Challenge to the appointment of a county “clerk-register” under the Michigan Election Law; Const 1963, art 6, § 14; MCL 168.209(1) & (2); MacDonald v De Waele; Whether a group of circuit court judges is a “public body” under the Open Meetings Act (OMA); MCL 15.262(a); In re 1976 PA 267; Menominee Cnty Taxpayers Alliance, Inc v Menominee Cnty Clerk; Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) based on lack of standing; Separation of powers; Request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); MCL 15.233(1); “Public body” under the FOIA; MCL 15.232(h)(iii); Judiciary exception; MCL 15.232(h)(iv); “Public record” & “FOIA coordinator”

The court held that: (1) plaintiff-Ruggiero had standing under the OMA but not under Michigan Election Law; (2) defendant-Unnamed Body was the proper body to fill the clerk-register vacancy at issue; (3) the Unnamed Body was not a public body under the OMA; and (4) the FOIA’s judiciary exception did not apply in this case. Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases challenged the process that the Unnamed Body (a group of circuit court judges) used to fill defendant-county’s clerk-register vacancy. “The Unnamed Body did not hold any public meetings or keep meeting minutes, and there was no notice provided to the public regarding the interviews, deliberations, or appointment.” Plaintiff-Bailey’s FOIA request was denied on the basis that the judiciary was explicitly excluded from the definition of a “public body.” The trial court ruled in favor of defendants. On appeal, the court first found that while Ruggiero “had standing under the OMA to pursue her claims against the Unnamed Body regarding compliance with that Act, she failed to show standing regarding her claims involving the Michigan Election Law.” It also found that the “Unnamed Body was the proper body to fill the vacancy in the office of clerk-register, thereby dispensing with Bailey’s claims on this front.” It further held that “the Unnamed Body was not a public body for purposes of the OMA, and applying that Act to the Unnamed Body would violate the Separation of Powers Clause.” Finally, it determined that “Bailey’s FOIA request was brought against” the county, “which meant the exception of the judiciary from the FOIA was inapplicable. His complaint satisfied the requirements for bringing a FOIA action against” defendant-county, thereby shifting the burden to the county “to show a valid reason for the denial.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.