Custody; Whether the trial court correctly found that the most recent order was the consent judgment of divorce; MCL 722.28; Statutory interpretation; Kubicki v. Sharpe; In re AP; Best interests of the child; Phillips v. Jordan; Interview with the children to determine their preferences for custody; Best interest factors; MCL 722.23; Factor (i); MCL 722.23(i); Maier v. Maier; The Child Custody Act (CCA); Retroactive change from an LGAL to a GAL; Waived issue; English v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of MI; Cadle Co. v. Kentwood

The court held that the trial court did not err in vacating the 9/7/18 order that should not have been entered in the first place; and it did not err in declining to treat the 8/18/17 order as if it was a custody order. Also, the trial court did not err in its analysis of factor (i) when determining the children’s best interests. Finally, the trial court never appointed a nonparty as an LGAL. Defendant argued that the trial court improperly vacated the 9/7/18 custody order and erroneously ignored the 8/18/17 order so that it could find the consent judgment of divorce to be the most recent custody order. The court held that the trial court did not err in vacating the 9/7/18 custody order. “That order was stipulated to by the parties, and the substitute judge who entered the order did not consider the best interest factors before entering the order.” The court held that the “trial court cannot blindly accept the stipulation of the parties, but must independently determine what is in the best interests of the child.” In Phillips, as in this case, “the trial court entered the stipulated order to change custody without making any independent determination regarding the best interests of the children pursuant to the” CCA. The court held “that the trial court erred in failing to make such a determination.” In addition, it “held that the trial court was required to set aside the stipulated order and to make its own determination regarding the best interests of the children.” Thus, here, the trial court properly vacated the stipulated order of 9/7/18, and made its own custody decision under the best interest factors. It also did not err by failing to treat the 8/18/17 order as the most recent custody order. The 8/18/17 order was not a custody order. Rather, that order merely released “the family counselor and provided that parenting time would be on the 2-2-5-5 schedule, i.e., the arrangement provided for by the consent judgment of divorce.” Affirmed.