Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Enforcement of an employment contract’s arbitration provision; Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 81300 in the 4/3/24 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the court’s decision in Rayford.
Age discrimination; Contractual limitations period; Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC; Collateral estoppel
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated Part IV of the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 83588 in the 5/9/25 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the court’s decision in Rayford. “On remand, the Court of Appeals may also address whether the plaintiff’s age discrimination claim is barred by collateral estoppel, which was not addressed by that court during its initial review of this case.” The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Notice under the Court of Claims Act (COCA); MCL 600.6431; Retroactive application of Christie v Wayne State Univ; Flamont v Department of Corrs; Hudson v Department of Corrs; Binding special-panel precedent; The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA)
Holding that plaintiffs-MDOC deputy wardens’ ELCRA claims were barred for lack of COCA notice and that Christie applies retroactively, the court reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition for defendants-State of Michigan and MDOC. Plaintiffs sued in circuit court alleging discriminatory failure to promote, but they failed to file a COCA notice within one year. Nonetheless, the trial court denied defendants’ summary disposition motion, finding Christie did not apply retroactively. On appeal, the court followed the special-panel decision in Hudson, which adopted Flamont and held Christie “fully retroactive,” requiring COCA notice for “all claims against the state, regardless of the forum.” Because plaintiffs’ belated 2023 notice came “long after the one-year period” expired, their failure to comply with COCA’s requirements foreclosed their claims.
Const 1963, art 4, § 33; Whether the Legislature is required to present all passed bills to the Governor; “Shall”; Applicability of Const 1963, art 4, § 13; Ripeness; Enforcement; Mandamus; Teasel v Department of Mental Health; Separation of powers; Bauserman v Unemployment Ins Agency; Standing; League of Women Voters of MI v Secretary of State; Distinguishing Killeen v Wayne Cnty Rd Comm’n; Justiciability; Pego v Karamo; Gilbert v Gladden (NJ); Brewer v Burns (AZ)
Concluding that plaintiffs had standing and that the case was justiciable, the court held that Const 1963, art 4, § 33 requires “the Legislature to present all passed bills to the Governor.” Further, it found that the Court of Claims (COC) erred in declining to issue a writ of mandamus. Thus, it reversed and remanded for the COC “to issue a writ of mandamus ordering defendants to present the bills at issue to the Governor.” As an initial matter, the court agreed with the COC that plaintiffs showed “sufficient, distinct injuries to have standing.” And it rejected defendants’ argument that the case was nonjusticiable under the political-question doctrine. “The question here involves the interpretation of the rules and requirements imposed by our Constitution.” Turning to the interpretation of Const 1963, art 4, § 33, the parties provided “different interpretations of what the word ‘shall’ modifies in the first sentence.” The court concluded that “Const 1963, art 4, § 33, clearly imposes the mandatory duty of presentment on the Legislature for ‘[e]very bill passed by the legislature[.]’ This duty is not session-dependent; the Legislature, as a whole, bears the duty of presentment. Additionally, the fact that Const 1963, art 4, § 33, does not provide a deadline for presentment is not dispositive. The discourse at the 1961 Constitutional Convention suggests that presentment is the next, immediate step after a bill is passed by both chambers.” As to the issue of enforcement, the court determined that mandamus was the appropriate remedy. Addressing the requirements for mandamus, it found as to prongs 1 and 2 that plaintiffs’ “clear, legal right to performance exists because [they] and defendants, as a single entity, have a clear legal duty to perform, and defendants have not only failed to perform the duty themselves, but have, by extension, prevented plaintiffs from doing so as well.” As to prong 3, it was “beyond dispute that the duty of presentment falls to the Legislature, and that the only chamber of the Legislature capable of presenting these particular bills is the House of Representatives, because [it] currently possesses them. As such, the ministerial act of presentment must, by the facts of this case, fall on defendants.” And as to prong 4, the COC “reasoned that mandamus was improper because plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law in the form of its declaratory judgment. But without a mechanism for enforcement, the declaratory judgment does not provide an enforceable remedy for plaintiffs.”
Action for injuries suffered at work; Contractual limitations period; Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 82564 in the 11/12/24 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals in light of the court’s decision in Rayford.
Employment-related claims; Shortened limitations period in the employment application; Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 83098 in the 2/18/25 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the court’s decision in Rayford.
