Become a mentor! The Mentor Center needs experienced attorneys to offer support & advice to young attorneys.
 
  • News and Moves

    Bodman PLC
    Michael D. Calvert
    Rachel L. Combs
    Laura M. Dinon
    Beth S. Gotthelf
    Sarah Harper
    Susan L. Johnson
    Michigan State University
    MDTC
    Aleanna B. Siacon
    Thomas S. Vaughn
    Michael E. “Mike” Wooley

 

Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.

 

 

Case Summary


Cases appear under the following practice areas:

  • Business Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75470
    Case: In re Automotive Parts Antitrust Litig.
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Bush, Batchelder, and Griffin
    Issues:

    Antitrust action under the Clayton Act & the Sherman Act; 15 USC § 26; “Direct purchasers”; Whether the case presented an exception to the “direct purchaser” standing rule under Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois; Indirect purchasers under the terms of the settlement agreement

    Summary:

    [This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court reversed the district court, holding that under Michigan law, the settlement agreements in the prior “indirect purchaser” antitrust action prohibited plaintiffs from bringing a “direct-purchaser” lawsuit. The case involved an alleged conspiracy to fix prices of anti-vibration rubber parts. Defendants argued that plaintiffs already settled their claims as part of an action brought by the class that indirectly purchased the parts. Plaintiffs argued that under Illinois Brick, they were “direct purchasers” of the parts and thus, not part of the settlement class. The district court ruled that plaintiffs were “direct purchasers under the ownership-or-control exception to the standing rule of Illinois Brick.” But the court, applying Michigan contract law, held that the settlement agreements “clearly and unambiguously” barred plaintiffs from maintaining a direct-purchaser lawsuit and thus, the district court abused its discretion by ruling to the contrary. Although the settlement excluded “direct purchasers,” the court held that the term did not apply to plaintiffs, who purchased their parts from a retailer, which in turn purchased the parts from another company, which purchased the parts from one of the defendants in both of the lawsuits. “Plaintiffs’ purchasing arrangement was not '[s]traightforward, uninterrupted,' or ‘immediate.’ And it certainly was not ‘without intermediation,’ an ‘intervening step’ or a ‘middleman.’ By definition then, it was not direct. It was indirect.” The court noted that even if plaintiffs had standing under Illinois Brick, that would not change the fact that they indirectly purchased the parts. Remanded.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Constitutional Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Litigation

    e-Journal #: 75389
    Case: Thomas v. City of Memphis, TN
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Donald, Suhrheinrich, and Griffin
    Issues:

    Jurisdiction; Dismissal of constitutional claims for declaratory & injunctive relief under 42 USC § 1983 as moot; Speech First v. Schlissel

    Summary:

    The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff-Thomas’s constitutional claims as moot where her allegedly unconstitutional removal from defendant-City of Memphis’s email listserv was “not likely to recur[,]” and the City showed that its change in media relations policy “completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Thomas sued under § 1983 for alleged violation of her constitutional rights by excluding her from the City’s Media Advisory List in retaliation for her news coverage of the mayor. Approximately 13 days after she filed her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, the City issued a new policy as to “all media advisories.” It then successfully moved to dismiss based on mootness. The court held that Thomas’s case was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It concluded that there was no actual case and controversy after the City changed its policy. Its “voluntary cessation” of the Media Advisory List mooted the case. The court found that the City’s change in its media-relations policy was a “legislative-like” rather than “ad hoc” procedure. The City’s Chief Legal Officer averred that “the City went through a formal, organized process, even if self-imposed.” Further, given that the “change in media relations policy was ‘legislative-like,’ the City need only demonstrate that it will not revert to the Media Advisory List for” the court to determine that the challenged activity was not likely to recur. While Thomas speculated “that the City might re-implement the Media Advisory List, there is nothing in the record that would suggest the City is likely to return to its old ways,” and she failed to otherwise cast doubt on its “good faith in promulgating the new policy.” The court also noted that any injunction at this point would lack “any practical effect.”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Contracts (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75354
    Case: Network Designs, LLC v. Music Hall Ctr. for the Performing Arts
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – O’Brien, Stephens, and Boonstra
    Issues:

    Breach of contract; Condition precedent; Duty to perform the contract in a skillful & workmanlike manner; Reasonableness; Account-stated claim; MCL 600.2145; Motion for relief from judgment; Fraud on the court; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(c); Usurious late fees

