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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Adjudication; Request for a jury instruction based on MCL 722.634 (limited, religious-based defense for a parent or guardian who does not provide a child with a specified medical treatment); “Legitimately”; Constitutional right to free exercise of religion; “Legitimately practicing” a religious belief; Whether MCL 722.634 was unconstitutional because it impermissibly interfered with a child’s constitutional right to life; Whether error was harmless; MCL 712A.2(b)(2); Admission of autopsy photos; MRE 401-403
The court held that the trial court’s determination that “legitimately” as used in MCL 722.634 “means that a parent or guardian’s religious beliefs must be legitimate” was unconstitutional and inconsistent with the language of the statute. Further, because a rational view of the evidence supported giving the requested jury instruction based on the statute, the trial court abused its discretion in denying respondents-parents’ request. But the court rejected their challenge to admission of their deceased infant’s (AP) autopsy photos. Concluding that the error in failing to give the requested instruction required reversal, it reversed the orders terminating their parental rights and remanded for a new adjudication trial, at which the trial court shall instruct the jury pursuant to MCL 722.634. The statute provides that “[a] parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, for that reason alone shall not be considered a negligent parent or guardian.” The court concluded that the trial court erred in ruling “that respondents’ religious beliefs lacked legitimacy solely because their beliefs were not represented by a tenet or rule of a religious organization.” In addition, it found that the trial court misconstrued the statute by interpreting the word legitimately “in connection with ‘religious beliefs’ as opposed to the practice of religious beliefs.” The proper inquiry under the statute “requires consideration of what it means to be ‘legitimately practicing’ a religious belief.” The court held that a parent or guardian, in order to be legitimately practicing his or her religious beliefs, must “be actually practicing their religious beliefs at the time that they did not provide a child with specified medical treatment. That means that the parent or guardian’s reason for not providing treatment cannot be a false or spurious reason.” If such a finding is supported by a rational view of the evidence, “an instruction in accordance with MCL 722.634 is required.” The record contained testimony “that respondents were actually, i.e., legitimately, practicing their religious beliefs when they did not seek medical treatment for AP. Multiple witnesses testified that respondents had long been advocates of divine healing” and there was evidence that they were actually relying on it when they did not seek medical treatment for AP.
Right-of-first-refusal agreement; Presumption that preemptive rights are personal to the parties; Whether the agreement was descendible; “Successor”; Applying the ejusdem generis principle to contracts; Effect of plaintiff’s decision not to previously exercise his right of first refusal; Limiting rights of first refusal to a “reasonable period”
Concluding that the right-of-first-refusal agreement at issue could not “be construed as running with the land or otherwise surviving plaintiff’s decision to affirmatively decline to exercise his right of first refusal” when the property was previously conveyed, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants. Plaintiff entered into the agreement with a prior owner (S) of defendant-Blodgett’s property. During one of the sales of the property in the interim, he “was offered, and expressly declined to exercise, his right of first refusal.” The persons (the Ps) who then bought it sold it to Blodgett. Five years later, plaintiff filed this action, unsuccessfully seeking to enforce his rights under the agreement. The court noted that the agreement was clearly descendible in part. It provided that it “shall enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the parties hereto, their respective heirs, administrators, executors, representatives, successors and/or assigns.” It did not define the word successor. Reviewing dictionary definitions, the court concluded that the word, standing alone, seemed “to broadly encompass any person who later holds title to the property, such as Blodgett. However, the circumstances and the rest of the contract show that such an expansive interpretation was not intended. The recitals at the” beginning of the agreement specifically referred to plaintiff and S, personally. Further, the ejusdem generis principle may be applied to contracts, and reading the term “successors and/or assigns” in context, it appeared “to mean something narrower than anybody who ever owns property once owned by either” S or plaintiff. Rather, it appeared to mean “someone who has acquired an interest directly from either [S] or plaintiff by some manner other than a bona fide purchase of property.” This backdrop framed the central inquiry here, “the effect of plaintiff’s decision not to exercise his right of first refusal” when the bank sold the Ps the property. The court concluded that “the better construction would seem to be that unless the contract specifies otherwise, the holder of a right of first refusal will extinguish that right by affirmatively declining to exercise it, presuming the right became vested and the holder had a proper opportunity to exercise it.”
