Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (j), & (k)(ii); In re Beck; In re Moss Minors; In re Ellis; In re Hudson; In re BZ; In re Miller; “Reasonable likelihood”; Child’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; In re White

Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ (b)(i), (j), and (k)(ii) were established, and termination was in the child’s (T) best interests, the court affirmed the order terminating respondent-father’s parental right. As to §§ (b)(i), (j), and (k)(ii), respondent’s argument was that “a reasonable likelihood of future harm was not proven, given that the sexual abuse happened three years earlier without any subsequent abuse by respondent, that respondent was now incarcerated, and that [T’s] mother divorced respondent and had sole custody of” T. The court noted that each of the “statutory grounds speaks of a reasonable likelihood of future harm or abuse if the child were to be returned to a respondent’s care or home.” Thus, the court rejected his claim that “the statutory provisions were unproven because he could not harm [T] in the future given his imprisonment and the divorce and custody arrangement; the statutory subsections presume a return to care. The notion that a reasonable likelihood of future harm cannot be established where a respondent would not have the physical opportunity to harm a child at a later date contravenes the plain language of” §§ (b)(i), (j), and (k)(ii). Regarding the apparent three-year lapse of time without additional sexual abuse allegations, the court held that the threat of harm to T “remained in light of the evidence of respondent’s manipulative and controlling behavior and the fact that respondent denied that he even sexually abused [T] in the first place despite his plea. Patently, the danger persisted. The mere passage of time absent additional sexual assaults did not equate to a diminishment of the danger posed to” T.