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court properly granted plaintiff summary disposition on plaintiff’s breach of contract and account-stated claims. It rejected defendant’s arguments that it was entitled to relief from judgment based on fraud on the court and that the trial court awarded usurious late fees under the parties’ contract. Defendant engaged plaintiff to provide information technology (IT) services for its business. The “parties’ relationship soured after defendant refused to pay plaintiff for certain outstanding invoices.” On appeal, defendant argued “(1) there was a question of fact whether plaintiff satisfied the implied condition precedent of the contract to perform services in a skillful and workmanlike manner thereby triggering defendant’s duty to pay for those services and (2) there was a question of fact whether ‘the hours expended and amount bill[ed]’ by plaintiff were reasonable.” The court found that neither argument warranted relief. Defendant’s first argument was based on a mistaken premise. “Because the duty to perform the contract in a skillful and workmanlike manner was not a condition precedent of the contract, plaintiff was not required to prove that it performed its services in a skillful and workmanlike manner in order to recover on its breach-of-contract claim.” Defendant’s claims “about the ‘excessive’ hours worked and billed by plaintiff” were not relevant to the breach-of-contract claim. “Defendant contracted with plaintiff to pay plaintiff for the hours that plaintiff worked completing IT services for defendant. Plaintiff reported the hours that it worked to defendant, and pursuant to the parties’ contract, defendant then had to pay plaintiff for its time.” Defendant did not assert that “plaintiff engaged in some type of fraud such that plaintiff did not actually work the hours for which it requested payment.” Instead, defendant only claimed “plaintiff should have charged less for the jobs it completed.” This was not a defense to defendant’s contractual obligations “to pay plaintiff for the time plaintiff actually spent completing IT services for defendant.” As to the account-stated claim, plaintiff “complied with the procedure in MCL 600.2145, and defendant failed to do the same, so plaintiff established a prima facie case that defendant owed the amount stated in plaintiff’s bill to defendant.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Criminal Law (5)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75381
    Case: People v. Hardaway
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – O’Brien, Stephens, and Boonstra
    Issues:

    Sentencing; Good-time credit; MCL 51.282(2); People v Resler; People v Grazhidani; Credit for time served; MCL 769.11b; Judgment of sentence (JOS)

    Summary:

    The court held that defendant was entitled to 60 days’ good-time credit and an additional 90 days’ credit for time served, and remanded for the trial court to amend the JOS accordingly. Defendant argued that “the trial court was required to consider his good-time credit days as the equivalent of days he actually served in jail.” The court agreed. It noted that the prosecution made no specific argument as to the issue and merely stated in its brief on appeal that it “defers to the court” on this issue. In Resler, the court “concluded that a defendant is entitled to his good-time credit when his probation is subsequently revoked and he is sentenced on the original charge, reasoning that the Legislature had not revoked good-time credit for conditional probation.” The court determined that “the trial court had exceeded its authority by declining to credit the defendant for 60 days of good time earned in jail.” It has questioned whether Resler was correctly decided. However, the court in Grazhidani “declined to declare a conflict with” Resler. It also declined to do so here, “in part because neither party has even requested that such a conflict be declared. Resler remains binding on this Court, and requires that defendant be granted the good-time credit he was awarded by the sheriff.” Also, the court concluded that the trial court erred by declining to give him credit for the 90 days he served in jail prior to his original sentence. It failed to follow the unambiguous dictate of MCL 769.11b when it sentenced him following his probation revocation.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75372
    Case: People v. Head
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Tukel, Servitto, and Rick
    Issues:

    Motion for relief from judgment; Sentencing; Violent habitual offender; Waiver

    Summary:

    The court held that a review of the merits of defendant’s argument was unnecessary because he “waived the issue of whether he was timely notified of his violent offender status that resulted in his 25-year mandatory minimum sentence.” Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying his motion for relief from judgment. Defendant “did not object to the enhancement at the trial court level, nor did he request additional time to consider his options.” But before the trial court accepted his plea offer, an exchange occurred that showed repeated acknowledgments by him that “he was required to be sentenced as a violent habitual offender and that the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence applied to him. Indeed, defendant affirmatively acknowledged his status as a violent habitual offender multiple times; he additionally stated that he understood this meant he was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment if he was convicted of second-degree murder or involuntary manslaughter.” Thus, he waived any challenge to his status as a violent habitual offender.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75375
    Case: People v. Keaton-Baldwin
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – O’Brien, Stephens, and Boonstra
    Issues:

    Probable cause; Second-degree murder; Requirement that the death be caused by an act of the defendant; “Malice”

