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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Freedom of religion; The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine; U.S. Const. amend. I; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 4; Winkler v. Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc.; Pilgrim’s Rest Baptist Church v. Pearson; Van Vliet v. Vander Naald; First Protestant Reformed Church v. DeWolf; Dlaikan v. Roodbeen; Jones v. Wolf; Standing; MCR 2.116(C)(5); Kaiser v. Schreiber; Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ.; Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v. Detroit; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hayes; Bowie v. Arder; Declaratory judgment; MCR 2.605(A)(1); Quo warranto; MCR 3.306(A) & (B); MCL 600.4501; Davis v. Chatman; City of Grand Rapids v. Harper; Evidence of negotiations & settlement; MRE 408; Gorman v. Soble
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendants-religious organization (IHOD) and trustees based on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine and plaintiff-former trustee’s lack of standing. Plaintiff brought several claims against defendants, and sought a declaratory judgment that they “improperly diverted IHOD from its stated mission” and that he was “qualified to have possession and control of IHOD’s assets, or alternatively that” the Attorney General, acting through him, seek “dissolution of IHOD and escheat of its assets to the state.” The trial court ruled in favor of defendants, finding the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine supported dismissal, and that he lacked standing. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by holding that his claims were barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. “The trial court did not err by ruling that resolution of plaintiff’s claims would require a decision on matters of church doctrine and polity.” And the damages he alleged were “spiritual in nature.” The matters at issue involved “ecclesiastical questions related to church doctrine and polity, disputes the trial court correctly abstained from deciding.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by ruling that he lacked standing based on his release of his membership and any rights attendant to that membership in a Settlement Agreement, as well as his agreement to have no contact with IHOD or its members for the rest of his life. It found that he was not an “interested party” as to IHOD, and that he “voluntarily relinquished any rights of membership and any rights attendant thereto in exchange for a settlement payment,” did not “participate in any of the activities or government of the group, and he agreed not to have contact with IHOD or any of its members for the remainder of his life.” His other claims were also properly dismissed because, “as a nonmember without any attendant rights in IHOD, [he] lacked standing to bring claims for any alleged injury resulting from the management or transfer of IHOD’s assets, or to bring any claims on behalf of IHOD itself.” Finally, the court rejected his contentions that the trial court erred by finding that the facts did not support his quo warranto claim, and by considering inadmissible evidence. Affirmed.
Constitutional challenges to amendments to Michigan’s Liquor Code; 2016 MI Pub. Acts 520, § 203(3) & (15); Whether the Twenty-first Amendment permits Michigan to allow Michigan’s retailers to offer at-home deliveries within the State while denying the same option to an Indiana retailer who does not have a Michigan retail license; U.S. Const. amend XXI, § 2; The Commerce Clause; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas; North Dakota v. United States; Granholm v. Heald; California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.; Jelovsek v. Bredesen; Byrd v. Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n; Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson (7th Cir.); Southern Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc. v. Division of Alcohol & Tobacco Control (8th Cir.); Cooper v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n (5th Cir.); Discrimination; General Motors Corp. v. Tracy; Whether Michigan’s decision to limit the ability to deliver directly to consumers to Michigan retailers was justified as promoting the non-protectionist, legitimate state interest of public health & safety; Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias; Arnold’s Wines, Inc. v. Boyle (2d Cir.); Wine Country Gift Baskets.com v. Steen (5th Cir.); The Privileges & Immunities Clause of Article IV; U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; McBurney v. Young; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; Crowley v. Christensen; Mugler v. Kansas; Bartemeyer v. Iowa; Remedy for an alleged violation; MCL 436.1925; Heckler v. Matthews; Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Lilly
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court reversed the district court, holding that the Twenty-first Amendment permits Michigan to allow its retailers to offer at-home deliveries within the State while denying the same option to an Indiana retailer who does not have a Michigan retail license. Michigan has a “three-tier” system for alcohol distribution—producers, wholesalers (the State), and retailers. Plaintiff-Lebamoff, an Indiana retailer, along with several Michigan wine consumers, challenged the recently amended Liquor Control Code, which permits in-state retailers to deliver alcohol directly to consumers through state-licensed “third party facilitators,” or common carriers, such as FedEx or UPS. The court concluded that Michigan’s decision to limit the ability to deliver directly to consumers to Michigan retailers could be justified as promoting non-protectionist, legitimate state interests, including public health and safety. Moreover, the court noted that because a similar Indiana law has been upheld, if the Michigan law was not upheld, this would mean that “Indiana retailers could make direct deliveries within Michigan, but Michigan retailers could not do the same in Indiana. That’s no way to run a railroad—or manage cross-border trade.” The court rejected Lebamoff’s claim that the law violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, noting it is well settled that the right to sell alcohol is not “a privilege or immunity under the similarly-worded Fourteenth Amendment.” It also noted that even if the district court had been correct in ruling that the Michigan law violated the dormant Commerce Clause, it should have returned things to the pre-2017 status quo, not altered “Michigan’s alcohol distribution system by extending delivery rights to out-of-state retailers[.]” Remanded.
