Action for third-party no-fault benefits; The No-Fault Insurance Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq.); MCL 500.3135; Serious impairment of body function; MCL 500.3135(5); McCormick v. Carrier; Principle that causation is generally an issue for the trier of fact; Nichols v. Dobler; Principle that whether a condition temporally follows an event is not conclusive evidence of causation; West v. General Motors Corp.; The spine as an important part of a person’s body; Chouman v. Home-Owners Ins. Co.; Movement of one’s back as an important body function; Shaw v. Martin; Sherrell v. Bugaski; Principle that being able to use one’s neck & back are important body functions; Harris v. Lemicex; Requirement that the impairments affected the injured plaintiff’s general ability to lead his normal life

The court held that the plaintiffs presented evidence creating questions of fact as to whether the injured plaintiff’s (Hawamda) injury met the statutory threshold for a serious impairment of body function, whether any such impairment was caused by the accident, and whether his general ability to lead his normal life was affected. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s orders granting the defendants summary disposition and remanded. It first concluded that the trial court erred in deciding “as a matter of law that no factual dispute existed as to the nature and the extent of Hawamda’s injuries.” Plaintiffs presented “documented manifestations of Hawamda’s subjective symptoms through medical records that traced Hawamda’s symptoms and treatment from the time of the accident in 2011, through 2014. Plaintiffs also offered objective manifestations of a serious impairment through MRIs” of his cervical and lumbar spine. Defendants cited “unremarkable MRIs of Hawamda’s brain and neck taken on the same day as the car accident.” Plaintiffs produced MRIs of his lumbar and cervical spine taken in 1/13 and 1/14 pursuant to his treating physician’s order. Defendants challenged those MRIs “because they were taken some two and three years after the accident.” However, the court noted that “the plain language of MCL 500.3135 does not include a temporal requirement. Together, the objective MRIs and medical records offered by plaintiffs relate the findings and subjective complaints to the accident.” It also noted that the ability “to use one’s neck and back are important body functions.” As to Hawamda’s general ability to lead his normal life, plaintiffs presented deposition testimony that his activities were “more sedentary since the accident.” He reported that he has been unable to work even part-time, can no longer lift heavy items, and “that while he was independent with self-care, he sometimes needed help dressing. He was able to do some cooking, use the telephone, help his wife watch their children, and drive ‘when necessary (but not alone).’ While this evidence is not overwhelming,” it supported that his “claimed manifested impairments affected his ‘general ability to lead his or her normal life.’”