Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Action for member oppression within a limited liability company (LLC) under the Michigan Limited Liability Act; MCL 450.4515; Accrual; MCL 600.5827; Trentadue v. Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co.; Moll v. Abbott Labs; Connelly v. Paul Ruddy’s Equip. Repair & Serv. Co.; Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.; The three-year limitations period of MCL 450.4515(1)(e); Whether MCL 450.4515(1)(e) constitutes a statute of repose, a statute of limitations, or both; CTS Corp. v. Waldburger; O’Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal; Sills v. Oakland Gen. Hosp.; Detroit Gray Iron & Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Martin; Johnson v. Recca; Tolling pursuant to the fraudulent-concealment statute; MCL 600.5855; Baks v. Moroun; Estes v. Idea Eng’g & Fabricating, Inc.; “Willfully unfair & oppressive conduct”; MCL 450.4515(2); Statutory construction; Epps v. 4 Quarters Restoration LLC; Robinson v. Detroit; CTS Corp. v. Waldburger
Holding that MCL 450.4515(1)(e) provides alternative statutes of limitations, and that a cause of action for LLC member oppression accrues at the time an LLC manager has substantially interfered with the interests of a member as a member, the court found that the plaintiffs’ actions for damages under MCL 450.4515(1)(e) were barred by the three-year statute of limitations unless they were entitled to tolling. Thus, it affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Plaintiffs, former employees of ePrize who acquired ownership units in the company, brought various claims against defendants, including claims for LLC member oppression, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, concluding that plaintiffs’ claims were untimely. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the gravamen of plaintiffs’ claims was for member oppression, and that the claims were timely filed. The high court disagreed. It held that “plaintiffs’ actions accrued in 2009 at the point at which they could first have sought a remedy under MCL 450.4515 based on the substantial interference with their interests as members, not in 2012 when they first incurred a calculable financial injury.” Further, “defendants allegedly substantially interfered with plaintiffs’ interests as members when the Operating Agreement was amended on March 1, 2009, to subordinate their shares, and plaintiffs’ actions thus accrued on that date, even if they did not incur a calculable financial injury until 2012.” Because “plaintiffs’ actions accrued on March 1, 2009, the three-year limitation period in MCL 450.4515(1)(e) on claims for monetary damages expired before plaintiffs filed suit on April 19, 2013.” Thus, their “claims for monetary damages are barred unless they can show on remand that defendants ‘fraudulently conceal[ed] the existence of the claim or the identity of any person who is liable for the claim[.]’ The trial court should determine on remand whether plaintiffs are entitled to tolling of their claims for damages under this provision.”
Sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of aggravated indecent exposure; MCL 750.335a(1) & (2)(b); Claim that he lacked "indecent intention"; Open exposure; People v. Neal; In re Certified Question; People v. Williams; People v. Vronko
Holding that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant openly exposed his erect penis to the victim while also putting others at substantial risk of observing him, the court affirmed his conviction. He argued that because he did nothing to wake up the victim or otherwise call attention to himself, he lacked the “indecent intention” to commit the offense. The argument failed because MCL 750.335a(2)(b) does not set forth an intent element. He also argued that he did not knowingly expose himself to the victim, but rather was merely attempting to gratify himself while she remained asleep. However, this argument failed to consider that the victim could awaken at any time, as she did sometime earlier. He also put others at substantial risk of observing him. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that his exposure was an open one.
