Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Juvenile life without parole (LWOP) resentencing, Miller factors & aggravating circumstances; MCL 769.25; Miller v Alabama; Involuntary dismissal at Miller hearing under MCR 2.504(B)(2); MCR 2.504; Samuel D Begola Servs, Inc v Wild Bros; Ineffective assistance of counsel at resentencing; Categorical bar on juvenile LWOP under Michigan Constitution; Const 1963, art 1, § 16; People v Carp
The court held that errors in the trial court’s analysis of the Miller factors required vacating defendant’s juvenile LWOP sentence and remanding for reconsideration under the proper framework. But it rejected his challenges to the denial of dismissal, his ineffective assistance claims, and his request for a categorical bar on juvenile LWOP. Defendant, who was 16 when he kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and killed a five-year-old, was originally sentenced to mandatory LWOP and later resentenced after Miller and Michigan’s implementing scheme in MCL 769.25. At the Miller hearing the court found the first two factors mitigating, the remaining three neutral, and imposed LWOP based largely on its view that defendant had “failed to take acknowledgment of the predatory nature of his conduct” and on reports noting “clinical concern” about his emotional identification with children, hostility toward women, and deviant sexual interests. The panel held that the Miller factors are mitigating only, so defendant’s failure to fully accept responsibility could not both neutralize the fifth factor and serve as an aggravating circumstance, and that the [trial] court improperly treated his violent past as evidence of his current “possibility of rehabilitation.” It directed the trial court on remand to reevaluate the fifth factor and the overall balance without those errors, although it did not preclude a renewed LWOP sentence. The court upheld denial of defendant’s MCR 2.504(B)(2) motion because exhibits, including sex-offender assessments, provided evidence on the Miller and aggravating factors, so it could not be said the prosecution had not shown “no right to relief.” It also rejected ineffective assistance claims where the judge explicitly stated she did not rely on an officer’s lay opinion and would not have been influenced by a witness’s polygraph results, leaving no reasonable probability of a different outcome. Finally, bound by Carp, the court reaffirmed that Const 1963, art 1, § 16 does not categorically bar juvenile LWOP and concluded the trial court correctly denied that claim. The court retained jurisdiction.
The Clean Air Act (CAA): Whether the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) approval of Michigan’s “exceptional-events request” was arbitrary & capricious; Issuance of a Redesignation Rule redesignating the Detroit area to “attainment” under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS); 42 USC §§ 7407(d)(3)(E)(i), (iii), & (v); Reasonably available control technology (RACT) requirements
The court affirmed respondent-EPA’s approval of Michigan’s CAA “exceptional-events” request based on the 2022 Canadian wildfires, but vacated the redesignation of the Detroit area to “attainment” for the NAAQS. It held that the “decision to grant the exceptional-event approval was not arbitrary or capricious” but that § 7407(d)(3)(E)(v) “permits redesignation only when a state ‘has met all requirements applicable to the area’ at the time of redesignation, rather than at the time a state submits its application for redesignation.” The court first held that the EPA’s approval of the “exceptional-event” request was not arbitrary and capricious. It explained that the EPA sufficiently investigated and thoroughly provided reasons for its decision that “‘the exceedances at issue were due to wildfire smoke, rather than local pollution.’” However, as to the redesignation of the Detroit area to “attainment,” the court reviewed the requirements set forth in § 7407(d)(3)(E). It rejected petitioner’s arguments as to the requirements in subsections (i) and (iii). Its determination “that the decision to grant the exceptional-event approval was not arbitrary or capricious” meant that the argument as to (i) failed. As to (iii), it concluded the EPA’s “determination that the air-quality improvements in the Detroit area were permanent and enforceable emission reductions was not arbitrary or capricious.” As to (v), petitioner argued that “Michigan did not satisfy the RACT requirements imposed when the area was designated Moderate nonattainment, . . . and thus could not satisfy the prerequisites for redesignated to attainment.” The court reviewed the statutory text and, contrary to the EPA’s construction, held that since § “7407(d)(3)(E) commands the EPA not to promulgate a redesignation unless the state ‘has met’ (in the present-perfect tense) certain statutory requirements, it follows that the statutory requirements must be met at the time of redesignation.” The fact that “a redesignation request was pending at the time of the bump up” to Moderate nonattainment “did not preserve the area’s nonattainment classification at the Marginal level or suspend implementation of the RACT requirements.”
