Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; Whether the Ex parte Young doctrine barred plaintiffs’ case for equitable & prospective relief; Virginia Office for Prot. & Advocacy v Stewart; Westside Mothers v Haveman; Whether the suit was barred because it is the functional equivalent of a quiet title action against the State; Idaho v Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho; Whether the suit sought specific performance of a State of Michigan easement contract
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court found that the district court properly denied defendants-state officials’ motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity, holding that plaintiff-Enbridge’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit interference with the operation of its Mackinac pipeline fell within the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Enbridge brought this federal action against Governor Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources alleging that their threat to revoke Enbridge’s pipeline easement at the Straits of Mackinac over environmental concerns violates federal law. Plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting any interference with the operation of the pipeline. The district court ruled that Enbridge’s action fell under the Ex parte Young doctrine, which provides that suits for equitable and prospective relief for a constitutional or federal violation against a named state official are not “suit[s] against the state,” and not barred by sovereign immunity. Defendants argued that an exception to the doctrine applied because the case was actually “the functional equivalent of a quiet title action against the State and would unduly infringe on the State’s sovereignty interests in its submerged bottomlands.” However, the court noted that Enbridge was only seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent alleged interference and “would not deprive the state of ‘substantially all benefits of ownership and control’ over the State’s submerged lands.” The court also rejected defendants’ argument that the suit was barred because it seeks “specific performance” of a State of Michigan easement contract, thus falling outside of Young. It found that Enbridge did not bring a “contract claim at all.” Instead, it asserted “the efforts of the defendants (individual state officers) to stop the operation of the pipeline violate federal law and the Constitution. And Enbridge requests a quintessential Young injunction prohibiting the defendants from violating federal law.” Affirmed.
Quiet title; Goodspeed v Nichols; The unclean-hands doctrine
The court affirmed the trial court’s order quieting title to the property to plaintiff/counterdefendant, the City. Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff-Appellant, Moby Dick, argued that title should be quieted in its favor because the City conveyed the property to defendant-B&C by delivering a facially valid quitclaim deed. The parties disagreed “about the City’s intent in delivering the deed to B&C and dispute various aspects of the record in that regard. They disagree[d], for instance, about whether the quitclaim deed was marked ‘COPY,’ and whether the City assessed taxes against B&C related to the property.” However, it was undisputed “that B&C never paid any of the consideration owed in exchange for conveyance of the property, contrary to the plain language of the quitclaim deed.” The court agreed “with the trial court that this undisputed fact is dispositive in this case and entitles to the City to have title quieted in its favor.” The parties’ intent was “embodied in the express language of the quitclaim deed—the City would convey the property to B&C in exchange for $250,000. Because the consideration was never paid, delivery of the quitclaim deed was ineffective to convey title to the property. While delivery of the deed raises a presumption of intent to pass title, that presumption ‘is not conclusive and may be rebutted by the evidence,’ as it was here by the undisputed facts of the case.” Moby Dick contended “that, while the City may have a breach-of-contract claim against B&C for its failure to pay the consideration for the deed, that failure is immaterial to the effectiveness of the conveyance.” Moby Dick relied on Goodspeed. “Unlike this case, Goodspeed did not involve a complete failure of consideration.” Rather, the court noted “in Goodspeed, the defendant paid part of the consideration owed and the parties’ dispute centered around the terms of their tangential agreement regarding the condition of the property. Thus, contrary to Moby Dick’s assertion, Goodspeed does not support its contention that the failure of consideration is irrelevant to whether the City validly conveyed title to B&C and that the City’s only recourse is damages claim against B&C for breach of contract.” Moby Dick also argued that the City was “not entitled to judgment in its favor under the unclean-hands doctrine.” The court held that at “most, the evidence may show that the City acted negligently with respect to the quitclaim deed, but ‘[m]ere negligence . . . do[es] not constitute facts giving rise to the application of the doctrine of unclean hands.’”
