Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Investigatory stop; People v Jenkins; Lost or missing evidence; People v Anstey; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v Bahoda; Admission of a prior conviction; People v Allen; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Competency
The court held that the investigatory stop was lawful and the absence of a recording did not violate due process, but improper admission of defendant’s prior conviction and parole status required reversal and a new trial. On appeal, the court held that a seizure occurred when the officer told defendant they were “not done talking” and noted that a stop is valid when based on “commonsense judgments and reasonable inferences.” The court found the officers had articulable suspicion given the call about suspicious behavior, defendant’s conduct, and the LEIN check. The court also held there was no Brady violation because no recording existed, finding due process is not violated when officers fail “to develop evidence in the first instance.” Further, his due process rights were not violated on the basis he was not competent to stand trial. “A reasonable and principled judge in the trial court’s position could have justifiably rejected the conclusion that defendant was not competent to stand trial.” The court also found no ineffective assistance for not requesting an adverse inference instruction because there was no showing of bad faith related to the failure to make a recording. However, it held that the prosecution committed misconduct by eliciting defendant’s prior resisting conviction and parole status without a proper non-propensity purpose, noting such evidence risks the jury deciding guilt on the basis of “general bad character.” And the error was not harmless because no limiting instruction was given. Reversed and remanded.
Change of circumstances for modification; MCL 552.28; Loutts v Loutts; Retroactive modification limits; MCL 552.603; Cipriano v Cipriano; Contract interpretation of divorce judgment; MCL 552.13; Andrusz v Andrusz; Attorney fee award; MCR 3.206; Reed v Reed
The court held that the trial court properly modified but did not terminate plaintiff’s spousal support obligation, and correctly limited retroactivity to the date notice of the modification petition was provided, but erred by awarding attorney fees without factual findings requiring a remand on that issue. On appeal, the court held that defendant’s remarriage constituted a new circumstance warranting review of support and quoted that “remarriage can justify modification when equitable under the circumstances.” The court also found that defendant’s increased income was anticipated at the time of divorce and stated that “a change must involve facts arising after entry of the judgment.” It next found that the dispositional ruling reducing support to balance the parties’ situations was equitable, noting “the object is to balance incomes so neither party is impoverished.” The court further held that retroactive modification could not precede the filing date of the petition, noting MCL 552.603(2) allows retroactivity only “from the date notice of the petition was given.” Finally, the court held that attorney fees required findings regarding necessity and reasonableness, finding that a court may not award fees “solely on equitable principles” without an evidentiary basis. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Medical malpractice; Immunity under the Pandemic Health Care Immunity Act (PHCIA); “Some connection” requirement; Franklin v McLaren Flint; Skipper-Baines v Board of Hosp Managers for City of Flint; Jokinen v Beaumont Hosp Troy; Constitutionality of the retroactive application of the PHCIA; Personal representative (PR)
In these consolidated appeals in medical malpractice cases, the court held that defendant-hospital was immune under the PHCIA in one of the cases but that the defendants in the other case were not because they failed to produce evidence meeting the PHCIA’s “some connection” requirement. In Docket No. 368268, plaintiff-PR sued defendant-William Beaumont Hospital, which appealed the trial court’s denial of its summary disposition motion. In Docket No. 368395, another PR sued multiple defendants, who also appealed the denial of their summary disposition motions. The court noted that while a COVID-19 “diagnosis or treatment is not necessary to invoke immunity under the PHCIA, there must still be ‘some connection’ between the medical care provided and the provider’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic to warrant immunity.” It held that “there was such a connection in Docket No. 368268,” with the result that the trial court erred in denying Beaumont’s summary disposition motion. It found that the circumstances in this “case, for all relevant purposes,” were indistinguishable from those in Franklin. The decedent “was diagnosed and treated for COVID-19. Although the alleged malpractice . . . related to the failure to identify and take steps to mitigate any risk of [her] falling out of her bed, this type of medical care would be ‘regular medical care’ in support of the state’s response to the pandemic, and under Franklin, is still covered under the PHCIA.” Further, plaintiff did not “show how the retroactive application of the PHCIA was unconstitutional.” But in the other case, defendants did not cite any evidence to show that their treatment of the decedent “was connected to their response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, [they] merely averred that the PHCIA afforded blanket protection to all healthcare providers during the pertinent period.” That was incorrect – “there must be some connection between the injuries and the provider’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.” Thus, in Docket No. 368268 the court reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition for Beaumont, while in Docket No. 368395, it affirmed.