Sentencing; People v. Lockridge; Crosby v. United States (2d Cir.); Scoring of OV 11; MCL 777.41; Penetration; MCL 777.41(2)(a)-(c); Res judicata; VanderWall v. Midkiff; Whether the trial court can consider facts concerning uncharged offenses or offenses for which the defendant was acquitted; People v. Compagnari; People v. Ewing; People v. Harris; People v. Golba; People v. Stokes; Burden of proof when scoring OVs; People v. Hardy
The court held that the trial court did not err in scoring OV 11. The defendant was convicted of CSC I, felonious assault, and domestic violence after he attacked his long-term girlfriend. In a prior appeal, the court rejected his challenges to the scoring of various OVs and PRVs, but remanded because OV 11 had been scored based on judicially-found facts. On remand, the trial court reaffirmed the earlier imposed sentences. On appeal, the court held that defendant waived his challenge to the scoring of OV 11 by failing to raise it in the initial appeal. Nonetheless, it found his challenge meritless. It rejected his argument that the scoring of OV 11 was improper because it required the trial court to score points for an offense of which defendant had been acquitted by a jury. It noted that “‘[a] lthough a trial court may not make an independent finding of guilt with respect to a crime for which a defendant has been acquitted, and then sentence the defendant on the basis of that finding, the court in fashioning an appropriate sentence may consider the evidence offered at trial, including other criminal activities established even though the defendant was acquitted of the charges . . . .’” Further, “the trial court was already warned that the guidelines are advisory and, in light of its reliance on judicially found facts, that it must determine ‘whether it would have imposed a different sentence.’” The trial court “expressly indicated ‘that it would not have imposed a different sentence.’” It “found by a preponderance of the evidence that one sexual penetration occurred, in addition to the penetration underlying the sentencing offense, to support it score for OV 11.” Affirmed.
Divorce; Parenting-time schedule; Great weight of the evidence; Corporan v. Henton; Fletcher v. Fletcher; Shade v. Wright; Proper cause or a change of circumstances; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Baker v. Baker; Established custodial environment; Rittershaus v. Rittershaus; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Hayes v. Hayes; Lieberman v. Orr; Rains v. Rains
The court held that because “the trial court’s parenting time order amounted to a change affecting the custodial environment, it committed clear legal error in its selection and application of the law from” Shade. Instead, the trial court was required to conduct a parenting-time analysis using the proper threshold under Vodvarka. The trial court determined that the child (TFV) had an established custodial environment (ECE) with both parents. The parties had agreed to alter the original custody arrangement, such that the defendant-father’s two evening sessions were combined into one overnight and his alternating weekend visitations included Friday evening. Both felt that this was in the child’s best interests because she did not like leaving the father’s care so quickly during the evening sessions. He testified that “when the child was in his care, she would come to him for guidance and parental comfort.” He was employed, enabling him to provide basic necessities for TFV. “Moreover, the parties lived in close proximity to one another as well as TFV’s school and daycare facility, making her day-to-day schedule similar in each household.” Given this evidence, it appeared that “each parent provided a secure, stable, and permanent environment for TFV.” Since the evidence did not “clearly preponderate” in favor of an alternative conclusion, the determination that an ECE existed with both parents was not against the great weight of the evidence. “The trial court’s order modifying parenting time significantly changed the amount of time” the child spent with each parent. The “agreed-to-modification of parenting time in 2014 left plaintiff with 265 overnights and defendant with 100 overnights.” The 2017 child support order that followed the trial court’s modification of parenting time indicated the parties had an equal number of 182.5 overnights. Even “where the parties shared joint physical custody, a reduction from 265 overnights to 182.5 overnights would likely affect the custodial environment of plaintiff. That was a loss of 82.5 days or approximately 11 weeks of parenting time.” Vacated and remanded.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), & (j); In re White; Child’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors
The court held that the trial court properly terminated the respondent-father’s parental rights to the child (AJS) where the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence and it was in the child’s best interests. Although the court held that to the extent that the trial court relied on § (c)(i) it clearly erred, respondent’s substance abuse qualified as an “[o]ther condition” causing AJS to come within the court’s jurisdiction (§ (c)(ii)). Further, he “received services to rectify his substance abuse, including drug screens, substance abuse counseling, and a significant period of time to show compliance and benefit from the services offered.” Despite the services, respondent continued to test positive or miss drug screens. And, although his last positive screen was in 3/16, “he had missed drug screens after that date, including missing three screens in the approximately one-month period between the second day of the termination hearing and the third day of the termination hearing.” There was also testimony that on one occasion he “deliberately dumped a urine sample and then left after refusing to give a second sample.” Moreover, despite the missed and positive drug screens, he testified that “he did not believe he had a substance abuse problem.” Defense counsel argued that “the drug screens were not accurate given that respondent self-reported using marijuana on a regular basis despite the fact that it did not turn up in the drug screens.” The child was three years old and had been in foster care for almost his entire life. Based on the record before the court, it could not hold that “the trial court clearly erred in finding that respondent had failed to rectify the condition and would be unable to do so within a reasonable time considering AJS’s young age.” Termination was also proper under §§ (g) and (j). Affirmed.