Sentencing; Restitution; Crime Victim’s Rights Act (CVRA) (MCL 780.751 et seq.); MCL 780.766; People v. McKinley; “Motion to add issues”; Claim that the restitution amounts allocated for victim-Shane’s future medical and psychological treatment and “lost wages” were not authorized by MCL 780.766; People v. Heil; “Reasonably determined” future losses; MCL 769.1a(4)(a); Omdahl v. West Iron Cnty. Bd. of Educ.; Causation; Claim that because “restitution is a form of punishment, the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury rather than a sentencing court determine the amount owed”; Apprendi v. New Jersey; Southern Union Co. v. United States; Alleyne v. United States; United States v. Bengis (2nd Cir.); United States v. Kieffer (10th Cir.); United States v. Booker; United States v. Leahy (3rd Cir.); People v. Lockridge

The court held that the restitution awards could not stand. Because the defendant’s illegal acts involving victim-Austin did not give rise to his convictions, Austin was not entitled to any restitution. Victim-Shane’s restitution award, too, was vacated, “as the evidence provided no reasonable factual basis for substantial components of the total." Also, as to defendant’s claim that “because restitution is a form of punishment, the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury rather than a sentencing court determine the amount owed,” the court held that it was “unaware of any state or federal courts that have adopted defendant’s constitutional argument,” found it unavailing, and declined the “opportunity to break new legal ground.” Thus, the court vacated most of the restitution order and remanded for correction of the order to reflect the amount paid for psychological therapy, $1,785. Should the prosecution elect to present additional testimony, the trial court may conduct a new restitution hearing. Defendant was charged with sexually abusing two young brothers. Both victims are now adults. The trial court referred to them pseudonymously as Shane and Austin. He pleaded guilty to the charged conduct involving Shane. The prosecutor dismissed a single count involving Austin. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison and ordered him to pay $276,800 in restitution to Austin, and $276,985 to Shane for future therapy costs, future medication expenses, future psychiatric services, and “lost wages.” He challenged only the restitution order. He claimed that the restitution amounts allocated for Shane’s future medical and psychological treatment and “lost wages” were not authorized by MCL 780.766. The court discerned “no rational basis for continuing to embrace Heil’s ‘easily ascertained and measured’ formulation, as the Heil court operated in an entirely different (and no longer pertinent) statutory milieu.” Here, it confronted specific statutory language that displaced any need for policy analysis. The trial court properly awarded restitution for the costs of the “actual” professional services rendered to Shane. "While future (not yet incurred) psychological expenses indisputably fall within the ambit of MCL 780.766(4)(a), the prosecution must demonstrate by an evidentiary preponderance that the claimed expenses are ‘reasonably expected to be incurred.’” Here, the court found the requisite proof sorely lacking. It held that the CVRA “permits an award only for losses factually and proximately caused by the defendant’s offense; nothing in the text or structure of the statute suggests otherwise.”