Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Unemployment benefit redeterminations under the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA); Timeframes under MCL 421.32a(1) & (2); MCL 421.32f; MCL 421.62(a); Fraud redeterminations; Department of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs/Unemployment Ins Agency v Lucente
Holding that Lucente controlled, the court affirmed the trial court’s order “because it reached the right result—affirming the ALJ’s and MCAC’s conclusions that” appellant-unemployment agency’s redeterminations of claimant-Campbell’s unemployment benefits “were null and void—albeit for the wrong reason.” Appellant issued redeterminations to Campbell indicating she improperly received unemployment benefits. On appeal, the ALJ found the redeterminations were null and void because appellant did not have the authority to reconsider her eligibility for benefits three years after the benefits were issued. It lacked authority because it did not issue the redeterminations within 30 days as permitted by § 32a(1) or within a year of the determination upon a showing of good cause as permitted by § 32a(2). The ALJ also found that, “while Campbell fraudulently received benefits,” appellant did not have authority to recoup them under § 62(a) because it “failed to meet the procedural requirements and timeframe set forth under § 32(f) or § 32a(1) or (2).” The MCAC and the trial court affirmed. On appeal, the court found that the trial court reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason. “Because this case involved intentional false statements, misrepresentations, or concealment of material information, [appellant] had six years after Campbell received improperly paid benefits in which to issue a determination as to her overpayments and fraud.” And its notices of redetermination were issued “well within six years of the” benefits. However, “Lucente demonstrates that the procedures employed by [appellant] were faulty, despite the timeliness of its actions.” As in Lucente, appellant “issued ‘redeterminations’ to notify Campbell of its decisions, rather than original ‘determinations.’ As the Supreme Court explained, this procedural misstep has significant consequences because it forecloses the claimant’s right to protest the decision and subject it to . . . review before proceeding to later administrative and appellate reviews.” As such, the Supreme Court “deemed the procedural irregularity an appropriate ground to set aside the ‘determinationless “redetermination.”’”
Eligibility for privileges at a regional airport as a “flying club”; The Michigan Aeronautics Code; MCL 259.4(c) & 259.91; A “federally obligated airport”; A flying club under federal law; FAA Order 5190.6B § 10.6; Requirements for flying club status; Improper marketing as a place people could learn to fly
The court held that the corporation at issue (nonparty-PHDS) did not meet the requirements under federal and state law to be registered and operate as a flying club and thus, that defendants-county, its board of commissioners, and regional airport did not err in denying PHDS registration as a flying club. It affirmed the trial court’s order denying plaintiffs’ summary disposition motion, granting defendants’ motion, and dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs asserted “that PHDS, an entity to which they were members, constituted a ‘flying club’” and that “defendants improperly denied PHDS registration as a flying club with privileges at the airport as a flying club.” FAA Order 5190.6B § 10.6 defines and sets out “the federal standards for flying clubs at federally obligated airports” (there was no dispute the airport here was such an airport). The court found “nothing ambiguous in the language set forth in FAA Order 5190.6B § 10.6 and the” FAA’s relevant amendments and clarifications. The county was obligated “to ensure that the airport complied with federal and state laws and regulations. To have flying club status under the” FAA Order, an entity must show “it is a nonprofit or not-for-profit entity whose aircraft’s ownership is vested in the name of the flying club or owned by all its members equally. An entity seeking flying club status is prohibited from holding itself out as a fixed based operator, flight school, or as a business that offers services to the general public. An entity seeking flying club status is expressly prohibited from marketing or communicating in any manner that it is a business where people can learn to fly.” Unrebutted evidence showed that nonparty individuals owned and held title to the aircraft used by PHDS “and neither PHDS nor its members held ownership interests in the aircraft as required under FAA Order 5190.6B § 10.6 as amended and clarified by the FAA in its policy statement . . . .” In addition, the FAA Order does not provide any “lease exception to the ownership requirement, nor does it specify that any form of substantial compliance suffices to meet” this requirement. The court added that the evidence also showed “PHDS violated the FAA Order’s prohibition against holding itself out as a place where people could learn to fly by advertising in a flyer posted at the airport terminal that it welcomed student pilots and had a flight instructor on staff.”
