Constitutional right to counsel; People v. Akins; Denial of a motion to adjourn the trial; People v. Coy; People v. Stinson; Docket concerns; People v. Williams; Plain error review; People v. Carines; Right of confrontation; Crawford v. Washington; “Hearsay”; MRE 801(c); Unavailable witness; MRE 804(a)(4); Testimony of an unavailable witness given at another hearing; MRE 804(b)(1); People v. Farquharson; People v. Meredith; People v. Garland; Similar motive to cross-examine at the preliminary exam; Exercise of due diligence to produce the witness; People v. Bean; Sufficiency of the evidence to support a conspiracy to commit armed robbery conviction; People v. Jackson; People v. Mass; Elements of armed robbery; MCL 750.529; People v. Chambers; Assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH); People v. Brown; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Armstrong; Matters of trial strategy; People v. Rockey; Decision whether defendant will testify; People v. Toma; People v. Martin; People v. Bonilla-Machado; Request for remand for a hearing pursuant to People v. Ginther; MCR 7.211(C)(1)

The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for an adjournment where he was attempting to retain a particular attorney, and that his right to counsel of his own choice was not violated. It also held that his right of confrontation was not violated by the admission of the victim’s preliminary exam testimony, and that there was sufficient evidence to support his conspiracy to commit armed robbery conviction. Finally, the court rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to the decision that he not testify, and found that there was no basis to remand for a Ginther hearing. He was also convicted of armed robbery and AWIGBH. The court first found that even if his adjournment request “implicated his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial, the record” showed he did not “establish that he was not negligent in the timing of his request.” Even though he was informed over “three months before trial that the trial court did not intend to adjourn trial, [he] did not retain new counsel. Rather, on the day of trial, [his] attorney asked for an adjournment because his client was ‘trying’ to retain a specific attorney.” The court also concluded that he did not show a legitimate reason for an adjournment. Although docket concerns by themselves “do not support the denial of an otherwise proper” adjournment request, defendant’s negligence together with his failure to show a legitimate need for an adjournment supported the trial court’s denial of his request. As to his right of confrontation, the issue was whether defendant had a similar motive to cross-examine the victim at the preliminary exam as he would have at trial. The court found that he did. In both proceedings, defendant “was motivated to show that he did not commit the charged crimes.” Given that the same issues were at stake in both the preliminary exam and the trial, he “had a substantially similar interest in those issues relative to the victim’s testimony in each of those proceedings.” As to the conspiracy conviction, the court held that it was reasonable for the jury to infer, based on the circumstances and the men’s acts, that they had entered into an agreement before the crime. Affirmed.