Contract for the sale of land; Whether plaintiff-buyer terminated the contract; Specific performance remedy
Noting that the text message on which defendants relied was unclear on its face, and that both they and plaintiff-buyer later took actions indicating a belief that the contract was still in effect, the court concluded that the text message was ambiguous. Further, plaintiff produced evidence showing that he did not intend for the message to terminate the contract, while defendants did not offer any evidence to establish a material fact question as to whether he intended to terminate it and did so. The court also held that specific performance was the proper remedy. Thus, it affirmed the order granting plaintiff summary disposition, denying defendants summary disposition, and dismissing their countercomplaint. Defendants contended that plaintiff’s text message to their representative constituted his “termination of the purchase agreement,” while he asserted it was simply “an attempt to renegotiate the price, which, when rejected by defendants, meant that the original purchase agreement terms remained in effect.” The court found that it was ambiguous on its face. It could “conceivably be viewed as a termination of the contract. On the other hand, it is questionable whether a text message may serve as a ‘written notice’ and the text language is in broken language and incomplete.” Further, it did not unequivocally say plaintiff wanted to terminate the contract. Instead, he suggested different terms upon which he wanted to close. The issue came down to intent. Defendants offered only the text message and email correspondence between plaintiff and an environmental consultant to support their summary disposition motion. Among other things, plaintiff showed that after he sent the text, he hired an architect for the property and his broker sent defendants’ representative a copy of plans for it. The court noted that all of his “actions and documentation support that plaintiff did not view the text as a termination of the contract. In addition,” the trial court noted that the contract’s “due diligence provision” provided that upon written notice of intent to terminate the contract being “sent to defendants within the 60-day due diligence period, ‘the Deposit shall be refunded in full termination of this Agreement.’ Defendants did not return plaintiff’s $15,000 deposit after receiving the” text.
Motion to withdraw a plea; Compliance with MCR 6.302(B)(2) & (C); People v Jackson; Whether the plea agreement was illusory; Sentencing; Waiver; MCR 6.425(E)(1)(c); Denying defense counsel the opportunity to allocute on defendant’s behalf; Whether the SORA reporting & compliance requirements in the sentence were ambiguous; People v Betts; People v Snyder; Judgment of sentence (JOS)
Finding that the trial court complied with MCR 6.302 and that the plea agreement was not illusory, the court affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. But because the trial court denied defense counsel the opportunity to allocate on defendant’s behalf, he was entitled to resentencing. The court declined to determine which version of the SORA he must comply with, noting that the trial court on remand will have the “opportunity to either clarify the ambiguity at play in this case and amend the [JOS] to reflect which version of the Act dictates defendant’s reporting and compliance requirements, or hold this matter in abeyance pending our Supreme Court’s decision in Betts and Snyder.” Defendant pled guilty to CSC III and was sentenced to 7 to 15 years. As to his motion to withdraw his plea, the court noted that the Supreme Court limited application of MCR 6.302(B)(2) in Jackson, holding that “automatic reversal is not required for a failure to give advice concerning the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences if the defendant is sentenced pursuant to a sentencing agreement.” The trial court here sentenced defendant “pursuant to the written plea agreement.” In addition, where “a written plea agreement exists, the trial court need not orally place each condition of that plea agreement on the record if the written agreement is incorporated into the record and all other requirements of MCR 6.302(C) are satisfied.” The court determined “that defendant was made aware of the terms of the plea agreement, that the trial court complied with the requirements of MCR 6.302(B) and (C), and that defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered a no contest plea to” CSC III. It also found no merit in his claim that the plea agreement was illusory. He clearly received the benefit of his bargain when the prosecution dismissed CSC I and II charges and he was sentenced in accordance with the agreement. But he was entitled to resentencing. The court noted that “MCR 6.425(E)(1)(c) does not require the defendant, his attorney, the prosecution, or the victim request the ability to allocute; the burden is placed on the trial court to provide the opportunity.” On remand for resentencing, the trial court will also need to correct his JOS as to which version of the SORA “governs defendant’s reporting and compliance requirements.”