Constitutionality of provisions in 2018 PA 608 amending the Michigan Election Law as to initiative petitions; The 15% geographic requirement; MCL 168.471, 168.477(1), & 168.482(4); Const 1963, art 2, § 9; Const 1963, art 12, § 2; Self-executing constitutional procedures; Requirements as to petition circulators; MCL 168.482; The checkbox requirement; MCL 168.472(7); The Anderson-Burdick test; Meyer v Grant; Buckley v American Constitutional Law Found Inc (ACLF); The affidavit requirement for paid circulators; MCL 168.472(2); Severability; In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2011 PA 38
The court held that the provisions of 2018 PA 608 creating the 15% geographic requirement in MCL 168.471, 168.477(1), and 168.482(4), and the precirculation affidavit requirement for paid circulators in MCL 168.472(2) are unconstitutional. But it held that the checkbox requirement in MCL 168.472(7) is constitutional. Thus, it affirmed the Court of Claims in part and reversed in part. As to severability, 2018 PA 608 “may be read as if the offending provisions are not there.” The court agreed with the Court of Claims that the geographic requirement violated the constitutional provisions as to “initiative petitions and constitutional amendments because those provisions are self-executing.” While the Legislature may enact statutory requirements relating to the procedures regulating initiatives, the court did “not view a geographic requirement that limits voter participation in the initiative process as pertaining to ‘procedures’ regarding initiatives.” Instead, it imposes “additional limitations on the electorate’s power under the Constitution.” The court noted that the Michigan Constitution does not contain any “geographic distribution requirement in the text. Under the longstanding constitutional structure, a registered voter anywhere in Michigan could sign a petition and that signature would be counted in support. In contrast, under the 2018 PA 608 amendments, a voter’s signature would not be counted if the geographic cap had been reached in his or her district.” This was not in line with the framers’ intent. Thus, the court held that the geographic limit established “an unnecessary and unreasonable restraint on the constitutional right of the people to initiate laws[,]” making it unconstitutional. However, as to the checkbox requirement, it was “persuaded that the state has a compelling interest in ensuring that the political speech involved in circulating petitions comes with a ‘full disclosure’ whether it is paid or volunteer” and that the requirement was “clearly narrowly tailored.” But the court found the intervening defendant failed to show the state’s interests were furthered by the affidavit “requirement, which singles out only paid circulators, and burdens the sponsors’ political speech by imposing a requirement that circulators must file an affidavit before gathering any signatures.” Thus, this requirement failed to meet the strict scrutiny standard.
Present sense impression hearsay exception (MRE 803(3)); Victim’s state of mind; People v Smelley; People v Moorer; People v Fisher; Harmless error; Aiding & abetting; Intent; Aiding & abetting jury instruction; Sufficiency of the evidence; Second-degree murder; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to vouching testimony; Relevance; Prejudice; Failure to challenge rebuttal testimony & to employ an expert; Distinguishing People v Ackley; Request for a Ginther hearing & appointment of an expert to testify at the hearing; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 1 & 9; MCL 777.31(1)(a) & (2)(a)-(b); MCL 777.39(1)(c) & (2)(a)
While out-of-court statements by the victim were not admissible under MRE 803(3), the court held that their erroneous admission was not outcome-determinative and did not entitle defendant to a new trial. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving an aiding and abetting jury instruction, and there was sufficient evidence that he had the necessary intent to support his second-degree murder conviction as an aider and abettor. The court found that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper vouching testimony, but defendant could not show prejudice. It rejected his other ineffective assistance of counsel claim and found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for a Ginther hearing and appointment of an expert. It also upheld the scoring of OVs 1 and 9 at 25 and 10 points, respectively. Thus, it affirmed his conviction and his 30 to 60-year sentence. To the extent the victim’s statements were admitted to show his state of mind, they “bore only a tenuous connection to the real issues, but carried with them a substantial danger of unfair prejudice for what they implied about defendant’s state of mind.” But reversal was unwarranted because they were not outcome-determinative. The thrust of the testimony of the witness (S) who testified about them was not “that the victim was fearful of defendant, but that [S] herself was fearful.” Defendant did not assert that S “should have been barred from testifying about her own, personal experiences with” him on the day of the crime. Further, he testified that he drove the shooter (J) to the crime scene, that he fled the scene, “and that he drove [J] to safety afterwards. Despite being aware that police would undoubtedly desire to question him, rather than go to the police, defendant made plans for the vehicle he drove to and from the scene to be delivered to his girlfriend, and waited for the police to find him. Defendant then repeatedly lied about whether he drove the vehicle and whether he was present at” the crime scene. While defense counsel should have objected to some of an officer’s (H) testimony, defendant could not “show that, but for the admission of [H’s] statement, there was a reasonable probability that the result” would have been different. H was one of many witnesses, and the statement “was only tangentially related to” the purpose of his testimony.