Municipal utility pricing dispute; Breach of contract; Applicability of the rules of statutory interpretation to municipal ordinances; Bonner v. City of Brighton; Strong presumption that statutes do not create contractual rights; Studier v. Michigan Pub. Sch. Employees’ Ret. Bd.; Unjust enrichment; Belle Isle Grill Corp. v. Detroit; Wright v. Genesee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs; The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) (MCL 691.1401 et seq.); Whether an ordinance afforded plaintiffs a private right of action; Myers v. City of Portage; Lash v. City of Traverse City; Availability of a common-law action to allow recovery for unlawful extractions; Pingree v. Mutual Gas Co.; Hyde Park Coop. v. City of Detroit; Bond v. Public Sch. of Ann Arbor Sch. Dist.; City of Detroit v. Martin; The law of the case doctrine; Grievance Adm’r v. Lopatin; Claim for declaratory relief; In re Bradley Estate
On remand from the Supreme Court to reconsider plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim in light of Wright and, as necessary, issues defendant-City of Flint raised that it did not previously consider, the court held that Flint was entitled to summary disposition on plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims. As to the unjust enrichment claims (Counts II and IV), it held that Count IV properly set forth a claim based on an unlawful extraction, but Count II only alleged a statutory violation, for which no private right of action for money damages was available. Thus, Flint was entitled to summary disposition of Count II but not Count IV. The law of the case doctrine barred Count V (alleging Flint unlawfully used its sewer and water revenues for the general fund), but the trial court did not err in denying summary disposition on Count VI (for declaratory relief). The case involved a municipal utility pricing dispute. Plaintiffs alleged in their first amended complaint that Flint’s ordinances created a contract for the provision of water services. However, the court concluded, based on their plain language, that the relevant ordinances did not expressly “state any intent to bind defendant contractually with regard to pricing structures.” Plaintiffs in fact admitted in their appellate brief that no express contract existed. Even assuming an intent to contract could be inferred from the ordinances, such an inference was insufficient. “On their face, the ordinances are equally susceptible—if not more so—to a reasonable interpretation that they were merely intended to state Flint’s policy with regard to rate calculation. Also fatal to plaintiffs breach of contract claims is that the ordinances did not state (or imply in any way), that Flint would be unable to subsequently amend them.” However, as to the unjust enrichment claims, in Count IV “plaintiffs expressly identified the 22% increase to the water and sewer rates as the misconduct that resulted in plaintiffs’ overpaying for water and sewer services.” The court concluded in a prior appeal (Kincaid II) that some of the “rate increases violated the applicable ordinances.” Thus, there was an unlawful extraction. Further, as the Supreme Court made clear in Wright, the GTLA does not bar an unjust enrichment claim. It also does not provide governmental immunity for declaratory relief claims. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Trakhtenberg; People v. Matuszak; People v. Moore; People v. Payne; Failure to raise a meritless or novel argument; People v. Ericksen; People v. Crews; Failure to request a jury instruction on defense of others; People v. Everett; People v. Mills; Effect of a defendant being the initial aggressor; People v. Riddle; Third-degree home invasion; MCL 750.110a(4)(a); Malicious destruction of a building under $200; MCL 750.380(5); The Self-Defense Act (MCL 780.971 et seq.); Defense of others; MCL 780.972(2); MCL 780.973; People v. Dupree; People v. Traver; Failure to present certain evidence; People v. Lane; Trial strategy; People v. Dunigan; People v. Carbin; Advising defendant to reject a plea offer before trial; People v. Geno; Laffler v. Cooper; Sentencing; Proportionality; People v. Lockridge; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Milbourn; People v. Smith; People v. Walden; People v. Dixon-Bey; People v. Lawhorn; OV 19; MCL 777.49(a); People v. Carpenter; Abandoned issue; People v. McGraw