Motion for a mistrial; Unredacted police interview video shown to the jury; Prosecutorial error; Expressions of personal opinion; Disparaging defense counsel; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object; Jury verdict form & jury instructions; Opportunity to find defendant guilty of CSC I under MCL 750.520b(1)(a) without subjecting him to a 25-year mandatory minimum sentence under (2)(b); Waiver; Use of the word “victim”; Sentencing; Failure to articulate why a within-guidelines sentence was proportionate; People v Posey
Concluding defendant did not show that he was unfairly prejudiced by the jury seeing two unredacted portions of his police interview video, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial. It also rejected his prosecutorial error and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Finally, it found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, to 30 to 75 years for his CSC I conviction. He first argued that he should have been granted “a mistrial after two portions of defendant’s police interview video were played for the jury, contrary to the parties’ pretrial agreement to redact them.” The court disagreed, noting that the “two references were brief and made during an over half-hour long video. The segments did not provide details on any past ‘domestic’ or CPS encounter. The video did not reveal the nature of the ‘domestic’ or whether defendant was the aggressor. The video also did not detail [his] involvement in the CPS matter.” Further, he failed to show “the inclusion of the unredacted video clips was outcome-determinative. There was significant evidence of defendant’s guilt presented at trial. The jury was able to hear [victim-]AW’s first-hand account of the assaults. The jury also heard testimony from AW’s mother and caretaker, who described AW’s behavioral changes, including locking her bedroom door at night while in her mother’s home with defendant. The jury further heard testimony about AW’s forensic interview team ruling out certain alternative hypotheses about why AW would say defendant assaulted her, including that her mother was behind the allegations despite AW not having revealed them to her mother. Furthermore, eight-year-old AW began puberty early, a process that the pediatric doctor testified had been correlated with sexual abuse.” The court additionally found that “the jury could infer defendant’s guilt on the basis of statements he made during his” police interview. While he “denied assaulting AW, he admitted to going into her bedroom at night as she had described. Defendant also made certain comments to [the detective] that the jury could find incriminating[.]” The court further concluded that, “to the extent the inclusion of the unredacted video had some prejudicial effect, . . . [a]ny potential prejudice could have been eliminated by a curative jury instruction.” Affirmed.
Motion to set aside a conviction; MCL 780.621d; People v Butka; Principle that the nature of the offense itself does not preclude the setting aside of an offender’s conviction; People v Rosen
The court held that the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion to set aside his conviction. He pled guilty in the district court to accosting a child for an immoral purpose. Three years later, he filed a motion to set aside his conviction, which was denied. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court based its decision solely on the nature of the offense, which was improper, and did not render adequate findings to account for both of the statutory elements. It noted that the trial court did not articulate a determination on whether defendant’s circumstances and good behavior weighed against setting aside his conviction. And with “respect to the public welfare, [it] noted only that it had not received input from the victim of the offense and that the nature of the offense was ‘pretty troubling.’” But it “did not address how setting aside defendant’s conviction would be contrary to the ‘prosperity, wellbeing, or convenience of the public at large,’ by impacting, for example, the societal interests of safety, order, and morals.” The court directed that on remand “the petition should be considered under the proper legal framework, consistent with MCL 780.621d, and the holdings set forth in Rosen, and Butka.” The trial court “shall conduct a new evidentiary hearing and petitioner shall be permitted to supplement the record with additional information, e.g., affidavits, professional assessments, witness testimony, etc.” Reversed and remanded.
