Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
View Text Opinion Full PDF Opinion
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Underestimating the minimum-sentence guidelines; Failure to exclude the body camera video; Failure to request a mistrial; Presentence investigation report (PSIR); Prejudice
Concluding that (1) defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel and (2) the trial court failed to make necessary corrections to the PSIR, the court affirmed his convictions and sentences but remanded for the ministerial task of correcting his PSIR. He was convicted of armed robbery, felony-firearm, and CCW. He was sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender to 126 to 240 months for armed robbery, 2 years for felony-firearm, and 19 to 90 months for the CCW. He claimed that defense counsel was ineffective for “underestimating the minimum-sentence guidelines for the charged offenses, which defendant relied upon to reject the plea offers[.]” The court found that even if it “were to agree with defendant that defense counsel’s scoring mistake was objectively unreasonable, defendant cannot show that there was a reasonable probability he would have accepted the plea offer had he been advised of the correct guidelines range.” Defendant failed “to mention on appeal that, at the time the plea offer was made, [he] conditioned his acceptance of the plea offer on the trial court releasing him from custody before sentencing.” The trial court denied his “request, stating that it did not intend to reduce defendant’s bond, especially if the plea was taken. It also warned defendant that if he was convicted at trial, the trial court would not be bound to follow the minimum guideline range and the actual sentence imposed could be longer. Defendant immediately rejected the plea offer, stating he wanted a trial. [His] refusal based on the denial of his request for pretrial release strongly indicates that he would not have accepted the plea offer even if he had known the correct minimum-sentence guideline range.” Thus, his “statements and conduct during plea negotiations belie his claim that he relied on defense counsel’s miscalculation in rejecting the plea offer.” Because he could not establish prejudice, it was “unnecessary for us to determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient.” Next, he claimed that counsel failed “to exclude the body camera video implicating defendant in an unrelated offense[.]” The court noted that the “body camera video admitted at trial captured an unidentified officer comment that a person involved in an unrelated breaking and entering had a bike similar to defendant’s.” He claimed “that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to seek exclusion of the video.” But he could not “show that but for counsel’s performance, there was ‘a reasonable probability that that outcome would have been different.’” Finally, because he “failed to show that the admission of the video footage was sufficiently prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial,” he could not “establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.”
Ineffective assistance; Plea negotiations; People v Douglas; Remand for evidentiary hearing; MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a); People v Chapo; Sentencing proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Within-guidelines presumption of reasonableness; People v Posey (On Remand)
The court held that defendant was not entitled to relief on her ineffective-assistance claim and that her within-guidelines sentence was proportionate. Defendant was convicted of AWIM, AWIGBH, FIP, and felony-firearm, and she was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 35 to 60 years for the AWIM conviction with lesser terms for the others. On appeal, the court held that the ineffective-assistance claim failed because the asserted eight-year minimum plea offer was not actually extended by the prosecution, noting it was “clear that no offer was actually made” and that trial counsel could not be ineffective “in relation to a plea deal that was never made.” It also found no record support for the contention that counsel told defendant the case was “in the bag.” It emphasized that defendant was advised on the record of the consequences of rejecting the actual offers and still chose trial, and that appellate review was “‘limited to mistakes that are apparent on the record.’” The court further ruled that a remand for an evidentiary hearing was unwarranted because “further factual development would not advance” the claim. It next found the sentence reasonable under the proportionality framework, reiterating that the “‘principle of proportionality requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’” It concluded the trial court properly considered deterrence, rehabilitation, punishment, defendant’s criminal history, and the “egregious” nature of shooting the victim during a neighborhood dispute. Affirmed.
Documents held by a university library; “Public records”; The law-of-the-case doctrine; Applicability of the personal-privacy FOIA exemption (MCL 15.243(1)(a)); Swickard v Wayne Cnty Med Exam’r; Exemption under MCL 15.243(1)(d) (disclosure exempted by statute); The Michigan Community Foundation Act (MCFA); MCL 123.905(3); Former MCL 397.381(1); The Library Privacy Act (LPA); MCL 397.605; Defendant’s constitutional autonomy; Const 1963, art 8, § 5; Punitive damages under MCL 15.240(7)
Concluding that its prior ruling that the documents at issue (the Tanton papers) are public records was final, the court further held that they were not exempt from disclosure and that their disclosure did not violate defendant’s constitutional autonomy. But it found that the Court of Claims erred in awarding plaintiff punitive damages in this FOIA action. The papers were the personal writings, correspondence, and research of an individual, Dr. Tanton, who donated them to one of defendant’s libraries. Several boxes of the papers were to remain closed until “2035, purportedly in accordance with the terms of the gift.” The Court of Claims initially granted defendant summary disposition on the basis the papers were not public records. In a prior appeal, the court reversed, holding that they were paper records. On remand, the Court of Claims ordered that the papers be produced to plaintiff and awarded him “$1,000 in punitive damages under MCL 15.240(7).” In this appeal, the court first rejected defendant’s argument that it should consider the public records issue anew. As there had “been no material change in facts or law,” it was bound by the law-of-the-case doctrine. As to the exemptions on which defendant relied, the court noted the Michigan Supreme Court held in Swickard “that deceased individuals do not have privacy rights against disclosure under FOIA.” As Dr. Tanton is deceased, his privacy rights have been extinguished. Thus, MCL 15.243(1)(a) did not apply. The court also concluded that the papers were not exempted from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d), by virtue of provisions of the MCFA and the LPA. “Dr. Tanton, not the MCFA or MCL 397.381, was the one who forbade disclosing the Tanton papers. Thus, the MCL 15.243(1)(d) exception” did not apply. And defendant’s argument based on the LPA failed “for the same reason as the MCFA argument.” The court also held that defendant’s “constitutional autonomy is not a shield against the requirements of FOIA simply because of a private decision made by an individual donor.” But given that “the Court of Claims declined to find that defendant acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and” it denied civil fines as a result, it erred in awarding punitive damages. The court vacated that award and affirmed in all other respects.