The court held that both defendants were not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Also, as to defendant-Jeremiah Leffew, the trial court articulated sufficient support for the out-of-guidelines sentence it imposed, and acted within its discretion and imposed a reasonable sentence, one “that was proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Defendant-Micheline Leffew was convicted of third-degree home invasion for which she was sentenced to serve five months in jail followed by a two-year term of probation. Jeremiah (her husband) was convicted of first-degree home invasion and felonious assault. He was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender to concurrent prison terms of 25 to 40 years for home invasion, and 2 to 8 years for felonious assault. Micheline argued that her counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on defense of others. The court held that notwithstanding “defense counsel may have succeeded in presenting a case at trial premised on Micheline having acted in defense of” another individual, “the defense case depended on a novel application of the law,” and therefore it “would have been an even more novel legal argument for Micheline’s counsel to have sought a jury instruction that effectively would have declared the law to be consistent with the defense presented. Simply put, the fact that a defense may have been presented does not mean that the law must be presented as if it conforms to that defense.” Further, it did not appear that the failure to request the instruction had any effect on the verdict. Jeremiah argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him to reject a plea offer before trial. After a Ginther hearing, the trial court determined that his counsel was not ineffective. “While there was some conflicting testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court’s factual conclusions are entitled to deference.” The court held that he “failed to establish that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Affirmed.
Sentence reduction under the First Step Act (§ 404); Whether 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(B) constrained the district court’s review of sentence modification motions under § 404, preventing it from considering post-sentencing factors upon resentencing; §§ 3582(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2); United States v. Rose (SD NY); § 3553(a); United States v. Christie (2d Cir.); United States v. Metcalfe; Pepper v. United States; United States v. Alexander
The court reversed the district court, holding that the First Step Act provision regarding retroactivity of the Fair Sentencing Act does not prohibit courts from considering a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct when deciding whether to reduce his or her sentence. Defendant-Allen pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and was sentenced as a career offender. He moved to reduce his sentence under § 404 of the First Step Act, arguing that his sentence and term of supervised release should be reduced because the “Fair Sentencing Act reduced [his] mandatory supervised-release term from” 10 years to 8 years, and his supervised-release term should be reduced accordingly. He also argued that because the statutory-minimum penalty for his drug offense had been lowered, the district court should reduce his prison sentence based on relevant sentencing factors, such as his age and his participation in prison classes. The district court reduced his period of supervised release, but declined to reduce his prison sentence, ruling that the First Step Act precluded consideration of post-sentencing conduct. The government conceded on appeal that this was error. Section 3582(c)(1)(B) does not “contain substantive standards that constrain the district court’s review of sentence modification motions,” as in §§ 3582(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2). Section 3582(c)(1)(B) simply empowers courts to “‘modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.’” Thus, a court is not precluded from considering the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). Reversed and remanded for consideration of Allen’s First Step Act motion.