Challenge to the appointment of a county “clerk-register” under the Michigan Election Law; Const 1963, art 6, § 14; MCL 168.209(1) & (2); MacDonald v De Waele; Whether a group of circuit court judges is a “public body” under the Open Meetings Act (OMA); MCL 15.262(a); In re 1976 PA 267; Menominee Cnty Taxpayers Alliance, Inc v Menominee Cnty Clerk; Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) based on lack of standing; Separation of powers; Request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); MCL 15.233(1); “Public body” under the FOIA; MCL 15.232(h)(iii); Judiciary exception; MCL 15.232(h)(iv); “Public record” & “FOIA coordinator”
The court held that: (1) plaintiff-Ruggiero had standing under the OMA but not under Michigan Election Law; (2) defendant-Unnamed Body was the proper body to fill the clerk-register vacancy at issue; (3) the Unnamed Body was not a public body under the OMA; and (4) the FOIA’s judiciary exception did not apply in this case. Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases challenged the process that the Unnamed Body (a group of circuit court judges) used to fill defendant-county’s clerk-register vacancy. “The Unnamed Body did not hold any public meetings or keep meeting minutes, and there was no notice provided to the public regarding the interviews, deliberations, or appointment.” Plaintiff-Bailey’s FOIA request was denied on the basis that the judiciary was explicitly excluded from the definition of a “public body.” The trial court ruled in favor of defendants. On appeal, the court first found that while Ruggiero “had standing under the OMA to pursue her claims against the Unnamed Body regarding compliance with that Act, she failed to show standing regarding her claims involving the Michigan Election Law.” It also found that the “Unnamed Body was the proper body to fill the vacancy in the office of clerk-register, thereby dispensing with Bailey’s claims on this front.” It further held that “the Unnamed Body was not a public body for purposes of the OMA, and applying that Act to the Unnamed Body would violate the Separation of Powers Clause.” Finally, it determined that “Bailey’s FOIA request was brought against” the county, “which meant the exception of the judiciary from the FOIA was inapplicable. His complaint satisfied the requirements for bringing a FOIA action against” defendant-county, thereby shifting the burden to the county “to show a valid reason for the denial.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Challenge to judges’ appearance on the ballot; Alleged false statement on an affidavit of identity (AOI); MCL 168.558(2); Effect of a failure to disclose the pertinent jurisdiction; MI Admin R 168.2(2); Alleged failure to file two copies of an AOI; MCL 168.558(1); Mootness; The “likely to recur, yet evade judicial review” exception; Effect of a failure to obtain judicial review because of the voluntary conduct of a plaintiff; League of Women Voters of MI v Secretary of State; Effect of a plaintiff’s failure to request expedited review under MCL 600.321(1)(c) or immediate consideration under MCR 7.211(C)(6)
The court held that because the election at issue has passed and plaintiff failed to request an expedited appeal, his challenges were moot and no exception to mootness applied. Plaintiff sought to keep two incumbent judges off the 11/24 general election ballot, contending each judge made false statements in her AOI or failed to submit two copies of the AOI. The Court of Claims granted summary disposition for defendant, finding there was “no question of fact that the judges filed two copies of their AOIs,” and that “the statute did not require candidates to disclose counties in which they previously ran for election or nomination.” On appeal, the court held that because the general election had passed, the appeal was moot. It noted that although “a court may address a moot issue under some circumstances, doing so [was] unwarranted in this case because of plaintiff’s lack of diligence in prosecuting this appeal.” When plaintiff “filed his claim of appeal, there remained more than a month to litigate this matter to finality before defendant’s deadline for certifying candidates. Instead of seeking expedited review” or immediate consideration, he “essentially neglected the case for three months. He did not file a brief until this Court warned him that it was overdue, and he filed it almost two weeks after the election took place.” Thus, his “inaction ensured that this matter was not timely reviewed. This Court cannot craft any practical relief in this matter, and, because it could have done so but for plaintiff’s delays,” it declined to consider his moot issues. Dismissed.
