Tortious interference with a business relationship; Baidee v. Brighton Area Schs.; A manufactured or false representation as evidence a person intentionally interfered; Wood v. Herndon & Herndon Investigations, Inc.; Hearsay; MRE 801(c); Guerrero v. Smith; Admissions of a party-opponent; MRE 801(d)(2); Whether plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement; Hicks v. EPI Printers, Inc.; Elements of a valid contract; Eerdmans v. Maki; Principle that a party cannot create an issue of material fact by contradicting his or her own deposition testimony; Kennedy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.; Statements of fact made in a clear, intelligent, & unequivocal manner; Barlow v. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc.; Use of an expert’s affidavit to create a genuine issue of material fact after contradictory deposition testimony; Dykes v. William Beaumont Hosp.

The court affirmed summary disposition for several of the defendants (referred to as the Garff defendants) on plaintiff-former employee’s claims alleging civil rights and consumer protection violations on the basis that an arbitration agreement barred her claims. It also affirmed summary disposition for two other defendants on her tortious interference with business relationships claim, concluding that she failed to show that defendant-Rivard, an employee of defendant-Ally Financial, intentionally interfered with her employment. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in determining there was no question of fact as to whether she signed an arbitration agreement with the Garff defendants. After being shown the agreement at her deposition, she identified her signature on it “in a clear, direct, and unequivocal manner. She recalled signing it, seemingly attributing her earlier partially contradictory affidavit on this point to her failure to recall it.” The court found that her later “statements to the contrary were not explanations or modifications, but direct contradictions of her earlier testimony,” and she failed to make any “showing of mistake or improvidence.” The court concluded that her unequivocal initial deposition statements were “binding and she did not create an issue of material fact by later contradicting herself at the same deposition.” As to her tortious interference claim, it found that the trial court erred in its ruling on the admissibility of certain testimony. As it was “not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it was not hearsay.” Further, the testimony about statements during the witnesses’ “conversations with Rivard would be admissible as admissions by a party-opponent.” But the court held that plaintiff still failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to “whether Rivard intentionally interfered with her prospective employment.” The evidence showed that his statements about her “were motivated by business reasons” and that he “was acting to protect the interests of Ally Financial rather than acting for his own benefit.” There was no evidence that his “statements of his beliefs about plaintiff were manufactured or false.”