Sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction of aggravated stalking; Whether he committed two acts of harassment; “Stalking” defined; MCL 750.411i(1)(e); “Course of conduct” defined; MCL 750.411i(1)(a); “Harassment” defined; MCL 750.411i(1)(d); “Unconsented contact” defined; MCL 750.411i(1)(f); Claim that because the jury acquitted defendant of home invasion for an incident “it necessarily could not have considered the incident as evidence of harassment”; People v. Vaughn; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to impeach the victim with text message records; Matters of trial strategy; People v. Horn; “Other acts” evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); “Plain error”; Jury instruction as to what constitutes a “willing” pattern of conduct for aggravated stalking; Sentencing; People v. Lockridge; Alleyne v. United States; Scoring of OVs 3, 7, 8, & 10

[Unpublished opinion.] The court affirmed defendant-Fleming’s convictions of larceny from a motor vehicle and aggravated stalking, but vacated his sentence of two years and six months to five years’ imprisonment for his convictions and remanded for resentencing pursuant to Lockridge. Defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated stalking because he did not commit two acts of harassment. He contended that “the jury acquitted him of the September 21 home-invasion charge, and the September 19 and July incidents did not constitute harassment.” It was undisputed that Fleming’s conduct violated his condition of release. The core of his argument was that he did not engage in a willful course of conduct. The court held that a reasonable jury could conclude that the September 19 incident constituted harassment. “Fleming approached the victim in a public place. He was not supposed to have contact with her because he had been arrested and charged with sexually assaulting her.” Given the facts, “a reasonable jury could find that this incident constituted unconsented contact, that a reasonable person would fear having someone charged with a previous assault against them approaching them, and that the victim did in fact feel harassed.” Fleming also contended that because the jury acquitted him of home invasion for the September 21 incident, it necessarily could not have considered the incident as evidence of harassment. The victim testified that, during that incident, Fleming entered her home and threatened her life. “A reasonable jury could find that the incident constituted unconsented contact, that a reasonable person would fear that conduct, and that the victim did in fact feel harassed. The fact that the jury also acquitted Fleming of home invasion does not necessarily mean that the jury could not have found that the incident constituted evidence of harassment.” The court noted that “jury verdicts rendered in several counts of a multicount indictment need not be consistent.” Also, “because other elements of the home invasion crime were in dispute, such as whether Fleming committed a breaking, the jury verdicts were not necessarily inconsistent in fact.” The court held that a reasonable jury could have found at least two separate acts of harassment from his conduct.