Homeowners insurance coverage dispute; Policy limitations-period; When defendant formally denied liability; MCL 500.2833(1)(q); Motion to compel an appraisal; MCL 500.2833(1)(m); Cantina Enters II Inc v Property-Owners Ins Co
In this homeowners coverage dispute, the court held that there was a question of fact as to whether defendant-insurer’s denial of some of plaintiffs’ claims “was equivocal or even revoked.” But plaintiffs were not entitled to an appraisal as to the disputed claims because a question existed as to whether they were covered at all. Thus, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order denying their motion to compel an appraisal and granting defendant’s summary disposition motion, and remanded. Plaintiffs filed a claim with defendant for damages after a pipe broke in their second-floor bathroom. Defendant made two payments totaling “about $10,000 to compensate plaintiffs for their loss.” They later submitted a proof of loss seeking approximately $135,000. Defendant “agreed to an independent appraisal for only the damaged property for which it acknowledged liability.” Plaintiffs sued and moved to compel an appraisal of all of their claims, The trial court found that defendant denied their claim on 8/18/22 and thus, the limitations period began running on that date and expired before they filed suit. The issue of whether the policy’s limitations-period provision barred their claims turned “on when defendant formally denied liability.” The court concluded defendant’s 8/18/22 letter denied coverage for plumbing repairs and additional living expenses but “did not formally deny liability for” other claims, such as “for the second-floor bathroom or for other items beyond the kitchen area. Whether this letter was a formal denial of these claims is further called into question by defendant’s subsequent requests that plaintiffs provide documentation in support of their claims related to the bathroom and other kitchen-related losses[.]” But the court found that their argument they were “entitled to an independent appraisal to evaluate the merit [of] their $135,000 claim relies on a strained reading of Cantina that conflates disputes over coverage with the valuation of a claim after liability is acknowledged. Unlike the defendant in Cantina, defendant in this case paid for specific damaged property that it determined were covered losses. Thus, [it] did not make ‘partial payments’ for the disputed claims at issue.” Because it paid “for specific damages that it determined were covered under the policy, while disputing liability for other claims[,]” the issue was “not simply the ‘amount of money owed to plaintiff[s] for the loss[.]’”
Denial of petition for a name change; Abandoned issue
The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s request “to change his name to ‘william-dennis,’ no last name.” He did “not affirmatively allege any error by the trial court.” Instead, he requested that the court “overrule the lower court and affirm what ‘already is[.]’” By failing to brief the merits of the issue, he abandoned it on appeal. However, the court concluded that even if he had not abandoned his “argument, his proposed reasons for seeking the name-change support the trial court’s determination that the request was sought with fraudulent intent.” The reasons he listed “for the name-change included extinguishing his debt and providing him with an indiscernibly vague, far-reaching expansion of his legal rights. These reasons demonstrate that the trial court’s determination was within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.”
Children’s best interests; Bond with the children; Lawyer-guardian ad litem (L-GAL); Relative placement
Concluding that the trial court did not clearly err by finding termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the best interests of his children, the court affirmed. He claimed that “he shared a bond with them, provided for their needs, and posed no threat to their well-being.” Yet, the trial court considered his “bond with the children, finding that respondent’s testimony regarding it was ‘sincere and truthful.’” However, it “also found that the bond did not outweigh the other best-interest factors.” Here, the record reflected that he “failed to consistently participate in court-ordered visitations. When he did participate, he used vulgar language around other young children and threatened staff. These actions reflect negatively on respondent’s parenting abilities and favor termination.” Also, he “failed to participate in individual therapy, parenting classes, or undergo a required psychological evaluation.” His refusal or “inability to complete these services indicates an unwillingness to take the steps necessary to ensure his children are adequately cared for.” Further, the trial court found that he “posed a risk to his children’s well-being because he sexually assaulted SG [a half-sister of two of the children], which outweighed any evidence that might have favored preserving his parental rights.” The court found that “the mere fact that respondent had not sexually assaulted his three daughters is not dispositive as to whether they were at risk of sexual assault in the future. In light of respondent’s sexual assault—which included penetration of SG—the [trial] court did not clearly err by finding that there was a risk of harm to the children.” Lastly, the court disagreed with the L-GAL’s “argument that the trial court failed to explicitly consider the children’s placement with relatives in its best-interest analysis, thereby requiring” remand. The court noted that because the trial “court expressly considered the relative placement, a remand for additional findings related to the placement is not required.”