Release of a claim; Effect of a prior assignment; Res judicata; Whether the claims arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claims released
Holding that the trial court did not err when it determined plaintiff-healthcare provider’s suit was barred by defendant’s insured’s (nonparty-K) release and by res judicata, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant. Plaintiff treated K after her auto accident. Defendant insured K at the time of the accident. Plaintiff argued K “could not have settled the claims related to its treatment because she had already assigned those claims to plaintiff.” However, the “Supreme Court has long held that when an assignment of claims occurs after a lawsuit is filed—the subject of which concerns those assigned claims—the assignor may settle or release those claims, precluding any further recovery by the assignee.” Plaintiff, aware of K’s “lawsuit, had the right to intervene in that litigation as a result of the assignment.” In choosing not to do so, plaintiff acquiesced for K, “the assignor, to proceed on its claims.” The record showed that “plaintiff’s decision not to intervene was a strategic decision.” Thus, it was bound under the terms of the settlement she “agreed to, which explicitly covered all other claims for PIP benefits.” Plaintiff also argued res judicata did not apply to its claims because they “were not ripe and did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence as [K’s] claims.” The court noted that K filed suit “to adjudicate all of her existing rights under the” No-Fault Act. When “plaintiff decided to bring its own action against defendant, it was aware that [K] intended to adjudicate all no-fault claims arising out of the” accident, but it did not seek to intervene in K’s litigation. While plaintiff’s claims may not have been ripe when K “filed her complaint because plaintiff’s services had not yet been rendered, its claims were ripe at the time plaintiff filed its own” case. Nothing prevented “plaintiff from bringing its claims at the time [K’s] lawsuit was pending. Plaintiff’s argument that its claims arose out of a different transaction or occurrence than” K’s claims was also meritless. She sought payment of no-fault benefits from defendant as a result of her 2016 accident. “Plaintiff, through its lawsuit, also sought payment of no-fault benefits arising from the same accident. Plaintiff, as an assignee,” stood in the position of K, having “‘the same rights and being subject to the same defenses.’” Thus, for it, “as an assignee, to exercise any rights under the assignment, those rights must have arisen from the same transaction or occurrence under which the assignor obtained those rights.”
PIP benefits; Motion to amend affirmative defenses to plead fraud with particularity; Delay; Prejudice; Futility; Distinguishing Haydaw v Farm Bureau Ins Co, Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, & Williams v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co
The court reversed and vacated the trial court’s order denying defendant-insurer’s (State Farm) motion to amend its affirmative defenses to plead fraud with particularity, and remanded. The case arose out of a motor vehicle accident. Defendant sought to amend as to fraud allegedly committed by its insured, R, when making the underlying claim for PIP benefits, in violation of an anti-fraud provision in the insurance contract between R and defendant. Defendant moved to amend its affirmative defenses following the close of its investigation into R’s claim. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s motion to amend on the basis that defendant’s motion was untimely. In denying its “motion to amend as untimely, the trial court did not make a finding that defendant acted in bad faith; rather, the trial court found that defendant’s delay resulted in prejudice to" plaintiff-healthcare provider. The court disagreed. In its original answer to the complaint, defendant asserted a fraud defense. In “its first responsive pleading, defendant provided plaintiff with reasonable notice that it would be pursuing a fraud defense.” Plaintiff claimed “it suffered prejudice because the delayed motion to amend affected its ‘ability to address [defendant’s] allegations of fraud during the course of depositions of the parties which [defendant] alleges committed it.’ However, not only was plaintiff on notice that defendant would be perusing a fraud defense, but it had counsel present at the depositions of” R and the other occupants of the vehicle. Notably, plaintiff did not claim that the proposed amendment would prevent it from receiving a fair trial. The court held that plaintiff had “not claimed prejudice sufficient to deny defendant’s motion for leave to amend, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise.” The court also briefly noted that plaintiff argued any amendment to defendant’s affirmative defenses to plead fraud with particularity would be futile. Plaintiff’s futility argument failed. The line of cases (Haydaw, Meemic, and Williams) on which plaintiff relied was procedurally and factually distinguishable from this case.
