Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Ineffective assistance of trial counsel; Failure to adequately explain the plea & sentencing agreements; Failure to notify defendant that a witness would not be testifying on his behalf; Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA)
Finding no errors warranting reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s CSC III and IV convictions and sentences. According to defendant, his trial counsel (S) “failed to adequately explain to defendant the plea agreement and sentencing agreement offered to him, which he would have accepted had” S done so. First, he argued that S “failed to inform defendant of the proper consequences of proceeding to trial.” Similarly, he contended that S “was deficient by failing to inform defendant of the benefits of accepting the trial court’s Cobbs agreement.” The court was unpersuaded because the record showed “that defendant was presented with information regarding the circumstances of his sentencing. [S] testified that he explained to defendant his sentencing guidelines and read to him the offer and sentencing guidelines sent by the prosecutor.” S’s secretary also testified that S “relayed the information from the e-mail to defendant. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that [S] adequately informed defendant of his potential sentencing consequences.” Defendant also argued that S “failed to inform [him] that [W] would not be testifying on defendant’s behalf.” However, S “testified that it was actually defendant’s desire to not have [W] testify at trial because [W] ‘was turning his back on [defendant,]’ and ‘didn’t want anything to do with’ defendant’s case, so ‘[defendant] believed that [W] would not be a good witness.’” Thus, the trial court also did not clearly err when it found that S did not fail to inform defendant that W would not be testifying on his behalf. Next, he argued that S “failed to inform defendant that the plea agreement allowed [him] to plead guilty to only one count of” CSC III. S “testified that he read defendant’s plea offer in full to defendant; thus, defendant knew that the prosecutor was willing to offer defendant a plea to one count of" CSC III. S "also testified that at no point did he tell defendant that, if he went to trial, defendant could not be sentenced to more than two years in prison.” Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that S “informed defendant of the sentencing agreement and that he could be sentenced to more than two years.” And lastly, defendant argued that S “failed to inquire about a no-contest plea with the prosecutor or negotiate for a” HYTA disposition. This argument was “not persuasive, as the prosecutor testified she would not have agreed to such a plea.” Moreover, S “testified that he would have been willing to pursue a no contest plea for defendant, but defendant was always insistent on going to trial and proving his innocence.”
Motion for a new trial; Right of confrontation; Admission of forensic evidence; Smith v Arizona; Video testimony; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); People v VanderVliet; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Trial strategy; Failure to make a futile objection; Prejudice; Motion for a mistrial; Unanimity instruction; People v Gadomski
The court vacated the portion of the trial court’s order as to defendant’s argument that “the absence of testimony from the laboratory scientists who tested the DNA samples and prepared the DNA profiles denied him the right to confrontation, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to object on these grounds[.]” It remanded for the trial court to “determine whether this evidence constitutes testimonial evidence and whether defendant was denied his confrontational rights.” But it affirmed in all other respects, finding the trial court did not err by (1) admitting other acts evidence, (2) denying his motion for a mistrial, or (3) failing to give a specific unanimity instruction. And it found he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel as to any other issue. Defendant was convicted of CSC I and kidnapping for forcing the complainant into an abandoned house and sexually assaulting her. On appeal, he first argued that the admission of DNA profile evidence violated his right of confrontation, presumably because he could not confront the individuals who “did the testing and prepared the DNA profiles.” The court found remand as to this issue was “necessary for the trial court to determine whether” the forensic company’s “data was testimonial in nature and to complete the Confrontation Clause analysis under the newly-provided framework in Smith.” The testimonial “nature of the evidence is not properly before this Court at this time given” uncertainties as to what was included in the “raw data” referred to by the parties. As to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it found he could not meet his burden “to prove that counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object.” He also could not meet his burden to prove counsel was ineffective for failing to demand that several witnesses appearing by two-way video technology testify in person. It next rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by admitting other acts evidence of a 1991 sexual assault with DNA evidence implicating him. “The evidence was offered for a noncharacter purpose. It was relevant to establishing an element to the charged offense and probative of the ultimate issues. [And it] supported the reasonable inference that defendant intended to force a young woman to engage in unconsented sex by employing a strikingly similar plan, scheme, or system to commit the sexual assault.” As to the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial at the close of the prosecution’s proofs, “because the bodily fluids tested were genuine, any break in the chain of custody was not fatal to the admission of the challenged evidence.” Finally, in light Gadomski, “a specific-unanimity instruction was not warranted in this case.”
