Parenting time; Shade v. Wright; MCL 722.27a(1); Resolving custody disputes in the children’s best interests; MCL 722.23; Eldred v. Ziny; Rivette v. Rose-Molina; Sinicropi v. Mazurek; Factors (b), (c), (f), & (l); Deference to the trial court’s decisions as to the weight of the evidence & witness credibility; Luna v. Regnier; Overlap in the factors; Fletcher v. Fletcher; Parents’ ability to cooperate; MCL 722.26a(1)(b); A preponderance of the evidence; Pierron v. Pierron; Legal custody; Whether joint custody was an option; Wright v. Wright; Attorney fees; MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b); Cassidy v. Cassidy; Borowsky v. Borowsky; Butler v. Simmons-Butler; Ordering a party to pay for court-ordered therapy sessions as a sanction for failing to attend; Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co.; Persichini v. William Beaumont Hosp.; MCL 600.611; Requirement that a party obey a trial court’s order; Kirby v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n

Concluding that the trial court did not err in denying defendant-father’s request for equal parenting time, in granting plaintiff-mother sole legal custody of their children, or in ordering defendant to pay attorney and therapy fees, the court affirmed the trial court’s order. It rejected his challenges to the trial court’s findings on statutory best interest factors (b), (c), (f), and (l), determining that in light of those factors, as well as the ones he did not challenge, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an increase in his parenting time was not in the children’s best interests. While “disputed by defendant, there was evidence that” he did not recognize the seriousness of one child’s behavioral issues and failed to address them “in an appropriate amount of time. Additionally, plaintiff testified about three instances of threatening behavior by defendant in the presence of the children. Finally,” the therapist (K) the trial court ordered the parties to see “recommended that defendant’s parenting time remain the same.” The court also held that the trial court’s decision that plaintiff should be awarded sole legal custody was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicable standard in this case. In addition to sole legal custody being in the children’s best interests, there was “animosity between plaintiff and defendant, manifesting in a struggle to come together to make decisions to foster the children’s well-being.” They were unable to even “have civil parenting-time exchanges on their own, which necessitated that the exchanges occur at police stations.” Thus, joint custody was not an option. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b), “based on defendant’s failure to comply with the consent judgment pertaining to the timeliness of parenting time exchanges, and working with plaintiff for the welfare of the children.” Finally, the trial court had the inherent authority to sanction him for disobeying its order to attend the therapy sessions with K, and did not abuse its discretion in ordering him to pay his portion of the two sessions.