A municipality’s authority to regulate mining activity; The Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA); MCL 125.3205; 2011 PA 113; Silva v Township of Ada; Kyser v Kasson Twp; “Gravel mining standards”; MCL 125.3205(3)-(5); Principle that the law to be applied is generally that in effect at the time of decision; Landon Holdings, Inc v Grattan Twp; Bad faith exception; Statutory preemption; DeRuiter v Township of Byron; Direct conflict; “Need”; Ultra vires action; Municipalities’ authority to zone; MCL 125.3201(1); Substantive due process; People v Sierb; Rational-basis review; Johnson v Department of Natural Res; Amendment of an ordinance; McCarthy v Village of Marcellus; Protected property interest; Mettler Walloon, LLC v Melrose Twp; Equal protection; Shepherd Montessori Ctr Milan v Ann Arbor Charter Twp; Preliminary injunction; MCR 3.310; Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n, IAFF Local 344 v Detroit; American Aggregates of Michigan (AAOM)
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting plaintiff-Township summary disposition of counterplaintiff’s (AAOM) counterclaims. AAOM petitioned the Township for conditional rezoning and special land use approval of its owned and leased property in order to conduct mining activities. Shortly thereafter, the Township issued a moratorium, and later amended its existing zoning ordinance. It eventually sought injunctions. During a lengthy proceeding, the trial court granted a series of summary disposition motions, resulting in the dismissal of each of AAOM’s counterclaims. On appeal, the court rejected AAOM’s argument that the trial court erred by holding that the amended ordinance was the applicable ordinance, noting it failed to show the Township adopted the amended ordinance to obtain a litigation advantage. In addition, it rejected AAOM’s claim that the amended ordinance was preempted by MCL 125.3205 under a direct conflict theory, finding no direct conflict. It also rejected AAOM’s contention that the amended ordinance was invalid because it was ultra vires, finding the Township “did not ‘evade the Legislature’s mandate.’” The court next rejected AAOM’s argument that the amended ordinance violated due process, finding there was no substantive due process violation under a rational-basis review. It further rejected AAOM’s claim “that the moratorium was not a proper exercise of the Township’s authority because it was an illegal attempt to amend the ordinance by resolution and because passing moratoria is not authorized by” the MZEA, finding it failed to support this argument. Moreover, the court rejected AAOM’s contention that the moratorium violated due process and equal protection, holding it failed to show it “had a constitutionally protected right to have its application considered in a certain time or had a ‘reasonable expectation of entitlement’ to the permit,” and that “the plain language of the moratorium purports to treat all individuals seeking approval for gravel mining equally.” And because it failed to establish a constitutional violation, it was not entitled to damages. Finally, AAOM could not show how it was harmed by the trial court’s failure to comply with MCR 3.310 in issuing the status quo order. Affirmed.
Action to recover personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits from the State; Notice requirement; MCL 500.3145(1); The one-year back rule; MCL 500.3145(2); Verification requirement for a notice of intent (NOI) under the Court of Claims Act (CCA); MCL 600.6431; MCL 600.6434; Fairley v Department of Corrs; Leave to amend to cure a faulty notice filed within MCL 600.6431(1)’s one-year period; Progress MI v Attorney Gen; Elia Cos, LLC v University of MI Regents
The court held that the Court of Claims erred by denying plaintiff’s motion to amend his NOI and complaint to satisfy the CCA’s verification requirement. Plaintiff was injured in an auto accident while a passenger in a vehicle owned and self-insured by defendant-State. He filed a NOI in the Court of Claims to bring a claim against defendant to recover PIP benefits. The notice was signed by plaintiff and his counsel, but not verified “before an officer authorized to administer oaths” as required by the CCA. About a week later, he filed his complaint in the Court of Claims, which was also signed by plaintiff and his counsel but not notarized. The Court of Claims denied plaintiff’s request for leave to amend, granted summary disposition for defendant, and dismissed his claim, finding the NOI was insufficient and that the time for strictly complying with the CCA’s one-year notice period had lapsed. On appeal, the court agreed with plaintiff that the Court of Claims erred by denying his motion to amend the NOI and complaint to satisfy the verification requirement. “Having provided notice that satisfies MCL 500.3145, plaintiff’s suit was not barred by the statute of limitations.” His NOI and complaint were not void and amendment was permitted. “Plaintiff must comply with the requirements of MCL 600.6431 and MCL 600.6434,” but Progress MI and Elia established that “he ‘may correct any defect in complying with those requirements during the pendency of the proceedings and in accordance with the court rules.’” On remand, he “should be afforded an opportunity to cure any defects in his compliance with the CCA’s verification requirements.” Reversed and remanded.
