Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Referring to jurors by numbers; “Anonymous jury”; People v Williams; People v Hanks; Batson v Kentucky challenge; People v Knight; Motion to suppress defendant’s police statements; Voluntariness; People v Cipriano; Sufficiency of the evidence for first-degree felony murder & premeditated murder convictions; MCL 750.316(1)(b); Premeditation; People v Oros; Double jeopardy; Two first-degree murder convictions for the death of one person; People v Coomer
The court held that (1) referring to the jurors by number did not violate defendant’s due process rights, (2) the trial court did not err in rejecting his Batson challenge, (3) his police statements were properly admitted, and (4) there was sufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree felony and premeditated murder. But his convictions and sentences for two first-degree murder counts for the death of one person violated double jeopardy. As to his first claim, nothing in the record suggested the jurors’ “biographical information was withheld from the parties. Both parties conducted extensive voir dire, and there is nothing that suggests any of the jurors believed that the use of numbers rather than their names was anything other than a common, convenient method for” managing the jury-selection process. The trial court also twice instructed the jurors “that defendant was presumed to be innocent until proven guilty.” As to his Batson challenge, the court held that he “failed to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination[.]” He next asserted that his police “statements were not voluntary because he was sleep-deprived and had been denied his psychotropic medication” in jail. But “the parties stipulated to the admission of a competency-to-stand-trial report, which noted the lack of documentation to support defendant’s claimed mental-health conditions as well as the lack of any mental-status impairment that would affect the voluntariness of his statements. Regardless of whether [he] was sleep-deprived, those that observed him found him to be coherent and capable of maintaining conversation.” The court also concluded his own admission provided “sufficient evidence that he killed the victim during the commission of the larceny.” And he stated that they “were in an argument that led to a physical struggle” during which he “stabbed the victim 75 times. The nature of the stabbing and the number of stab wounds support the reasonable inference that defendant had time to reflect before killing the victim.” But the convictions of two counts for one death violated “the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.” Thus, the court remanded “for the ministerial task of modifying the judgment of conviction and sentence to specify that he has one conviction and one sentence for first-degree murder supported by two theories: premeditated murder and felony murder.” It affirmed in all other respects.
Sentencing; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Presumptive proportionality of a within-guidelines sentence; Unusual circumstances
Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing defendant’s within-guidelines sentences, the court affirmed. These consolidated appeals arose from two cases arising from domestic violence incidents. In one case he was convicted of FIP, FIP of ammunition, CCW, assault with a dangerous weapon, domestic violence, and felony-firearm. He was sentenced “as a fourth-offense habitual offender to a within-guidelines sentence of 58-months minimum and 20-years maximum for” his FIP, CCW, and assault with a dangerous weapon. In the other case he was convicted of malicious destruction of property over $20,000 and domestic violence. For the former he was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender to a within-guidelines “minimum of 57 months and a maximum of 20 years.” The only issue on appeal was whether his 57- and 58-month minimum sentences were reasonable. The trial court emphasized “the severity of defendant’s crimes.” It found that the amount of damage he was able to do “‘in one single evening to the tune of over $100,000’ was ‘shocking.’ So too for ‘the psychological damage that [he] impacted on’” the victim (A), his then-girlfriend. It “also balanced that severity with defendant lacking ‘one ounce of remorse or shame or regret,’ highlighting [his] response to police officers after destroying [A’s] house that ‘sometimes shit happens, it is what it.’” The trial court also knew that he was “a habitual offender” and had several felony and misdemeanor convictions, many involving “guns and violent conduct[.]” Defendant asserted he was “still capable of reform through counseling and that his age—63 at sentencing—means he will be ‘less likely to commit crimes’ and thus should have received lesser sentences. But the trial court was aware of [his] age and struggles and yet appropriately balanced those with his significant criminal record and the” crimes here. The court saw nothing in the record showing “‘unusual circumstances that would render [his] presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate.’”
Medical malpractice; Expert-qualification matching; MCL 600.2169; Stokes v Swofford; Summary disposition on causation; Skinner v Square D Co; Direct institutional liability; Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr; Daubert/MRE 702 reliability; Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc
The court held that the trial court properly refused to strike plaintiff’s neurology expert, correctly denied summary disposition as to causation and on direct-liability claims, and properly declined to hold a Daubert hearing. It also denied a cross-appeal. Applying Stokes, the court explained that “the ‘matching’ required by MCL 600.2169(1)(b) is limited to general board specialties,” and because both physicians were board-certified in neurology, the expert met “the initial statutory requirement.” On causation, the record presented a triable dispute: plaintiff’s experts opined that excessively high-dose steroids and delayed or inappropriate antibiotics left the decedent ventilator-dependent and that, “more likely than not, had he been properly treated, he would still be alive.” The court rejected defense assertions that the opinions were legally insufficient, agreeing with the trial judge “that a genuine issue of material fact” existed as to causation. Proximate cause is for the jury unless reasonable minds could not differ. As to direct liability, an expert’s affidavit and testimony supported claims that defendants failed to “select, employ, train and monitor” staff and to “ensure that appropriate policies and procedures are adopted and followed.” As to Daubert, defendants offered no showing that the opinions lacked a reliable foundation under MRE 702. Perceived inconsistencies were fit for cross-examination, not exclusion. Affirmed.
Premises liability vs ordinary negligence; Licensee duty; Janini v London Townhouses Condo Ass’n; Constructive notice of hazard; Applicability of res ipsa loquitur; Pugno v Blue Harvest Farms, LLC; Fuller v Wurzburg Dry Goods Co
The court held that plaintiff’s claim sounded in premises liability, that the defendants owed only the limited duty applicable to licensees, that she failed to show notice, and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply. Plaintiff was injured when “a letter ‘A’ fell from the marquee sign” of defendant-theatre while she stood on the adjacent sidewalk. She admitted she was not visiting the theatre, which was closed, but was merely waiting to cross the street. The court explained that her “injuries arose from an allegedly dangerous condition on the land—a letter that dislodged from the marquee” and she claimed defendants “were negligent in maintaining the marquee.” Under Michigan law, “if the plaintiff’s injury arose from an allegedly dangerous condition on the land, the action sounds in premises liability rather than ordinary negligence.” As a licensee, plaintiff could recover only if defendants failed to warn of hidden dangers they knew or should have known about, but “the law imposes no additional ‘duty of inspection or affirmative care to make the premises safe for the licensee’s visit.’” The court found that she “failed to present any evidence that [they] knew or should have known of the alleged hidden danger” and that her argument “simply because the letter fell” was insufficient. It emphasized that “conjecture and speculation are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary disposition.” Turning to res ipsa loquitur, the court noted that the doctrine “is not an independent cause of action” and that “before this inference of negligence can be drawn, something more must be shown than the mere happening of the accident.” While the marquee was under defendants’ control, “there is no evidence to suggest that their negligence caused the letter to fall[.]” The court cited Fuller for the principle that an inference of negligence cannot rest solely on an unexplained accident. The court deemed plaintiff’s other issues abandoned. Affirmed.