Sufficiency of the evidence; Assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer; MCL 750.81d; People v Quinn; “Obstruct”; MCL 750.81d(7)(a); “Assault” & “battery”; People v Morris; Judicial misconduct; A trial court’s authority to control the proceedings; Whether a trial judge has pierced the veil of impartiality; People v Stevens
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions of two counts of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer, and that the trial court’s conduct did not pierce the veil of impartiality. His convictions arose out of an incident that occurred as deputies executed a search warrant and attempted to take his DNA sample as part of a separate investigation into a CSC case from 2006. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crime. “From the testimony presented, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that defendant assaulted, resisted, obstructed, or opposed [two deputies], particularly given that the prosecution does not have to prove physical violence to prove resistance or obstruction; they can be established by the defendant’s words or actions.” In addition, the prosecution proved that he “knew or had reason to know the person he assaulted, resisted, obstructed, or opposed was a police officer performing his or her duties.” The court further found that “he did not establish that the warrant was actually invalid.” The court also rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court pierced the veil of impartiality by the comments it made during his self-representation. “The only inappropriate judicial conduct consists of a few sarcastic, offhand comments by the judge, which appear to have been born out of frustration with defendant’s inability to focus on the present case and which do not appear to have affected defendant’s substantial rights, given the testimony at trial. Defendant thus falls short of meeting his burden in showing the trial court pierced the veil of impartiality.” Affirmed.
Auto negligence; Judicial estoppel; Opland v Kiesgan; Attorney fees
The court held that because defendants-driver (Schneider) and vehicle owner (Morin) failed to establish the requirements of judicial estoppel, and because the circumstances of the case would not further the doctrine’s purpose, the trial court erred by granting them summary disposition on judicial estoppel grounds, and by granting them attorney fees. Plaintiff and Schneider were involved in a car accident in 2016. Defendants asserted that, in a separate action against her insurers, the trial court and insurers relied on her “statements that her injuries were solely related to the 2016 accident, as opposed to the 2016 accident aggravating her preexisting injuries from 2012.” Defendants noted she indicated in the current case that the 2016 injuries exacerbated the injuries associated with the 2012 accident. On appeal, the court found there was no indication that the trial court in the earlier action “accepted as true plaintiff’s position that she sustained all of her injuries in the 2016 accident.” Instead, plaintiff and one of the insurers “reached a settlement concerning plaintiff’s first-party claim and then, on the basis of their agreement to settle the matter,” the complaint was dismissed. She “also did not offer wholly inconsistent positions in the” earlier case and the present case. “[P]laintiff argued that she suffered new injuries from the 2016 accident, but she did not contend that her injuries were solely due to the 2016 accident.” Notwithstanding her “statement in an interrogatory response that she felt she had made a full recovery from her 2012 traumatic brain injury, that was not the only injury she suffered in 2012, and she simultaneously stated that she ‘still had some minor residuals from the previous crash.’ The issue of whether the injuries from the 2016 accident were new, as opposed to an exacerbation of the injuries associated with the 2012 accident, is a question of causation.” In addition, applying the doctrine was “not necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Defendants can attempt to impeach plaintiff’s credibility at trial and can attempt to demonstrate that the alleged 2016 injuries did not result in a serious impairment of a body function that affected” her ability to lead her normal life. Even if the insurer improperly relied on her “statements that her injuries were caused solely by the 2016 accident when settling” that case, this would place the insurer “—not defendants—at a financial disadvantage.” Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), & (j); Reasonable reunification efforts; Effect of the COVID-19 pandemic; Effect of the fact the other parent’s termination case was still ongoing; In re Medina
Concluding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent-mother with her child or err in terminating her parental rights while the father’s case was still ongoing, the court affirmed the order terminating her rights. She did not challenge the trial court’s findings as to statutory grounds or the child’s best interests on appeal. Rather, she contended that it erred “because she did not receive benefits from the DHHS given the COVID-19 pandemic and because father’s parental rights had not been terminated.” But the court noted that the record showed she “was offered alcoholics and narcotics anonymous meetings and family team meetings that she refused to attend. She refused to complete more than half of the 76 drug tests offered, and she canceled 54 of the 85 parenting-time visits. Additionally, [she] was offered Michigan Works and unemployment resources and therapy for her mental health and substance abuse, for which she had inconsistent attendance. [She] canceled or refused to attend some of these services even before the COVID-19 pandemic.” She missed multiple visits with the child before the DHHS required virtual visits due to the pandemic. “A respondent has the responsibility to participate in the services that are offered.” The court added that “any alleged error was not outcome-determinative and did not affect mother’s substantial rights because [she] still presented a barrier to reunification at the time of termination when she was refusing all services and stated that she believed that she did not need services related to her mental health or substance abuse.” As to the father’s status, the court noted it held in Medina that one parent’s rights may be terminated without termination of the other parent’s rights.