Whether a ballot initiative petition violated the 160-day rule in MCL 168.471; The power of initiative; Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9; Construction of constitutional & statutory initiative & referendum provisions; Newsome v. Riley
Holding that the initiative petition at issue did not violate the 160-day cutoff in MCL 168.471, the court reversed summary disposition for defendants and remanded to defendant-Secretary of State (SOS) to forward the petition to defendant-Board of State Canvassers. Plaintiffs “engaged in a statutory initiative campaign to ban horizontal hydraulic fracturing, which is commonly known as ‘fracking.’” The front-page summary of the petition provided that the proposal was to be voted on in the 11/8/16 general election, but no election date “was provided in the full language of the petition’s text.” Plaintiffs sought to file the petition with the SOS the day before the 2018 election. But defendant-Director of Elections refused to accept it “because the frontpage summary stated that it was to be voted on at the” 2016 general election that had already passed. Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, “that the petition did not violate MCL 168.471, which provides that petitions must be filed at least 160 days before the election at which the proposal would be voted on.” The court concluded that the “Court of Claims erred in concluding that the inclusion of an expected election date in the summary meant that the initiative could only be voted on that date. This was legal error because it is statutory law, not the circulator’s intent, that determines when an initiative is to be voted on. MCL 168.471 states in relevant part that initiative petitions ‘must be filed with the [SOS] at least 160 days before the election at which the proposed law would appear on the ballot if the legislature rejects or fails to enact the proposed law.’” Because the petitions “are not required to state the election at which the proposed law will appear,” the court did not see any reason “why the reference to an already-passed election should be the date from which the 160-day period is calculated. By statute, the petition may not be voted on in an election less than 160 days away, and so, whatever the petitioner’s intent, the relevant election date is the next one that is at least 160 days away.” This part of MCL 168.471 was satisfied. The Court of Claims also erred when it found that the petition was not filed on 11/5/18. Even assuming the SOS “had the authority to reject it, the basis for doing so was erroneous. Because the Director wrongly refused to accept the filing, the petition must be treated as having been filed on that day.”
Michigan’s No-Fault Insurance Act (the Act) (MCL 300.3101 et seq.); Whether the future PIP benefits claim was or could have been resolved in a prior case; Res judicata; Washington v. Sinai Hosp. of Greater Detroit; Adair v. State; Sewell v. Clean Cut Mgmt., Inc.; Principle that a court may determine future liability under the Act & preclude payment until an expense is actually incurred; Rose v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Proudfoot v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.; Distinguishing Lewis v. Aetna Cas. Co.
The court held that because the Wayne Circuit Court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s prior case operated as a decision on the merits, the trial court correctly determined that his claim for future PIP benefits was resolved in the first action. Thus, the trial court properly granted defendant-insurer summary disposition on the basis of res judicata, and did not err when it denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred when it held that the doctrine of res judicata applied to his claim for future PIP benefits. Citing the Act and two unpublished decisions, he disputed that the Wayne Circuit Court resolved his claim for PIP benefits accruing after 10/25/17. Plaintiff also argued “that a claimant may only waive unaccrued future PIP benefits through language in a court order specifically referencing a waiver or release.” As a result, plaintiff contended that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition, and denied his motion for reconsideration. “However, the plain language of plaintiff’s complaint filed in Wayne Circuit Court sought ‘compensatory damages, including Plaintiff’s damages incurred after the filing of this Complaint.’ Such an explicit request” contradicted plaintiff’s contention “that the Wayne Circuit Court case did not include a claim for future damages.” Michigan law gave the Wayne Circuit Court “authority to address plaintiff’s claim for future PIP benefits, accrued before, during, or after” 10/25/17. He sought an award of future benefits in his complaint. His first complaint was dismissed with prejudice on the basis of discovery violations. While he relied on Lewis, that case did not extend to or support his “assertion that future PIP benefits in a no-fault personal injury benefits case can only be waived by a court order specifically referencing a waiver or release.” Further, it did not touch upon the res judicata doctrine.
Slip & fall on ice; Premises liability; Negligence; Benton v. Dart Props., Inc.; Duty; Sanders v. Perfecting Church; Hoffner v. Lanctoe; Whether plaintiff was an invitee or licensee; Pippin v. Atallah; Open & obvious danger; Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc.; Principle that a snow-covered surface, by its very nature, presents an open & obvious danger because of the high probability that it may be slippery; Ververis v. Hartfield Lanes (On Remand); “Special aspects”; Whether the condition was effectively unavoidable; Lymon v. Freedland; Bullard v. Oakwood Annapolis Hosp.; Effect of defendant’s notice of the condition
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendant because the ice on which plaintiff fell was open and obvious and not effectively unavoidable. Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell on ice in defendant’s driveway. The trial court dismissed her claim, finding there was no genuine issue of material fact that the hazard presented by the snowy condition of the driveway was open and obvious and not effectively unavoidable. On appeal, the court found there was “no genuine issue of material fact that the hazardous risk was open and obvious because a reasonably prudent person would have observed the snowy and icy conditions of the driveway and foreseen the accompanying danger of slipping.” Simply because she “did not see a particular patch of ice or snow does not negate the application of the open-and-obvious doctrine.” Further, the danger “was not effectively unavoidable.” Finally, given that “the hazardous condition was open and obvious (without any special aspects making it nonetheless unreasonable), [defendant] had no duty to remedy the condition and it was irrelevant whether she knew of” it. Affirmed.
