Divorce; Spousal support; Berger v. Berger; Olson v. Olson; Deference to the trial court’s special ability to assess the witnesses’ credibility; Cassidy v. Cassidy; Relevance of the amount of marital property a party was awarded; Gates v. Gates; Reliance on a prognosticator program; Distinguishing Myland v. Myland; Attorney fees; MCL 552.13(1); MCR 3.206(D); Stackhouse v. Stackhouse; Maake v. Maake; MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b); Richards v. Richards

Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiff-ex-wife $2,910 a month in spousal support or $8,000 in attorney fees, the court affirmed the divorce judgment. As to spousal support, defendant-ex-husband argued that the trial court abused its discretion “because (1) the evidence did not establish that plaintiff was unable to work, (2) plaintiff was awarded substantial assets she could use to support herself, and (3) the trial court relied on a computer program rather than legal analysis” in calculating the award. The court disagreed. First, the trial court made findings on all of the Olson factors except fault, and its findings were not clearly erroneous. Defendant did not cite any “authority for the proposition that, to receive spousal support, a payee spouse must provide medical evidence that she or he is disabled under any particular definition of disability. Plaintiff testified that she had no education or training beyond high school. She had not worked in 27 years. Her chronic pain prevented her from sitting or standing for long periods, and she had to take breaks every 30 minutes while performing household tasks. Defendant did not produce any evidence to refute” her testimony. As to his contention that she was “capable of supporting herself from the substantial marital assets she was awarded[,]” under Gates, the amount of marital property she was awarded had “no bearing on whether the spousal support award” was appropriate. As to the trial court’s use of a prognosticator program to calculate the amount, unlike in “Myland, the trial court did not use an arbitrary formula in this case. The parties themselves used a prognosticator program to calculate their proposed spousal support awards.” Rather than simply multiplying “defendant’s income by an arbitrary number that it arrived at independent of the spousal support factors . . . the trial court considered the parties’ financial status quo and their respective needs and earning capacities.” As to the attorney fee award, plaintiff established that she could not bear the expense of the case, and “that a portion of her attorney fees were attributable to defendant’s violation of a court order.” The trial court awarded her attorney fees because, as “to both mediation and the sale of the marital home, defendant attempted to find loopholes in the trial court’s order, rather than participating in good faith, as he was required to do.” It did not abuse its discretion.