Failure to adjourn an evidentiary hearing; MCR 2.503; “Good cause”; People v Grace; “Satisfactory, sound or valid reason”; People v Buie; Promotion of justice
Holding that “there was a satisfactory, sound, and valid reason” to adjourn the evidentiary hearing at issue, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the prosecution’s motion to adjourn, and its grant of defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence and dismiss the case. He was charged with possession with intent to deliver more than 50 grams, but less than 450 grams, of heroin or fentanyl. He “moved to suppress evidence of the drugs, and an evidentiary hearing was scheduled on the motion. At the hearing, the key witness involved in the search and seizure of the drugs,” a state trooper (S) “failed to appear due to an alleged emergency that required [his] expertise as a canine handler.” The court noted that in Grace, it “appeared to suggest that ‘good cause’ for an adjournment is established under MCR 2.503(B)(1) when, in the context of a request made because of an absent witness, the criteria in MCR 2.503(C) are satisfied,” and it found they were met here. It further noted that, in Buie, the Michigan Supreme Court “defined ‘good cause’ as a ‘satisfactory, sound or valid reason.’” The court determined there was “a compelling reason” for adjournment here. There was “an emergency situation in which [S’s] skills as a canine handler were required. The trial court did not find otherwise and, in fact,” accepted another trooper’s “explanation of the active event in which [S] found himself. The trial court reasoned that the trooper improperly prioritized one work obligation” over another. The court found that the flaw in this reasoning was that the trial “court treated the emergency as if it were the equivalent of an ordinary event in” S’s daily work life. It also “rejected adjourning the evidentiary hearing because it was unknown whether a short or long adjournment was necessary. But there was no exploration whatsoever into how long a delay would be necessary had the hearing been adjourned. The emergency was likely short-lived, hours versus days or weeks, and even had it gone longer, authorities may have been able to procure the assistance of another canine handler.” The trial was not scheduled to start for over three weeks. The court held “that the trial court’s refusal to adjourn the hearing and the concomitant decisions to suppress the evidence and dismiss the case were not reasonable or principled[.]” It directed the trial court on remand to schedule an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress.
Claims of self-dealing in the administration of a condo project; Due process; Sua sponte grant of summary disposition; Whether defendant was permitted to fully brief & present its argument for reconsideration; Harmless error; Whether summary disposition was premature; Amendment of the master plan, by laws, & condo subdivision plan; MCL 559.190(2); Conversion; Valuation evidence; Jack Loeks Theatres, Inc v City of Kentwood; Hearsay
The court held that the trial court’s sua sponte grant of summary disposition for plaintiffs-condo owners did not violate defendant-original developer’s due-process rights. However, summary disposition was prematurely granted. Plaintiffs claimed defendant used its status as owner of a majority of the condos to amend the project’s master deed to incorporate two grass runways as a common element while at the same time removing a vacant parcel. The trial court granted summary disposition on the conversion claim and on the issue of liability on the claim in Count I, subpart D of their amended complaint. It also allowed them to rely on the property tax assessment records and the testimony of a township assessor (J) to establish the valuation of the vacant parcel. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court’s sua sponte ruling as to Count I, subpart D, violated its due-process rights as it ruled without providing an adequate opportunity to brief the issue and present its position. Defendant “fully briefed and presented its arguments regarding why the trial court erred when it sua sponte granted summary disposition on Count I, subpart D. [It] considered and rejected those arguments.” The court could not find that its “actions contravened” defendant’s due-process rights. However, “summary disposition was prematurely granted.” The trial court “made factual findings without the documentation necessary to do so being appending to [defendant’s] motion and plaintiffs’ answer.” Moreover, MCL 559.190(2) “expressly provides that ‘the master deed, bylaws, and condo[] subdivision plan may be amended, even if the amendment will materially alter or change the rights of the co-owners or mortgagees, with the consent of not less than 2/3 of the votes of the co-owners and mortgagees.’” The excision of the vacant parcel “was accomplished and approved by the vote of a super-majority the owners of the” units, including most of plaintiffs. “The trial court’s ruling fail[ed] to address what impact, if any, this vote and MCL 559.190(2) have on the viability of plaintiffs’ claim alleged in Count I, subpart D.” It also prematurely granted summary disposition for plaintiffs on Count II of their amended complaint, “which may be viewed as alleging conversion by [defendant] of specific, identifiable sales proceeds held by” defendant on behalf of plaintiffs. Whether defendant “held specific, identified funds entrusted to it by plaintiffs depends on what impact, if any, the owners vote and MCL 559.190(2) have on the viability of plaintiffs’ claimed entitle[ment] to a portion of the sales proceedings.” The trial court “has yet to address this potentially dispositive question.” Finally, the trial court erred by allowing J’s lay testimony as to the valuation of the vacant parcel. Reversed and remanded.
Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(ii); Validity of a no-contest plea; Adequacy of an advice of rights under MCR 3.971(B); In re Pederson; In re Ferranti; Whether the trial court adequately distinguished between the adjudicative & dispositional phases; Distinguishing In re Mota; Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2)(a); Child’s best interests
The court held that (1) respondent-mother’s no-contest plea was valid, (2) the trial court did not fail “to adequately distinguish between the adjudicative and dispositional phases,” (3) reasonable reunification efforts were not required in this case, (4) § (b)(ii) supported termination, and (5) terminating both respondents’ parental rights was in the child’s (A) best interests. It found it apparent from the record that the trial court adequately advised her “of her rights prior to accepting her no-contest plea at the combined adjudication and initial dispositional hearing in accordance with MCR 3.971(B).” As to her claim that her plea was involuntary, this was “also belied by the record. When the trial court informed [her] of her rights pertaining to adjudication, it also explicitly stated that, by pleading no contest, she ‘waiv[ed] the right for the department to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there are statutory grounds to terminate [her] parental rights.’ [It] also later clarified, ‘If I accept the no contest plea, the results will be that this matter will be put over and we will have trial as to best interest.’ In each instance, respondent[] verbally confirmed that she understood.” As to whether the trial court adequately distinguished between the adjudicative and dispositional phases, the court noted that, in contrast to Mota, it was “not presented with a situation in which adjudication and disposition were erroneously indistinguishable; rather, the trial court in this case adhered to the procedural safeguards set forth in our court rules such that there was a clear bifurcation between the adjudicative phase and the dispositional phase of the proceedings.” It next determined that “the trial court appropriately found that reasonable efforts were not required pursuant to MCL 712A.19a(2)(a)[.]” As to a ground for termination, the CPS Investigation Report “described the investigation into the injuries suffered by [A], including interviews with medical, emergency, and hospital personnel, as well as with respondents and the police officers who interviewed [them]. As detailed in the report, [A] had sustained a multitude of severe injuries inconsistent with any accident or actions in the normal day-to-day care of an infant while she lived exclusively with respondents.” The court concluded “the trial court did not clearly err by finding that there was clear and convincing legally admissible evidence that respondent[] will not prioritize [A’s] safety or defend [A] against abuse in the future.” Affirmed.
Child’s best interests; Lawyer guardian ad litem (LGAL)
The court held that the “trial court gave all of the evidence that was presented its proper weight in determining that it was in [child-L’s] best interests to terminate” respondent-father’s parental rights. He argued that the trial court clearly erred when it held “that termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of [L] because it did not fully consider the possibility that his conviction CSC I of” L’s sister could be overturned. The court disagreed. He argued “that the trial court erred by not giving enough weight to the possibility of his conviction being overturned or that he may be granted a new trial after going through the criminal appeals process.” If that occurred, respondent contended, “he would have enough time to complete a permanence plan for [L] and would be able to take care of her.” L’s LGAL argued that it was in L’s “best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights because [he] sexually abused her sister and was sentenced to prison until at least 2039; [he] physically abused [L]; [L] did not want to have any contact with respondent; [L] was in a stable foster home with a foster parent who could adopt her; and [L’s] need for stability and permanence outweighed any speculative criminal appeal.” The court agreed with the LGAL’s arguments. “The trial court heard testimony that respondent sexually abused [L’s] sister and was convicted of” CSC I. He was sentenced to 17 to 40 years. L “would reach the age of majority before his release.” The trial “court heard testimony that respondent physically abused [L], that [L] did not want contact with respondent, that [L] wanted to be adopted by her foster parent, that [L] was in a stable home where she had formed [a good] relationship with her foster parent, and she was in the same home as her sister. Respondent was sentenced to prison until at least 2039, and was in no position to take care of [L], even if she wanted to have any contact with him. The possibility of respondent successfully appealing his conviction is far too speculative to overcome the vast amount of evidence that establishes that it is in [L’s] best interests for his parental rights to be terminated. The focus of a best-interests hearing is the child, not the parent.” Affirmed.