Petition to remove a personal representative (PR) & successor trustee; Whether a settlement agreement should be set aside due to lack of notice or participation in the mediation; MCR 5.120; The Estates & Protected Individuals Code (MCL 700.1101 et seq.); MCL 700.7814; MCL 700.3705(d); An agreement to settle a lawsuit as a contract; Walbridge Aldinger Co. v. Walcon Corp.; Whether the agreement should be set aside due to lack of mutual assent; Angelo DiPonio Equip. Co. v. State Dep’t of State Hwys. & Transp.; Meeting of the minds as to all essential elements; Siegel v. Spinny; Consideration; Yoches v. City of Dearborn; Sands Appliance Serv., Inc. v. Wilson; Fraud; Hord v. Environmental Research Inst. of MI; Impossibility of performance; Roberts v. Farmers Ins. Exch.; Rogers Plaza, Inc. v. SS Kresge Co.; Interpretation of an account beneficiary form; A non-probate transfer on death account; MCL 700.6101(1)(a); MCL 700.6309; Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.119(F)(3); Palpable defined; Stamp v. Mill St. Inn
Holding that the probate court erred in finding that appellant-Barbara Brown was bound by the Settlement Agreement (SA) given that she did not receive notice of or participate in the mediation, the court reversed the order granting appellee-PR’s (Randall Brown) petition for entry of a final order dismissing the petition and the case pursuant to the SA as it related to Barbara. It vacated the portions of the order providing that the SA was binding and enforceable as to her, and remanded. However, the court affirmed in all other respects, concluding that appellants failed to show the SA should be set aside as to appellant-Farmer. The parties’ father, testator Meddie Allen Brown, “devised for the assets of his trust to be distributed among them. Randall was appointed” PR of the estate and the trust’s successor trustee. Farmer petitioned the probate court in propria persona to remove Randall as PR and trustee. The probate court “dismissed the appellants’ petition for removal and approved closure of the estate based on” the SA. It found that “Barbara was bound by the actions of fiduciary Randall under MCR 5.120 where she had not previously intervened in mediation or appeared for any other court proceedings.” The court held that the probate court erred. The only notice Barbara was sent about the mediation was a 2/22/17 letter from the probate court to all interested parties with the Pre-Trial Scheduling Conference Order attached. Randall relied on this “as having fulfilled the requirements of MCR 5.120.” However, this letter “was sent from the probate court and not the fiduciary as was required by MCR 5.120. It was not followed by any other notice from the fiduciary to keep the interested parties reasonably informed. The court’s notice did not advise the interested parties of their rights to intervene.” In the absence of the notices required by MCR 5.120, Barbara was not bound. The court noted there is “no temporal requirement in the rule or in case law” as to when an interested person has to intervene. Barbara also was not bound because “neither she nor any person with authority to represent her signed” the SA. But the probate court did not err in refusing to set it aside as to Farmer on the basis of lack of mutual assent, or in interpreting a beneficiary form to find that an account’s proceeds were payable only to Randall.
