Denial of motion for a mistrial; Right to a fair & impartial jury; People v. Orlewicz; Purpose of voir dire; People v. Sawyer; The trial court’s discretion in conducting voir dire; People v. Tyburski; Claim that the prosecutor’s questioning of a potential juror exposed the jurors to an “extraneous influence”; People v. Budzyn; Presumption that jurors follow their instructions; People v. Mahone; “Other acts” testimony under MCL 768.27a; MRE 403; People v. Bywater; People v. Watkins; People v. Buie; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v. Washington; Failure to raise a meritless argument; People v. Ericksen; Prosecutorial error; People v. Bahoda; People v. Unger; Alleged “vouching”; People v. Dobek

[Unpublished opinion.] Concluding that the prosecutor’s questioning of the jury pool about its experiences with delayed disclosure of sexual abuse served a valid goal in this case, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Further, the Watkins considerations supported the admission of the challenged other acts evidence under MCL 768.27a. The court also rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial error claims. Thus, it affirmed his CSC I and II convictions and sentences. This case involved delayed disclosure of sexual abuse. The court concluded that the trial court’s “denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial related to the delayed disclosure questions was consistent with the trial court’s obligation” to conduct a voir dire that “was ‘sufficiently probing . . . to uncover potential juror bias.’” The court also rejected the argument that the prosecution’s questioning of a potential juror “exposed the jurors to an extraneous influence and was grounds for a mistrial.” While the potential juror’s comments about “her experiences with delayed disclosure arguably may have exposed the jury to extraneous influence, since, like the victims and other witnesses in this case, the potential juror’s sister was sexually abused and disclosed her abuse years later when others alleged abuse, and thus the comments could have had an impact on the jury’s perception of the prevalence of delayed disclosure of sexual abuse.” However, defendant did not show that “there was ‘a real and substantial possibility that [the exposure] could have affected the jury’s verdict.’” The prosecutor subsequently “asked the jury pool whether it could ‘keep an open mind about th[e] issues’ and ‘listen to the evidence as it’s presented to you,’ to which no potential juror replied negatively.” Thus, the record did “not indicate that any juror prejudged the phenomena of delayed disclosure.” As to the other acts evidence, the court noted that the “acts to which witnesses testified under MCL 768.27a were similar to the acts underlying the charged offenses” regarding “the ages of the victims, the victims’ relation to defendant, the locations where the abuse took place, and the nature of the abuse.”