Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), & (j); Adjudication; Due process; In re Ferranti; In re Sanders; MCR 3.971(C)(1) & (2); MCR 3.971(A) & (B); Waiver of right to present evidence; Referee’s factual findings; MCL 712A.2(b)(2); In re Miller; Ineffective assistance of counsel; In re Martin; People v. Sabin (On Second Remand); People v. Jordan; Failure to object to the referee’s decision that it was unnecessary to follow MCR 3.971(C) & give the respondent-mother a full advice of rights as to the stipulation to jurisdiction at the adjudication hearing; Sufficiency of attorney’s attempt to make a record of respondent’s agreement to the procedure

Holding that the trial court did not plainly err by deciding that there was a statutory basis for its jurisdiction as to respondent-mother, and she was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, the court affirmed termination of her parental rights to the children. The mother argued that “her adjudication was deficient and violated her constitutional due process rights such that the termination proceedings were void ab initio." She maintained that “by ‘stipulating to jurisdiction,’ she ‘was in actuality admitting the material allegations of the petition,’ which ‘had the same effect as if she had tendered a plea to the petition.’” She argued that as a result, the referee was obligated to comply with MCR 3.971 in accepting her “plea.” The mother argued on appeal that her ‘“stipulat[ion] to jurisdiction’ constituted a plea that required compliance with MCR 3.971(C)(1) and (2)[.]” However, MCR 3.971 was not implicated because her “adjudication was not based on a ‘plea’ of admission or no contest.” Rather, unlike in Ferranti, she “actually had an adjudication trial during which the DHHS presented its entire case and rested, and the lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL) for the children called one witness and presented the witness’s direct testimony. It was only after this point that mother decided to ‘stipulate[e] to jurisdiction.’” Thus, the mother “waived her right to present her own evidence to rebut that of the DHHS and the children’s LGAL.” The record reflected that her “adjudication was based on the evidence introduced at her trial rather than on any admission or ‘plea’ by her, and her due process rights were thus protected.” Because her “adjudication was not based on a plea of admission or no contest, MCR 3.971 was not implicated and the referee did not commit plain error by not applying this court rule under the factual circumstances of this case.”