Civil action alleging criminal wrongdoing & fiduciary malfeasance by a public high school related to books; A complaint alleging criminal offenses; MCR 6.101(C); People v Joker; Revised School Code (RSC)
“In this civil action alleging criminal wrongdoing and fiduciary malfeasance by a public high school for offering books with sexually explicit content in the library,” the court affirmed “the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition on multiple grounds.” Plaintiffs conceded “that they failed to secure prosecutorial endorsement or pay security for costs to bring a criminal action against defendants, pursuant to MCR 6.101.” They nevertheless insisted “that the alleged criminal violations ‘form the basis for the allegations of criminal malfeasance in the Mandamus and Declaratory Judgment actions for which the case was brought.’” Plaintiffs further maintained that, because “this is a Mandamus/Declaratory Judgment action, bearing the ‘AW’ case filing, we must resolve, on appeal, whether summary judgment on the [criminal] allegations” was properly found. This claim lacked merit. “Accepting all factual allegations as true, and deciding the motion on the pleadings alone, the trial court properly found that plaintiffs could not initiate criminal prosecution without the prosecutor’s endorsement or filing a security.” Because plaintiffs argued “that the relief sought—mandamus and declaratory judgment—depend on these criminal allegations, the trial court could not grant this relief on the basis of the improperly raised criminal claims.” Insofar as they later claimed “that the security costs should be waived or reduced because plaintiffs’ counsel was working pro bono and the issue presented was one of great public concern, this Court held in” Joker, that “even if a complainant was indigent he was not entitled to post a purely nominal sum as security for costs.” Thus, their “failure to follow MCR 6.101(C) renders their criminal allegations unenforceable.” The court held that no “additional ‘factual development could possibly justify discovery’ because plaintiffs conceded that they did not follow proper procedures and they cannot waive security costs under MCR 6.101(C).” Thus, they “failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.” Plaintiffs also argued “that the trial court’s denial of their requested civil relief was improper because a writ of mandamus or declaratory judgment are appropriate enforcement mechanisms for RSC violations or criminal statutory violations.” Again, this argument lacked merit. Because plaintiffs lacked “the capacity to bring their claim and request relief, the trial court did not err in granting defendants summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8).” The court also agreed “with the trial court that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek declaratory relief.” Finally, given “plaintiffs’ procedural failures in bringing their claims, and the fact that all plaintiffs’ claims would remain uncontestably dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(1), (C)(4), or (C)(5) even were we to reverse the trial court’s ruling under (C)(8), we decline to review the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.”
Child’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts; Principle that the focus of the best-interest determination is on the child, not the parent; In re Schadler; Remedy
Concluding that, in determining whether termination was in the child’s (JJR) best interests, the trial court improperly focused on respondent-father, rather than JJR, the court held that “the trial court committed clear error in its best-interest analysis.” JJR was removed from the father’s “care after skeletal exams revealed ‘multiple rib fractures in multiple healing stages as well as a left clavicle fracture’ and a classical metaphyseal lesion in his femur. JJR’s doctors determined that his injuries were the result of ‘nonaccidental trauma[.]’” The father asserted that the injuries were accidental and “refused to accept responsibility for his actions regarding the events that caused his son to be removed and placed in care.” In ruling that terminating the father’s rights was not in JJR’s best interests, “the trial court considered the fact that JJR was placed with respondent-mother, finding that he was doing well in her care, so there would be no need for adoption. But while [it] expressed concern about respondent-father’s ‘spotty’ participation in supervised parenting time, it found termination was not in JJR’s best interests because it was ‘persuaded that there’s enough here that [respondent] wants to be a positive influence in his, his son’s life[.]’” But the court noted that the “focus of the best-interest determination is on the child, not on the parent.” As to the appropriate remedy for the clear error, while the DHHS demanded reversal of the trial court’s best-interests decision, “entry of such an order does not dictate whether the trial court should be afforded the opportunity to again conduct a best-interest analysis.” The court concluded “that the trial court’s flawed analytical approach led to the flawed outcome” it identified, and that the most appropriate remedy was to vacate the trial court’s decision as to JJR’s best interests and remand for further consideration of whether terminating the father’s parental rights is in JJR’s best interests. In conducting this analysis, it “should go through each of the best-interest factors, making findings from JJR’s perspective as to whether each factor weighs against or in favor of” terminating the father’s rights. Reversed and remanded.