“Civil contempt”; Rolex Watch USA, Inc. v. Crowley; Glover v. Johnson; Grace v. Center for Auto Safety; Colling v. Barry; Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund of Local Union 58, IBEW v. Gary’s Elec. Serv. Co.; “Criminal contempt"; United States v. Moncier; First Amendment “retaliation”; Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock; Leonard v. Robinson; Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n; King v. Zamiara; Arnett v. Myers; “Substantive due process”; Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc; Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp.; “Procedural due process”; Morrison v. Warren; Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino; “Equal protection”; Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano; Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, OH; Qualified immunity; Brown v. Crowley; Warren v. City of Athens, OH; Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ.; Municipal immunity from 42 USC § 1983 liability; Meyers v. City of Cincinnati; Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., OK v. Brown; Certificate of Occupancy (COO); Special Approval Land Use (SALU) permit

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The district court abused its discretion by failing to hold the defendant-Village of Armada in contempt after it violated a clear and unambiguous order to issue a COO for additional business space that conformed with the then existing SALU permit. Also, because a jury could reasonably find that the defendants retaliated against the plaintiffs-Patereks for having complained about Village officials, in violation of the First Amendment, the defendants were improperly granted summary judgment on most of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. The original SALU contained only one condition as to hours of operation, while the COO contained “rigid time constraint[s].” The Village violated the district court’s order by “patently disregard[ing] the district court’s unequivocal instruction for Defendants to issue a COO that conformed with the then existing SALU.” The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiffs’ motion for criminal contempt. It erred by granting the defendants summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim where they offered sufficient circumstantial evidence that “their recurring speech activities resulted in an escalating animus between Defendants and the Patereks, which ultimately led Defendants to take the adverse actions at issue in this case.” Because “a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs for their protected speech activity,” summary judgment for the defendants on the retaliation claim “was inappropriate[.]” A jury could also find that they “arbitrarily and capriciously ticketed Plaintiffs, in violation of substantive due process; [and] that Defendants, due to their animus against Plaintiffs, subjected Plaintiffs’ business to disparate treatment, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause[.]” However, they were properly granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim. Defendant-Delecke, the Commissioner of the Village Planning Commission, was not entitled to qualified immunity because the evidence suggested that he “used his government post to harass and retaliate against Plaintiffs by causing tickets to be issued and by denying Plaintiffs the rights bestowed to them under their SALUs.” Since each alleged constitutional violation stemmed “from the decision of an official with final decision-making authority related to the particular policy” at issue, “the Village is liable if a jury finds in Plaintiffs’ favor.”