Res judicata; Collateral estoppel; Effect of an arbitration decision; Lumbermen’s Mut Cas Co v Bissell; Scope of the matter submitted to arbitration; Port Huron Area Sch Dist v Port Huron Educ Ass’n; Asian American Hotel Owners Association, Inc. (AAHOA)
Rejecting plaintiff’s claim that the decision of defendant-AAHOA’s board to remove him “from his position on the board was outside the scope of the matter submitted to arbitration,” the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that his action here was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the arbitration panel’s decision. The Michigan Supreme Court stated in Lumbermen’s “that res judicata and collateral estoppel may still apply to preclude claims or issues when the prior judgment resulted from arbitration rather than a judicial proceeding[.]” But in Port Huron, it noted that “an ‘arbitrator can bind the parties only on issues that they have agreed to submit to him.’” Plaintiff contended that “because the AAHOA governing documents did not authorize the arbitration panel to remove [him] from the board without further discretionary ratification from the board[,]” res judicata and collateral estoppel did not preclude him “from litigating the propriety of his dismissal from the board.” Thus, the court had to “determine the scope of the matters actually submitted to the arbitrators’ authority.” It concluded that, “contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, the relevant documents . . . specifically authorized the arbitration panel to issue a binding award—which did not require further board approval—removing plaintiff from his board position and rendering him ineligible for committee participation or board elections for a specified time. The Ethics and Enforcement Policy expressly provided that ethics complaints would be adjudicated by a panel of arbitrators to determine whether an ethics violation occurred, and the policy further stated that the arbitrators were authorized to decide that disciplinary action was necessary, including ‘Removal from position and timed ineligibility for committee participation or Board elections.’ Moreover, the policy expressly stated that the ‘arbitration panel’s determinations will be final and do not need to be confirmed or approved by the Board.’”
Defamation per se; MCL 600.2911(1); Defenses; Johnson v Michigan Minority Purchasing Council; Rosenboom v Vanek; Qualified privilege; Actual malice; Prysak v R L Polk Co; Abuse of process; Dalley v Dykema Gossett, PLLC; Sanctions for a frivolous complaint; Attorney fees & costs; Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n; Attempt to file an amended complaint; Futility
The court held that the trial court did not err in granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiff’s defamation per se and abuse of process claims. It also did not err in concluding that plaintiff filed a frivolous complaint and in its calculation of attorney fees and costs awarded to defendant as a result. In addition, it did not abuse its discretion in denying amendment of plaintiff’s complaint. The parties were previously married. As to the defamation per se claim, the court noted that plaintiff’s associate (V) “contacted defendant and alerted her to death threats that plaintiff made against her and her husband as well as a threat to kidnap the” parties’ children. Due to V’s communications, defendant contacted the children’s school to notify the school administrators “of the potential threat, that she hoped that she was worrying for nothing, and that she was seeking court intervention. Defendant’s representations were consistent with the information provided by [V]. Additionally, defendant alleged that plaintiff was abusive to her during and after their marriage, and she obtained PPOs against him in 2016 and 2018.” The court noted that plaintiff “did not address these allegations.” While he “alleged that defendant had an obligation to take reasonable action and investigate the claims of [V] first, such as by contacting the police, there is no such requirement imposed in defamation law on defendant in this case.” As to the abuse of process claim, the court was “unable to conclude that defendant caused plaintiff to enter into a stipulation and order agreeing to supervised parenting time when he was represented by counsel. Moreover, defendant alleged that plaintiff had a history of disturbing behavior that resulted in the issuance of PPOs in 2016 and 2018, claims that plaintiff did not dispute.” The court also found that, given the “facts and circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err in its determination that plaintiff’s complaint was frivolous.” In addition, in “light of the trial court’s analysis of the Pirgu factors,” the court could not conclude that its “factual findings were clearly erroneous, or that the amount of the sanction award constituted an abuse of discretion.” Affirmed.