    Summary:

    The court held that the “evidence presented at the preliminary examination was sufficient to establish probable cause that defendant committed the crime of second-degree murder.” Also, because “a showing of probable cause means that a court must bind the defendant over,” the district court abused its discretion when it declined to do so. The prosecution argued that the district court erred when it dismissed the murder charge against him on the ground that probable cause had not been established. The court agreed. It was undisputed that victim-C “died as a result of multiple blunt force traumas to the head, and that defendant presented no evidence or argument concerning lawful justification.” Thus, only the second and third elements of second-degree murder (i.e., his identity as the actor who caused C’s death and whether he acted with malice) were at issue at the preliminary examination. The evidence, when viewed in the aggregate, casted “significant doubt on defendant’s version of the events and is sufficient to lead a person of ‘ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt.’” The court held that particularly in light of the fact that probable cause is “not a very demanding threshold,” the evidence presented was sufficient to establish probable cause as to the second element of second-degree murder. The evidence strongly suggested that the harm caused to C “was done, if not with an intent to kill or cause great bodily harm, in obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences.” Also, to “the extent the district court found that probable cause had not been established that defendant had acted with malice, it erred. While the evidence supporting defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crime and state of mind was circumstantial, circumstantial evidence” was sufficient to find probable cause. Also, the circumstantial evidence presented “easily leads a person of ‘ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt.’” In other words, the facts were sufficient to establish probable cause that he “committed the crime of second-degree murder, which is all that is required to bind defendant over at a preliminary examination. The evidence may or may not definitively prove that defendant committed the crime, but that decision is not necessary at the preliminary examination; it is for the trier of fact.” Thus, he should have been bound over. Reversed and remanded.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75399
    Case: People v. Thompson
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – M.J. Kelly and Redford; Dissent - Ronayne Krause
    Issues:

    Ineffective assistance of counsel; Right to counsel; People v Tanner; Waiver; People v McElhaney; Effect of a polygraph agreement; People v Strieter; Notice of intent to offer alibi testimony; MCL 768.20; MCL 768.21(1); People v Travis; Hearsay; Unavailable declarant exception; MRE 804(b)(3); Principle that an accomplice’s statement admitted under MRE 804(b)(3) does not violate a defendant’s right of confrontation if it is a nontestimonial statement; People v Taylor

    Summary:

    The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, that the trial court did not err by excluding proposed alibi testimony, and that admission of testimony about his codefendant’s (L) statements did not violate his right of confrontation. He was convicted of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, CCW and felony-firearm. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to establish the terms of the polygraph agreement, which caused the trial court to deny his motion to suppress incriminating statements he made in the post-polygraph interview. “[R]egardless of the terms of the polygraph agreement, the record reflects that defendant was fully aware that counsel would not be present during questioning, defendant was advised of his rights and understood that he could request counsel or contact his attorney at any time during questioning but never did so, and that counsel had instructed defendant not to answer any questions after the polygraph examination but defendant disregarded counsel’s instructions and knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and proceeded to respond to further questioning.” Under the circumstances, he did not show that “defense counsel’s failure to obtain a written agreement or provide sworn testimony of the agreement’s alleged terms affected the outcome of the proceedings.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by excluding proposed alibi testimony for failure to timely provide notice of the proposed testimony, finding he failed to show it was more probable than not the exclusion of the proposed testimony affected the outcome. “Therefore, any error was harmless.” Finally, even though L identified him as the shooter, “he directly inculpated himself in the planning and execution of the armed robbery. Further, [L’s] admissions that he advised defendant to destroy evidence and his implicit warning that [witness-W] should not snitch reflected his conscious belief that he understood that his admissions exposed him to criminal liability. [L’s] statements were against his penal interests and admissible under MRE 804(b)(3). Moreover, because [L] inculpated defendant, his accomplice, and himself in the context of a narrative of events to [W] at [L’s] initiative without any prompting or inquiry, [L’s] whole statement, including the portions that inculpated defendant were admissible as substantive evidence at trial under MRE 804(b)(3).” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75390
    Case: United States v. Sheckles
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Murphy, Rogers, and Nalbandian
    Issues:

    Search & seizure; “Probable cause” to track defendant’s phone & to search his apartments; Reasonableness of a vehicle stop; Consent to search a storage unit

    Summary:

    The court held that the police had probable cause for the warrant to “ping” defendant-Sheckles’s phone where another drug dealer informed them that they were going to do a drug deal at a specified phone number. It also found no Fourth Amendment violation as to the other searches at issue. Sheckles pled guilty to five drug and firearm offenses, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress evidence. As to the search warrant to obtain his cell phone’s location data, the court held that there was probable cause where the officers learned that a known drug distributor was going to make a deal with a “Louisville distributor” at a certain phone number, and that “the phone’s location would likely yield useful evidence of criminal activity, including the distributor’s identity.” It held that this information provided a sufficient nexus between the phone’s location data and criminal activity to support a warrant. It also rejected Sheckles’s argument that because the drug deal had fallen through, there was no probable cause at the time his phone was pinged. There was still “a fair probability” that the phone pinging would reveal evidence of criminal activity after the warrant was issued. The court also held that the two warrants to search his apartments were supported by probable cause where they alleged that he was a drug dealer, and that the phone had pinged at the two apartments. Also, his vehicle was parked in one apartment’s specified spot, a complaint of suspected drug activity was made about the other apartment, and an officer smelled marijuana coming from that apartment. Further, case law supported the conclusion that “‘[i]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live.’” The court also upheld the Terry stop of Sheckles’s vehicle, concluding that the evidence the officers had “gave them at least a ‘particularized and objective basis’ to question Sheckles about his ongoing drug trafficking.” As to his claim “he had already been arrested when the officers found the handgun because they” had placed him in handcuffs, “handcuffing ‘does not affect the legitimacy of the Terry stop’ as long as the facts justify the precaution[,]” and the court held that the “officers could conclude that the facts warranted it here.” Finally, as to his challenge to the search of his storage unit, the court rejected his claim that his girlfriend was coerced into giving her consent, and noted that the unit’s rental agreement identified her as having authorized access to it. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Family Law (2)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75378
    Case: Burnham v. Burnham
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Letica, Cavanagh, and Fort Hood
    Issues:

    Divorce; Burden of proof; Fraud; Relief from judgment; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(c); Serving a motion only on defendant, not defense counsel; MCR 2.107(B)(1)(c)

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court did not err by assigning plaintiff-ex-wife the burden of proof to establish defendant-ex-husband’s alleged fraudulent concealment of three pensions at the evidentiary hearing on his motion. Also, given the testimony of his witnesses that she was privy to many conversations discussing his pensions, and his testimony that she consented to him keeping those pensions in exchange for defendant forgoing his claim to a loan repayment and down payment of the house, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting his motion to set aside the order granting her motion for relief from judgment. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred by assigning her the burden of proof because the hearing was on his motion. She contended that “defendant, as the moving party and the party requesting that her order be set aside, had the burden of proof.” The court noted that defendant’s motion “denied that plaintiff was entitled to relief on her motion due to improper service as well as her knowledge of the pensions. Plaintiff answered and maintained that she properly served defendant and that defendant defrauded her.” In addition, the trial court focused “on the question of whether fraud occurred and plaintiff voiced no objection to bearing the burden of proof. In other words, the trial court afforded defendant the opportunity to be heard on plaintiff’s allegations of fraud and imposed costs on defendant for his initial failure to answer and appear on plaintiff’s motion.” Thus, the trial court correctly placed the burden of production and proof on her. Plaintiff argued that he had defrauded her and “described the remedy available for fraud. Given this, the trial court’s opinion and order properly addressed whether plaintiff was entitled to relief on her motion.” Further, to the extent she complained that defendant and the trial “court muddled the burdens of production and proof,” the record revealed that she contributed to any error, and thus, she was not entitled to relief. Even if the court accepted her position on appeal as to “the procedural posture of defendant’s motion as technically correct, the trial court’s error would not necessarily require reversal.” The trial court determined “that defendant showed that he did not fraudulently conceal his pensions, which would accurately reflect that defendant carried his burden of proof.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75388
    Case: McLaren v. McLaren
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Jansen, Ronayne Krause, and Gadola
    Issues:

    Divorce; Marital property; Cunningham v Cunningham; Equitable division of the marital estate; Berger v Berger

    Summary:

    Determining that the trial court did not make specific factual findings on various matters, the court remanded for it to do so as to whether a Florida property was marital or separate property, its value, which party owns it, the value of plaintiff-ex-husband’s pension as it compared to the value of the marital estate awarded to defendant-ex-wife, and why the division of the marital estate was equitable. The court found that the trial court’s conclusion “that the Florida property was not marital property lacks any reasoning or analysis from which” it could assess whether this ruling was clearly erroneous. The trial court’s finding was “conclusory, and because there was ample evidence presented that the parties did purchase the Florida property together, with marital funds, during the course of the marriage, the trial court’s finding lacks the specificity required to facilitate appellate review.” As things stood, the finding as to the Florida property was “insufficient to determine whether it was clearly erroneous to categorize the property as separate property, let alone whether it was equitable to award the property to plaintiff.” In addition, however the property is categorized, “the trial court must also make specific findings regarding the value of the property, which party should retain ownership of the property, and why that ownership is equitable. If necessary, the trial court shall take additional testimony regarding this issue, and may supplement the record, in order to make more specific findings.” The court further concluded that the trial court did not make specific factual findings as to “the value of plaintiff’s pension as compared to the value of the properties awarded to defendant.” As with the failure in regard to the Florida property, the failure to make specific findings on the value of plaintiff’s pension precluded the court “from concluding whether the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous, and whether the trial court actually engineered an equitable division of the marital estate.” The court retained jurisdiction and issued an order as to the proceedings on remand.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Litigation (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Constitutional Law

    e-Journal #: 75389
    Case: Thomas v. City of Memphis, TN
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Donald, Suhrheinrich, and Griffin
    Issues:

    Jurisdiction; Dismissal of constitutional claims for declaratory & injunctive relief under 42 USC § 1983 as moot; Speech First v. Schlissel

    Summary:

    The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff-Thomas’s constitutional claims as moot where her allegedly unconstitutional removal from defendant-City of Memphis’s email listserv was “not likely to recur[,]” and the City showed that its change in media relations policy “completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Thomas sued under § 1983 for alleged violation of her constitutional rights by excluding her from the City’s Media Advisory List in retaliation for her news coverage of the mayor. Approximately 13 days after she filed her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, the City issued a new policy as to “all media advisories.” It then successfully moved to dismiss based on mootness. The court held that Thomas’s case was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It concluded that there was no actual case and controversy after the City changed its policy. Its “voluntary cessation” of the Media Advisory List mooted the case. The court found that the City’s change in its media-relations policy was a “legislative-like” rather than “ad hoc” procedure. The City’s Chief Legal Officer averred that “the City went through a formal, organized process, even if self-imposed.” Further, given that the “change in media relations policy was ‘legislative-like,’ the City need only demonstrate that it will not revert to the Media Advisory List for” the court to determine that the challenged activity was not likely to recur. While Thomas speculated “that the City might re-implement the Media Advisory List, there is nothing in the record that would suggest the City is likely to return to its old ways,” and she failed to otherwise cast doubt on its “good faith in promulgating the new policy.” The court also noted that any injunction at this point would lack “any practical effect.”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Negligence & Intentional Tort (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75380
    Case: Cunningham v. Michigan Healthcare Prof'ls, P.C.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Gleicher, Borrello, and Swartzle
    Issues:

    Alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in upholstery or reupholstery of a chair & failure to warn of a known danger; Negligence; Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC; Duty to use ordinary care; Fultz v Union-Commerce Assocs; Res ipsa loquitor; Pugno v Blue Harvest Farms, LLC; Woodard v Custer

    Summary:

    Finding no ground to impute liability to defendant-reupholstery company without any evidence of negligence, the court held that the trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff’s claim for injuries caused by the collapse of a defective chair in her doctor’s office. She sued defendant and others for her injuries. The trial court dismissed her negligence claim and found that her product liability claim failed as defendant did not design, manufacture, or sell the defective chair. On appeal, the court held that the trial court did not err by dismissing her negligence claim, noting that although defendant owed plaintiff a duty to use ordinary care, plaintiff failed to show that defendant “breached its duty or caused the chair collapse.” There was no evidence that defendant "was negligent in sending two employees to move the five-seater with the assistance of furniture dollies.” And, based on the testimony at trial, “the five-seater collapsed because two segments of the base cylinder came apart.” It was also “mere speculation that the turning of the cylinder was a harbinger of collapse.” Further, because no one “with direct knowledge of the five-seater’s condition” was deposed, there was “no admissible evidence regarding the seat’s pre-reupholstery condition.” The court also rejected her claim that because chairs generally do not collapse without some negligence, res ipsa loquitor put defendant “on the hook for the negligence” here. It noted that “chairs sometimes fail in the absence of” negligence, that the five-seater was not in defendant’s exclusive control, and that there was “no indication that ‘evidence of the true explanation of the event’ was ‘more readily accessible’” to defendant than to other parties. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

Ads