Nondomestic ex parte PPO; Appeals in PPO cases; MCR 3.709; Timing; MCR 7.204(A)(1); Criminal contempt for failing to comply with a PPO; MCL 600.2950a(23); Burden of proof; MCR 3.708(H)(3); Sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal contempt; Principle that a contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration the legal or factual basis of the order; United States v Rylander; Requirements for an ex parte PPO; MCL 600.2950a(12); “Stalking”; MCL 750.411h(1)(d) & i; “Course of conduct”; MCL 750.411h(1)(a); PF v JF; “Harassment”; MCL 750.411h(1)(c); “Emotional distress”; MCL 750.411h(1)(b); “Unconsented contact”; MCL 750.411h(1)(e); Findings of fact & conclusions; MCR 3.705(A)(2); MCR 3.708(H)(4); MCR 2.517; Cumulative error
The court held that respondent’s challenge to the validity of the PPO underlying his criminal contempt was foreclosed. In addition, the evidence was sufficient to show that he violated the PPO and was properly found in criminal contempt. Further, the trial court did not err in providing its findings of fact and law. Finally, respondent was not entitled to relief based on cumulative error. The trial court found respondent in criminal contempt for violating a PPO by punching petitioner (his neighbor) as petitioner was cutting another neighbor’s lawn. It sentenced him to 3 days in jail and ordered him to pay $200 in fines and $600 in court costs and attorney fees. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion to terminate the nondomestic ex parte PPO because it was invalid, finding appellate relief was precluded as he failed to timely challenge this issue. “[T]he time for filing respondent’s claim of appeal commenced” in 9/17, and he “had 21 days after the denial of the motion to terminate to file his claim of appeal as of right.” However, he did not file his appeal until 7/19, after the finding of criminal contempt. The court also rejected his claim that there was insufficient evidence to support his criminal contempt conviction because the evidence did not establish a violation of the PPO. “Evidence was presented that petitioner was harassed and attacked by respondent, and the trial court found this evidence to be credible. The conduct occurred despite the trial court order precluding its occurrence.” The court next rejected his contention that the trial court provided insufficient findings of fact and law, requiring reversal of his conviction, noting the trial court “was aware of the issues, correctly applied the terms of the PPO to the facts, and found respondent in criminal contempt” for violating the PPO, and that “remand for further explanation would not aid” appellate review. Finally, the court rejected his argument that the cumulative effect of several errors deprived him of due process. “Because no errors have been identified, respondent is not entitled to appellate relief.” Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(j); Child’s best interests
After remand, the court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to the child-J. In a prior appeal, it affirmed the trial court’s determination that statutory grounds existed to terminate her parental rights under § (j). However, because J was placed with relatives, and the record contained no evidence that the trial court considered that relative placement when considering the J’s best interests, it held that “the factual record was inadequate for purposes of the best-interests determination.” Thus, it vacated the trial court’s order terminating the mother’s parental rights and remanded for a new best-interests determination, retaining jurisdiction. On remand, the trial court conducted the best-interests determination and held that “the record showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination of” the mother’s parental rights was in J’s best interests. Thus, it entered a new order terminating her parental rights to J. The case returned to the court after remand. “Having reviewed the transcript of the trial court’s best-interest findings, and being familiar with the reasons why the trial court concluded that statutory grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that terminating” her parental rights was in J’s best interests.