Requirements for certain donations to be tax-deductible; Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 170(h)(5)(A); General rule that taxpayers cannot take a charitable deduction for a donation of a partial interest in property (such as an easement); I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(A); Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(a); “Qualified conservation contribution” exception; § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii); §§ 170(h)(1)(C), (4)(A)(iv), & (4)(B); Treasury Regulations §§ 1.170A-14(d)(5) & (e); Whether the donation qualified where it was not “protected in perpetuity”; § 170(h)(5)(A); § 1.170A-14(g)(1); Glass v. Commissioner; Distinguishing Kaufman v. Shulman (1st Cir.) & Commissioner v. Simmons (DC Cir.); Whether the Tax Court erred by denying the request to reform the donation agreement; Woods v. Commissioner (TC); Kelley v. Commissioner (9th Cir.); Anchor v. O’Toole; Greer v. Commissioner; “Remote future events”; § 1.170A-14(g)(3); Mitchell v. Commissioner (10th Cir.); Alioto v. Commissioner
On appeal from the Tax Court, the court held that petitioner-Hoffman’s donation of an easement in property did not constitute a “qualified conservation contribution” and did not merit a tax deduction where the donation was not “protected in perpetuity.” Hoffman donated an easement to a preservation society and agreed not to change the façade of an historic building that it owned. Hoffman sought a charitable deduction for the donation, arguing that it was a qualified conservation contribution. In order to take this deduction, I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) requires that the donation be protected “in perpetuity.” The Tax Court ruled that Hoffman was not entitled to claim the deduction because Hoffman’s donation permitted it to “‘make harmful changes to the donation whenever the donee fails to act within 45 days of the proposed change.’” Applying Ohio contract law, the court first held that the donation agreement failed to protect conservation rights in perpetuity. It then considered Hoffman’s argument that the restrictions were “perpetual because they will always be a part of the agreement and might prevent future changes to the donation.” It held that the “Revenue Code doesn’t care about the mere existence of restrictions; it requires that the donation ‘protect[]’ the conservation purposes ‘in perpetuity.’” The court noted that the agreement’s 45-day provision “distinguishes this case from others where courts have upheld tax deductions based on similar donations[,]” like Kaufman and Simmons. The agreements in those cases included provisions that permitted “the donee ‘to give its consent (e.g., to changes in the Façade) or to abandon some or all of its rights’ in the donation.” The court upheld the Tax Court’s refusal to allow Hoffman to reform the donation agreement where Hoffman did not show that the refusal was an abuse of discretion. The court rejected its claim that this case fell “within the narrow exception to the perpetuity requirement for remote future events.” To qualify, “the possibility that the conservation purpose may be defeated must be ‘so remote as to be negligible.’” Hoffman’s donation agreement contained “multiple terms that specifically address the possibility that the conservation purpose would be defeated. Given that fact, it’s hard to see how the possibility was ‘so highly improbable that it might be ignored.’” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), & (j); Adjudication; Due process; In re Ferranti; In re Sanders; MCR 3.971(C)(1) & (2); MCR 3.971(A) & (B); Waiver of right to present evidence; Referee’s factual findings; MCL 712A.2(b)(2); In re Miller; Ineffective assistance of counsel; In re Martin; People v. Sabin (On Second Remand); People v. Jordan; Failure to object to the referee’s decision that it was unnecessary to follow MCR 3.971(C) & give the respondent-mother a full advice of rights as to the stipulation to jurisdiction at the adjudication hearing; Sufficiency of attorney’s attempt to make a record of respondent’s agreement to the procedure
Holding that the trial court did not plainly err by deciding that there was a statutory basis for its jurisdiction as to respondent-mother, and she was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, the court affirmed termination of her parental rights to the children. The mother argued that “her adjudication was deficient and violated her constitutional due process rights such that the termination proceedings were void ab initio." She maintained that “by ‘stipulating to jurisdiction,’ she ‘was in actuality admitting the material allegations of the petition,’ which ‘had the same effect as if she had tendered a plea to the petition.’” She argued that as a result, the referee was obligated to comply with MCR 3.971 in accepting her “plea.” The mother argued on appeal that her ‘“stipulat[ion] to jurisdiction’ constituted a plea that required compliance with MCR 3.971(C)(1) and (2)[.]” However, MCR 3.971 was not implicated because her “adjudication was not based on a ‘plea’ of admission or no contest.” Rather, unlike in Ferranti, she “actually had an adjudication trial during which the DHHS presented its entire case and rested, and the lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL) for the children called one witness and presented the witness’s direct testimony. It was only after this point that mother decided to ‘stipulate[e] to jurisdiction.’” Thus, the mother “waived her right to present her own evidence to rebut that of the DHHS and the children’s LGAL.” The record reflected that her “adjudication was based on the evidence introduced at her trial rather than on any admission or ‘plea’ by her, and her due process rights were thus protected.” Because her “adjudication was not based on a plea of admission or no contest, MCR 3.971 was not implicated and the referee did not commit plain error by not applying this court rule under the factual circumstances of this case.”