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (j), & (k)(ix); No-contest plea; MCR 3.971(D)(1); In re Pederson; Ineffective assistance; In re Casto; Best interests; In re Atchley
The court held that respondent-father failed to show error in the acceptance of his no-contest plea or in the best-interests determination and failed to establish ineffective assistance. The DHHS alleged that respondent sexually abused his 13-year-old daughter by putting his hand down her pants and rubbing her buttocks, and the child disclosed the incident to a relative and during a forensic interview. The trial court accepted respondent’s no-contest plea to jurisdiction and statutory grounds under §§ (b)(i), (j), & (k)(ix), then after a best-interests hearing terminated his parental rights. On appeal, the court held that respondent’s challenge to the plea was unpreserved and that he could not establish “clear or obvious” error because the record did not definitively show whether the CPS report used for the factual basis was provided before or during the hearing. He also failed to show prejudice because he did not contend he would have rejected the plea if he had reviewed the report. The court also rejected the claim that the trial court failed to confirm the plea type, noting respondent agreed on the record that he was entering a no-contest plea. It next found that the ineffective-assistance claim failed because respondent did not argue prejudice and, in any event, there was no reasonable probability the outcome would have differed given the lack of any showing that he would have declined the plea. The court finally held the trial court did not err in finding termination was in the child’s best interests, relying on the sexual-assault statutory grounds, the weak bond, the child’s expressed lack of safety and preference to remain with her mother, and the child’s need for permanency and protection. Affirmed.
Guardian’s petition to terminate parental rights; Ability to support; MCL 712A.2(b)(6)(A); “Ability” to contact under no-contact order; MCL 712A.2(b)(6)(B); In re ALZ; In re Kaiser; Petition authorization; In re Ferranti
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by authorizing the guardians’ petition under MCL 712A.2(b)(6) on the minimal record because there was no evidence respondent-mother had the ability to provide support and the evidence did not establish she had the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with the child under the conditional no-contact order. The child had lived for years with the guardians, including respondent’s mother. A probate-court no-contact order barred respondent from contact unless she satisfied enumerated conditions and petitioned for visitation. The trial court authorized a petition alleging jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(6) and entered an order continuing the child’s placement with the guardians and stating the child could not be returned to respondent. On appeal, the court first held that the statutory findings for foster-care placement under MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2) were inapplicable because the child was not removed or placed into foster care. The order functioned as a release to the guardians under MCL 712A.13a(3) and MCR 3.965(B)(13)(a) with protective conditions. The court then found probable cause was not established under MCL 712A.2(b)(6)(A) because, although the record suggested respondent had not provided support, there was no evidence she had the ability to pay. It also held MCL 712A.2(b)(6)(B) was not established because “ability” to contact in the face of restrictive court orders turns on the parent’s realistic capacity and efforts to regain access, and the referee erred in concluding respondent simply chose not to satisfy the conditions. The minimal record instead suggested respondent made some efforts that may have been thwarted and that contact was not solely within her power. Reversed and remanded.
Denial of admission of wills & codicils; Undue influence; Bill & Dena Brown Trust v Garcia; Credibility determinations; Guardian ad litem (GAL)
Holding that the trial court did not err in finding that the wills and codicils at issue were obtained through undue influence, the court affirmed the order denying admission of the documents. Appellant and appellee are the decedents’ (Streate and Lucille) son and daughter. Appellant sought admission of documents he alleged were the decedents’ wills and codicils. He admitted that he drafted the documents. Appellee objected, asserting “they were obtained on the basis of appellant’s undue influence over the decedents[.]” The trial court, after a bench trial, found that appellee “established a rebuttable presumption of undue influence that appellant failed to rebut.” The court noted the case turned “on the weight the trial court afforded the testimonies provided below.” In light of its “deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and the testimonies provided, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” The record reflected “that, while in appellant’s care, hospital staff treating Streate for a fall observed marks on his wrists consistent with being held by restraints. He also had pressure sores on his genitals and buttocks. As a result, hospital staff contacted Adult Protective Services (APS). Appellant claimed that his resistance to APS’s investigation was due to his parents’ desire to avoid the agency, but appellee disagreed. APS” petitioned for a guardianship. Witness-K was appointed as Streate’s GAL “and assigned to investigate Streate’s alleged abuse and neglect. [K] testified that he interviewed appellant and was not satisfied with his explanation that Streate’s condition was caused by sitting on a rattan chair without padding, but Streate died before he finished his reports.” In addition, appellee “testified that, after Streate’s death, Lucille fled with her to California with only a suitcase.” The trial court impliedly found that appellee and K “were more credible than appellant. Appellee’s and [K’s] testimonies support the trial court’s conclusion that decedents were subject to appellant’s control and suffered abuse at his hands.”