Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(ii); Validity of a no-contest plea; Adequacy of an advice of rights under MCR 3.971(B); In re Pederson; In re Ferranti; Whether the trial court adequately distinguished between the adjudicative & dispositional phases; Distinguishing In re Mota; Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2)(a); Child’s best interests

The court held that (1) respondent-mother’s no-contest plea was valid, (2) the trial court did not fail “to adequately distinguish between the adjudicative and dispositional phases,” (3) reasonable reunification efforts were not required in this case, (4) § (b)(ii) supported termination, and (5) terminating both respondents’ parental rights was in the child’s (A) best interests. It found it apparent from the record that the trial court adequately advised her “of her rights prior to accepting her no-contest plea at the combined adjudication and initial dispositional hearing in accordance with MCR 3.971(B).” As to her claim that her plea was involuntary, this was “also belied by the record. When the trial court informed [her] of her rights pertaining to adjudication, it also explicitly stated that, by pleading no contest, she ‘waiv[ed] the right for the department to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there are statutory grounds to terminate [her] parental rights.’ [It] also later clarified, ‘If I accept the no contest plea, the results will be that this matter will be put over and we will have trial as to best interest.’ In each instance, respondent[] verbally confirmed that she understood.” As to whether the trial court adequately distinguished between the adjudicative and dispositional phases, the court noted that, in contrast to Mota, it was “not presented with a situation in which adjudication and disposition were erroneously indistinguishable; rather, the trial court in this case adhered to the procedural safeguards set forth in our court rules such that there was a clear bifurcation between the adjudicative phase and the dispositional phase of the proceedings.” It next determined that “the trial court appropriately found that reasonable efforts were not required pursuant to MCL 712A.19a(2)(a)[.]” As to a ground for termination, the CPS Investigation Report “described the investigation into the injuries suffered by [A], including interviews with medical, emergency, and hospital personnel, as well as with respondents and the police officers who interviewed [them]. As detailed in the report, [A] had sustained a multitude of severe injuries inconsistent with any accident or actions in the normal day-to-day care of an infant while she lived exclusively with respondents.” The court concluded “the trial court did not clearly err by finding that there was clear and convincing legally admissible evidence that respondent[] will not prioritize [A’s] safety or defend [A] against abuse in the future.” Affirmed.