Attendant care benefits “incurred”; MCL 500.3107; Douglas v Allstate Ins Co; Written order, oral ruling, & stipulation to form; MCR 2.602; Roberts v Farmers Ins Exch; Relief from judgment; Waiver; MCR 2.612; Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC; Causation; Intervening accident; MCL 500.3105; Griffith v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co
The court held that defendant was entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff’s attendant-care claims and on all remaining PIP claims because plaintiff failed to show that attendant-care expenses were “incurred” and failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on causation in light of later injuries. Plaintiff, a Michigan resident injured in a 2005 Kentucky crash, sought PIP benefits from defendant, including for extensive attendant care. After discovery showed most listed “care providers” testified they were volunteers, were paid by other sources, or did not recall providing services, defendant moved for summary disposition. The court noted that an expense is “incurred” only if the insured becomes liable to pay it and the providers expect compensation, and held that the record “failed to establish that the attendant care providers expected compensation for their services.” Plaintiff’s emailed “Google Doc” response was not properly filed and, even if considered, did not address whether compensable attendant care existed and relied on a “mere promise” to prove issues at trial rather than admissible evidence. The court rejected plaintiff’s challenge to inclusion of one provider in the written order because his counsel stipulated to the order’s “form and content,” and a written order that the court finds comports with its decision controls. It further held plaintiff waived any claim that defendant misrepresented the oral ruling by not raising it in his relief-from-judgment motion. On defendant’s cross-appeal, the court ruled that undisputed medical records, plaintiff’s 2014 protest-related suit, and a 2015 fall showed an intervening cause and that plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that “two thirds” of his damages still arose from 2005 did not create a fact question, so summary disposition should have been granted on causation as well. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Whether a patient who assigned her claim for PIP benefits to a third party may still sue to recover those benefits; C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive MI Ins Co; Comparing Wallace v Suburban Mobility Auth for Reg’l Transp; Real party in interest; Standing; Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART)
On remand from the Supreme Court, the court concluded that C-Spine Orthopedics and Wallace controlled, requiring remand “for the trial court to ‘balance the equities and determine whether equitable rescission is warranted under the facts of this case’ and whether the real party in interest defect that existed at the filing of the complaint can be cured.” Thus, it vacated the trial court’s order denying defendant-SMART’s summary disposition motion and remanded. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court for reconsideration in light of C-Spine, directing it “to reconsider whether a patient who has assigned her claim for PIP benefits to a third party may still file a lawsuit to recover those benefits.” Noting that the facts and proceedings here were “nearly identical to the circumstances in Wallace” (a companion case to C-Spine), the court focused on the Supreme “Court’s resolution of that case.” The Supreme Court ruled “that while Wallace had standing to file a lawsuit, she lost her real party in interest status when she assigned her claims for PIP benefits to her medical providers.” Its decision on “Wallace’s appeal turned on the fact that the trial court, because of its understanding of the legal issues before it, did not engage in a rescission analysis. Put another way, the trial court accepted Wallace’s rescission, but never balanced the equities before doing so.” Just like in Wallace, plaintiff here “assigned her rights to pursue PIP benefits to her medical providers.” Less than a year after the accident, she “filed a complaint to collect first-party no-fault PIP benefits” from SMART. Subsequently, she “and several of her medical providers entered into agreements whereby they agreed to revoke and rescind, ‘nunc pro tunc’ the assignments. Similar to Wallace, SMART argued that plaintiff was not the real party in interest and had no standing to pursue her claims because she had already assigned her claims to her medical providers. The trial court denied the motion, in part, based on its finding that [she] and her medical providers had revoked the assignments and, as a consequence, plaintiff could pursue her claim for PIP benefits. As in Wallace, the trial court here accepted plaintiff’s claim of rescission, but never balanced the equities.”
Motion to set aside the default judgment; Good cause; Shawl v Spence Bros, Inc; Meritorious defense; Unjust enrichment; Statutory conversion
The court concluded “the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment,” which the circuit court affirmed. On appeal, defendant argued it “established both good cause and a meritorious defense to the complaint.” The court held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not hold a hearing to establish the veracity of plaintiff’s claims before entering the default judgment.” Concluding “that the trial court’s decision fell within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes,” the court disagreed that “the district court abused its discretion by denying its motion to set aside the default judgment.” The court found that “the district court’s holding that defendant did not establish good cause was within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” It also concluded “that defendant failed to present a meritorious defense to all of plaintiff’s claims in the district court, defendant was not entitled to make a lesser showing of good cause and, consequently, was not entitled to set aside the default judgment.” The court found that by “failing to raise absolute meritorious defenses to the claims of unjust enrichment and statutory conversion in the district court, defendant failed to show that it had an absolute meritorious defense to plaintiff’s complaint.” Thus, it saw “no need to address defendant’s remaining arguments regarding the defenses it raised to plaintiff’s claims of breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation.” Affirmed.