Specific unanimity instruction on torture & unlawful imprisonment charges; People v Cooks; Alternative-means of committing unlawful imprisonment; MCL 750.349b; People v Chelmicki; General unanimity instruction adequacy; Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate impeachment/exculpatory evidence, subpoena witnesses, & request a specific unanimity instruction; People v Grant; Failure to make a futile objection; People v Ericksen
Holding that a specific unanimity instruction was not required for either the torture or unlawful imprisonment charges, the court affirmed defendant’s convictions. He was also convicted of CSC I under the felony-circumstance theory and AWIGBH after meeting the victim on a dating app, taking her first to a hotel and then to his parents’ basement, beating and choking her over approximately 28 days while controlling her phone and movements, and ultimately striking her with a hatchet before she sought help at a hospital. On appeal, the court rejected his claim that the jury needed a special unanimity instruction. First, trial counsel expressly approved the instructions and thus waived the issue. Further, the general unanimity charge sufficed since “in most cases, ‘a general instruction to the jury that its decision must be unanimous will be adequate,’” and because the unlawful imprisonment statute provides alternative means of committing an offense, “‘jury unanimity is not required with regard to the alternate theory.’” The court also rejected his request for a specific unanimity instruction on torture because the various acts were not proved by “materially distinguishable” evidence likely to confuse jurors and he advanced a singular defense. The court further rejected his ineffective-assistance claims based on unpursued phone, social-media, and location records, uncalled witnesses, and the lack of a special unanimity request. It concluded the proposals were speculative or cumulative and added that “‘failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.’” Finally, his challenge to the timeliness ruling on a supplemental filing was moot because the trial court granted leave to file it and decided the claims on the merits.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to present a defense or certain evidence, to call witnesses, to object to admission of a witness’s preliminary exam testimony, & to inform defendant of the fourth-offense habitual offender mandatory 25-year minimum sentence; Sufficiency of the evidence for a carjacking conviction; Motion for a directed verdict on an AWIGBH charge; Scoring of OV 13; MCL 777.43(1)(c)
The court rejected defendant-Gibbs’s multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and held that there was sufficient evidence to support his carjacking conviction. It also concluded the trial court did not err in denying his motion for a directed verdict on an AWIGBH charge. Finally, it upheld the trial court’s 25-point score for OV 13. The case arose from the carjacking and assault of an elderly man (K). Gibbs claimed defense counsel was ineffective for, among other things, failing to present a defense and to inform him of the fourth-offense habitual offender mandatory 25-year minimum sentence. As to the former, defense “counsel called Gibbs as a witness and effectively questioned him, which allowed Gibbs the opportunity to provide his account of what occurred.” The record also showed “that defense counsel clearly articulated why the jury should conclude that Gibbs was not the person who assaulted [K] and that Gibbs did not intend to steal [K’s] truck. Defense counsel delineated [K’s] documented mental illness issues, and argued that” as a result, “he was confused about who assaulted him and what occurred when he gave Gibbs and” his girlfriend a ride. Further, defense counsel “argued that Gibbs could not have intended to steal [K’s] truck because he engaged the vehicle’s OnStar location service, which provided a method to ping the exact location of the vehicle. Gibbs fails to indicate what additional rational argument defense counsel should have made.” As to the mandatory minimum, “Gibbs was aware that he faced the possibility of receiving a sentence even greater than 25 years. Moreover, [he] refused any plea offer because he maintained his innocence—and continues to do so—specifically refusing to admit that he drove away [K’s] truck without permission.” As to the sufficiency of the evidence for his carjacking conviction, viewed “in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was ample evidence to find that Gibbs had the requisite intent to prove carjacking beyond a reasonable doubt.” The evidence showed that he (1) struck K “in the head multiple times, causing him to bleed, (2) pulled [K] out of the vehicle, (3) struck [K] again, causing him to fall to the ground, and (4) then drove the vehicle for 20 minutes before parking in another city and unloading tools from the vehicle.” Further, when officers arrived, he did not comply with their commands and tried to flee. Affirmed.
Warrantless home search; Motion to suppress evidence; Authority to consent; People v Mead; People v Thurmond; Reasonable belief that the third party consenting has common authority over the premises; People v Goforth; People v Brown; Whether any other exception to the warrant requirement applied
In an interlocutory appeal, the court held that the trial court erred in determining “that defendant’s girlfriend had the authority to consent to a search of his house and” it erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search. For the consent exception to the warrant requirement to apply, “‘an officer must obtain consent to search from someone who has the authority to give it. Generally, that means either the property’s owner or a third party who shares common authority over the property.’” The court noted that a “third party’s authority can also be ‘apparent common authority.’” It found no ambiguity here. Defendant’s “girlfriend was not living in defendant’s house on the night in question. She explicitly told the officers that all of her belongings had been moved out of the house, with the exception of her chickens. She also stated that she ‘only stop[ped] by to check on the chickens and make sure [defendant]’s still breathing.’ [Her] explicit statements that she had moved all of her belongings out of the house directly undermines any claim the officer may have had regarding [her] actual common authority over the premises, as common authority requires ‘mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes[.]’” The court further held that the “search was equally unjustifiable under the apparent-authority doctrine. . . . [Her] explicit statement that she had moved all of her belongings out of the house alerted the officers that she lacked common authority over the premises. Her statements that she only stopped by to check on defendant and her chickens further reinforces that she was present as a visitor in defendant’s house, rather than someone with common authority over the premises.” Thus, she lacked “apparent authority to consent to a search of” the house. And the court found that no “other exceptions to the warrant requirement would apply” here. Reversed and remanded.
