut Maurer off from all payments for her care.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Criminal Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 78945
    Case: People v. Brewer
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Gleicher, K.F. Kelly, and Letica
    Issues:

    Sentencing; Scoring of 50 points for PRV 1 & 25 points for OVs 1 & 3; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failing to provide mitigating evidence at sentencing

    Summary:

    In these consolidated appeals, the court held that the trial court did not clearly err by assessing 50 points for PRV 1, and 25 points for OVs 1 and 3. Also, defendant did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel. He pled guilty to armed robbery, first-degree home invasion, unlawful imprisonment, AWIGBH, and felony-firearm. He argued “the trial court erroneously assessing 50 points for OV 1 because his two previous felonies were not adult convictions, but juvenile adjudications. His previous armed robbery and first-degree home invasion convictions “from 2013 were the previous high-severity felonies the trial court relied on to assess 50 points for PRV 1.” They carried “the same liabilities as any other adult conviction.” Thus, the trial court properly considered them as previous high-severity felony convictions, and the trial court did not err by assessing 50 points for PRV 1. Defendant also argued the trial court erroneously assessed 25 points for OV 1 because the prosecutor did not show his use of a weapon was aggravated. Though the evidence showed he "did not possess a weapon during the armed robbery and despite the fact that neither [F or M] were convicted of armed robbery or scored for OV 1 at the time of defendant’s sentencing, the trial court did not err by assessing 25 points for OV 1. The sentencing guidelines do not require that the other offenders in MCL 777.31(2)(b) be identified, charged, and convicted before any other offenders may be assessed points under OV 1.” The court found the fact that “defendant was the first offender identified, charged, and convicted of the armed robbery" was irrelevant for the purposes of scoring OV 1. Between his “testimony and the PSIR, there was a preponderance of evidence to find that [M] discharged a firearm at a human being in the course of the armed robbery. OV 1 requires all offenders who participated in the crime to receive the same score, without regard to whether the offenders were prosecuted or convicted. The trial court properly determined that a firearm was discharged at a human being in a multiple offender case." Thus, the trial court did not err by assessing 25 points for OV 1. Lastly, he argued “the trial court erroneously assessed 25 points for OV 3 because the PSIR did not demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that a life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to a victim.” Defendant contested whether D’s injuries “were life threatening or permanent. At his plea hearing, defendant did not admit to the occurrence of any injury. There were no medical records nor a victim-impact statement introduced at sentencing to establish that a life threatening or permanent injury occurred. The only record evidence" that even remotely pertained to the victim’s injuries was the PSIR. Defendant contended, “however, the PSIR alone does not show by a preponderance of the evidence that a life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to” D. From the evidence, “the trial court was permitted to infer that the bullet’s location caused paralysis, a life threatening or permanently incapacitating injury.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Insurance (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Attorneys

    e-Journal #: 78943
    Case: Maurer v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Patel, Borrello, and Shapiro
    Issues:

    First-party action for PIP benefits; Attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1); Moore v Secura Ins; Ross v Auto Club Group; Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.119(F)(3)

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court did not err in ruling that defendant-insurer (Farm Bureau) unreasonably refused to pay plaintiff-Maurer the PIP benefits in dispute, and in awarding plaintiff her attorney fees pursuant to MCL 500.3148(1). She was in an accident in 2000 and underwent surgery in 2002 as a result. Defendant paid for that surgery. Plaintiff asserted “she improved for a time after the surgery, but then her symptoms worsened. She relied on pain medication for years. Ultimately, she underwent another surgery in 2018. Farm Bureau refused to pay the expenses that Maurer incurred for continued pain management, the 2018 surgery, and post-surgical attendant care.” Plaintiff filed this action and a jury found in her favor. The trial court then determined defendant “unreasonably withheld PIP benefits,” and ordered it to pay plaintiff $54,820 in attorney fees. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in doing so and in denying its motion for reconsideration. The court disagreed. Defendant relied on reports from two of its own doctors (O and M) to whom it sent plaintiff for exams. The court found that the failure of O and M “to offer anything more than conclusory statements and recommendations distinguishes this case from the cases” cited by defendant. The court concluded a reasonable fact-finder could determine that an insurer would not rely on O’s and M’s “reports to justify refusing all payments associated with Maurer’s care because the assessments were conclusory, ignored significant medical evidence to the contrary,” including imaging evidence, “and were contrary to the opinions of Maurer’s treating physicians.” During the litigation, defendant compelled plaintiff to undergo another medical exam by another of its own doctors, a neurosurgeon (K), and it cited K’s opinion that the 2018 surgery was unrelated to the accident. But the court noted that K “did not examine Maurer until 2019, which was after Farm Bureau had already made the decision to stop paying for Maurer’s care. So Farm Bureau could not have relied on his opinion at the time of its decision.” Thus, the court found the trial court did not clearly err in giving K’s testimony “little weight in assessing whether Farm Bureau acted reasonably at the time when it cut Maurer off from all payments for her care.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Litigation (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Municipal

    e-Journal #: 78940
    Case: Salem Springs SE, LLC v. Superior Charter Twp.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Yates, Jansen, and Servitto
    Issues:

    Mandamus; Southfield Educ Ass’n v Board of Educ of Southfield Pub Sch; Local governmental authorities’ right to “reasonable control” of highways, streets, alleys, & public places; Const 1963, art 7, § 29; Mootness; Declaratory relief

    Summary:

    In this case involving access to wastewater treatment, the court held that plaintiff-Salem Springs and defendant/cross-plaintiff--Salem Township (the Township) did not satisfy any of the four mandamus elements, making dismissal of their mandamus claims proper. But it reversed the dismissal of Salem Township’s claim for declaratory relief, which was based on mootness, and remanded as to that claim. Salem Township sought to construct a sewer line under a road in a county road commission right of way that “would traverse almost the entirety of” defendant-Superior Township. Salem Township submitted a permit application to construct the sewer line within Superior Township. When Superior Township did not process the application, Salem Springs (which owned land in Salem Township it was seeking to develop) filed this action. The trial court later dismissed the mandamus claims as moot. The court concluded it did so based “on the erroneous belief that the only relief Salem Springs and the Township sought with respect to their mandamus claims was to have the Superior Township defendants render a decision on the permit application.” It determined that Salem Township and Salem Springs “presented a controversy, to wit: they believe they have a right to have the Township’s permit application approved when Superior Township denied it. The trial court is the appropriate forum to determine whether that is true. Thus ‘mootness’ was not the appropriate basis on which to dismiss the mandamus claims.” However, the claims failed on the merits. As to the first two mandamus elements, the court held that Salem Springs and Salem Township “had a right to have the permit application considered under the standards set forth in” Superior Township’s ordinance, “and it was considered under those standards. The Superior Township defendants had a duty to consider the application under the standards adopted in the ordinance” and did so in denying the permit application. As to the third element, the court found that judgment calls were involved here as opposed to a ministerial act. As to the final element, Salem Springs and Salem “Township could have sought to amend their complaints, and/or could have left their substantive due process claims active instead of dismissing them. There was thus an alternative remedy available to them.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Municipal (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Litigation

    e-Journal #: 78940
    Case: Salem Springs SE, LLC v. Superior Charter Twp.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Yates, Jansen, and Servitto
    Issues:

    Mandamus; Southfield Educ Ass’n v Board of Educ of Southfield Pub Sch; Local governmental authorities’ right to “reasonable control” of highways, streets, alleys, & public places; Const 1963, art 7, § 29; Mootness; Declaratory relief

    Summary:

    In this case involving access to wastewater treatment, the court held that plaintiff-Salem Springs and defendant/cross-plaintiff--Salem Township (the Township) did not satisfy any of the four mandamus elements, making dismissal of their mandamus claims proper. But it reversed the dismissal of Salem Township’s claim for declaratory relief, which was based on mootness, and remanded as to that claim. Salem Township sought to construct a sewer line under a road in a county road commission right of way that “would traverse almost the entirety of” defendant-Superior Township. Salem Township submitted a permit application to construct the sewer line within Superior Township. When Superior Township did not process the application, Salem Springs (which owned land in Salem Township it was seeking to develop) filed this action. The trial court later dismissed the mandamus claims as moot. The court concluded it did so based “on the erroneous belief that the only relief Salem Springs and the Township sought with respect to their mandamus claims was to have the Superior Township defendants render a decision on the permit application.” It determined that Salem Township and Salem Springs “presented a controversy, to wit: they believe they have a right to have the Township’s permit application approved when Superior Township denied it. The trial court is the appropriate forum to determine whether that is true. Thus ‘mootness’ was not the appropriate basis on which to dismiss the mandamus claims.” However, the claims failed on the merits. As to the first two mandamus elements, the court held that Salem Springs and Salem Township “had a right to have the permit application considered under the standards set forth in” Superior Township’s ordinance, “and it was considered under those standards. The Superior Township defendants had a duty to consider the application under the standards adopted in the ordinance” and did so in denying the permit application. As to the third element, the court found that judgment calls were involved here as opposed to a ministerial act. As to the final element, Salem Springs and Salem “Township could have sought to amend their complaints, and/or could have left their substantive due process claims active instead of dismissing them. There was thus an alternative remedy available to them.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Negligence & Intentional Tort (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 78947
    Case: Thomas v. City of Warren
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – M.J. Kelly and Swartzle; Dissent - Boonstra
    Issues:

    Premises liability; Buhalis v Trinity Continuing Care Servs; A premises possessor’s duty protect an invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land; Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc; Open & obvious danger; Joyce v Rubin; Effect of lighting; Abke v Vandenberg; Knight v Gulf & W Props, Inc

    Summary:

    Holding that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the hazardous condition on defendant-landlord’s (Kane Real Estate Investments 2) property was open and obvious, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendant, and remanded. Plaintiff-Thomas sued defendant for an injury she sustained as she was leaving her friend’s house. Her friend was renting the home from defendant. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant. On appeal, the court disagreed with the trial court’s analysis. “Having considered the evidence regarding the darkness, the lack of adequate lighting, and the affect of both on the visibility of the 2-inch lip” between the rental property’s driveway and the sidewalk before and after plaintiff “stubbed her toe, we conclude that there is a genuine question of material fact with regard to whether the allegedly hazardous condition was open and obvious at the time of the incident.” It noted that defendant failed to provide any evidence refuting plaintiff’s testimony, including the testimony of its witnesses, which created “no factual question with regard to whether the condition would be visible upon casual inspection at night and whether the lighting conditions in the area were adequate to illuminate the hazard.” Further, although there was evidence to “support a finding that the lip would be visible upon causal inspection in the dark, it does not directly refute Thomas’s testimony that it was too dark to see the 2-inch lip before or after she stubbed her toe on it.” Thus, because the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, “the non-moving party, there is a genuine question of material fact with regard to the visibility level of the allegedly hazardous condition.”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Probate (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Wills & Trusts

    e-Journal #: 78944
    Case: In re Estate of Broemer
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Cavanagh, O’Brien, and Rick
    Issues:

    Dispute over the distribution of an unsigned will; Petition to admit the will under MCL 700.2503; Jurisdiction & standing; Whether appellant was an “interested party”; MCL 700.1105(c); MCR 5.125; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Due process; Duckett v Solky

    Summary:

    The court held that the probate did not err by denying appellant’s objection to the distribution and administration of the decedent’s estate. The probate court granted appellees’ petition to admit the decedent’s unsigned will, and the estate was divided three ways among them. Appellant and other purported heirs later objected, and a settlement agreement was reached allowing the will to stand and providing a lump sum to be distributed among the other heirs. The probate court approved the settlement. Appellant’s daughter (other-party-VanPoppelen) objected, but the probate court denied the objection. On appeal, the court first found that the probate court properly denied the objection on the basis of VanPoppelen’s lack of standing to raise it, albeit for the wrong reason. It then rejected appellant’s argument that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel by the deficient performance of attorney-C, the attorney for the represented heirs, and that she was denied due process and the opportunity to object to the admission of the will because she did not have access to the Zoom hearings. It noted that she provided “no authority to support the assertion that she was entitled to appointed counsel or that counsel was appointed to represent her.” In addition, there was no evidence “to support appellant’s contention that she was denied access” to the proceedings, and she “failed to establish that she was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Termination of Parental Rights (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 78948
    Case: In re Clifton
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Patel, Cameron, and Letica
    Issues:

    Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Child’s best interests

    Summary:

    Concluding § (c)(i) existed and the trial court did not clearly err in holding that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest, the court affirmed. “The primary condition that led to adjudication was respondent’s physical assault on the child, but other conditions were respondent’s failure to address the child’s medical issues and the child’s home environment.” While there was evidence he “had made some progress in therapy and shared a bond with the child, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the evidence supported termination” under § (c)(i). The court determined that respondent “could not meet his minimum parental responsibilities, never progressed to unsupervised visits, failed to consent to the child’s medication, and did not have a suitable home for the child.” Considering his “general lack of progress and failure to benefit from services for over two years, the trial court also did not clearly err when it found that the conditions that led to adjudication were not reasonably likely to be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” In addition, the court concluded delaying permanency for the child was not in the child’s best interests.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Wills & Trusts (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Probate

    e-Journal #: 78944
    Case: In re Estate of Broemer
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Cavanagh, O’Brien, and Rick
    Issues:

    Dispute over the distribution of an unsigned will; Petition to admit the will under MCL 700.2503; Jurisdiction & standing; Whether appellant was an “interested party”; MCL 700.1105(c); MCR 5.125; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Due process; Duckett v Solky

    Summary:

    The court held that the probate did not err by denying appellant’s objection to the distribution and administration of the decedent’s estate. The probate court granted appellees’ petition to admit the decedent’s unsigned will, and the estate was divided three ways among them. Appellant and other purported heirs later objected, and a settlement agreement was reached allowing the will to stand and providing a lump sum to be distributed among the other heirs. The probate court approved the settlement. Appellant’s daughter (other-party-VanPoppelen) objected, but the probate court denied the objection. On appeal, the court first found that the probate court properly denied the objection on the basis of VanPoppelen’s lack of standing to raise it, albeit for the wrong reason. It then rejected appellant’s argument that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel by the deficient performance of attorney-C, the attorney for the represented heirs, and that she was denied due process and the opportunity to object to the admission of the will because she did not have access to the Zoom hearings. It noted that she provided “no authority to support the assertion that she was entitled to appointed counsel or that counsel was appointed to represent her.” In addition, there was no evidence “to support appellant’s contention that she was denied access” to the proceedings, and she “failed to establish that she was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

Ads