Subject matter jurisdiction; Action seeking to compel arbitration of state probate proceedings under § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); 9 USC § 4
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to compel arbitration of a pending state court probate proceeding and determine the assets of a decedent’s estate. The appeal arose from a dispute between siblings related to a Family Trust and their mother’s estate. Plaintiffs were the Trust and the first successor trustee. Defendant is the executrix of the mother’s estate. The Trust provided that all disputes related to it are subject to arbitration. After defendant initiated state court probate proceedings, plaintiffs unsuccessfully asked the state court to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs then sued in federal court to compel arbitration under § 4 of the FAA and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the court explained that the district court would only have subject matter jurisdiction here “if it would have had subject matter jurisdiction over the state court probate proceedings.” It also considered “the probate exception to federal jurisdiction” and explained the two-part test for determining whether it applies. The court found that, applying these rules, it could “make short work of” plaintiffs’ effort to assert federal question jurisdiction. It noted a “proceeding under § 4 of the FAA does not raise a federal question simply because it was brought under § 4 of the FAA.” Courts must look at “the underlying dispute that plaintiffs want to arbitrate and see if the complaint filed in state court raises a federal question.” In this case, the probate proceeding defendant “initiated in state probate court is plainly a state law dispute—federal law does not govern the interpretation of a will. So the district court lacked federal question jurisdiction.” As to diversity jurisdiction, the court held that the proceedings in state court “are plainly in rem proceedings. The core of the probate case is whether certain pieces of real and personal property belong to Mrs. Johnson’s estate or whether they belong to the Trust. That is a dispute over the title to property—a classic in rem proceeding.” By appointing defendant “the executrix of the estate, the state probate court took possession of the property as a matter of federal law.” Thus, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Affirmed.
Motion to terminate an amended personal protection order (PPO); Judicial bias; Mitchell v Mitchell; TT v KL; Evidence that respondent violated the initial PPO; MCL 600.2950(1)(c), (1)(l), & (4); Claim that petitioner improperly sought a PPO to gain an advantage in a child-custody dispute; Failure to support arguments
While the court deemed respondent’s appellate arguments abandoned for failure to support them, it concluded that, even considered on the merits, he did not show that he was entitled to relief from the denial of his motion to terminate the amended PPO at issue. The parties were previously married. He raised four challenges on appeal. But he offered “no more than one sentence in support of each of his arguments, and” provided no “citation to facts in the record or relevant caselaw to support his positions.” He first contended “that the extension of the PPO was the product of judicial bias.” The court noted that he “never moved to disqualify the judge. Moreover, on appeal, he has failed to establish any disqualifying bias. Even if” the court credited his claim “that the judge made ‘dismissive remarks and personal attacks,’ respondent has not satisfied the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption that the trial court was unbiased. . . . To the extent that any remark made by the trial court was critical of, or hostile to, respondent, that criticism or hostility does not establish disqualifying bias under the rule identified in TT.” Second, he asserted that the PPO’s extension “was improper because there was no evidence that he violated the initial PPO.” But even if he was “correct that the evidence did not show that he had violated the existing PPO, that fact alone is not dispositive. Instead, the trial court merely must find a reasonable cause to believe respondent might commit certain acts listed in the statute, including threatening to kill petitioner or engaging in other conduct that interferes with [her] personal liberty or causes a reasonable apprehension of violence.” Respondent’s third and fourth arguments rested “on the premise that petitioner has a history of using PPOs to gain leverage in child-custody cases, and that she did so in this case.” But he did not establish that she “improperly sought a PPO to gain an advantage in a child-custody matter—either in the case at hand or in a previous case[.]” Affirmed.
Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Individual findings as to each child; MCR 3.977(I)(1)
Holding that the trial court made adequate individualized best-interests findings for all five children and that termination was proper, the court affirmed. Respondent-mother’s parental rights were terminated after she relapsed after initial progress. Two of her children (one 23 months old and the other 7 months old) tested positive for cocaine, and an older child reported marijuana use with the mother and witnessed domestic violence. On appeal, the court found that the trial court’s findings clearly indicated that it “‘view[ed] each child individually’ when it determined whether termination of [her] parental rights was in each child’s best interests.” To the extent it “rendered findings applicable to all five of the children—including that [she] lacked parenting skills, there was a history of domestic violence in this case, that the children had long-term options available to them, and that they were doing well in their placements—its findings were relevant to all of the children.” Under the circumstances, it “was not required to make redundant findings for each child.” The court noted that the trial court “is simply required to make brief findings, and respondent[] has not articulated how the explanation that the trial court provided did not satisfy the requirements of MCR 3.977(I)(1).” Finally, the trial court “rendered findings as to several relevant factors, including the need for permanency, stability, and finality, the history of domestic violence, respondent[‘s] lack of parenting ability, and the possibility of adoption, and those findings were supported by the evidence.”