Withholding of removal; 8 USC § 1231(b)(3); The substantial evidence standard; Khalili v. Holder; Abdurakhmanov v. Holder; Mikhailevitch v. INS; Whether the Immigration Judge (IJ) & Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) correctly apply the corroboration requirement in 8 USC § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); Gaye v. Lynch; INS v. Aguirre–Aguirre; The REAL ID Act; In Re S-M-J- (BIA); Matter of L-A-C- (BIA); Uzodinma v. Barr (8th Cir.); Chukwu v. Attorney Gen. of U.S. (3d Cir.); Ren v. Holder (9th Cir.); Rapheal v. Mukasey (7th Cir.); Wei Sun v. Sessions (2d Cir.); Liu v. Holder (2d Cir.); Avelar-Oliva v. Barr (5th Cir.); Soeung v. Holder (1st Cir.); Toure v. Attorney Gen. of U.S. (3d Cir.); Whether substantial evidence supported the IJ’s & BIA’s determination that petitioner inadequately explained why he failed to corroborate his past-persecution claim involving his stepfather; § 1229a(c)(4)(B) as amended by the REAL ID Act; § 1229a(c)(4)(B); § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); Fisenko v. Holder (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder; Dragnea v. Lynch (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Brushtulli v. Holder (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Yanyun Ni v. Holder (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Ying Chen v. Holder (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Gjoni v. Gonzales (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Diallo v. INS (2d Cir.); Irhibayeva v. Holder (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Whether the BIA erred by rejecting petitioner’s claim that he was persecuted “because of” his membership in the particular social group; Matter of C-T-L- (BIA); Gonzalez-Posadas v. Attorney Gen. U.S. (3d Cir.); Barajas-Romero v. Lynch (9th Cir.); Singh v. Ashcroft

The court vacated the denial of petitioner-Guzman-Vazquez’s application for withholding of removal, holding that an IJ may not require corroborative evidence without giving the applicant an opportunity to explain its absence. It further held that the IJ and BIA’s determinations as to the unavailability of evidence to corroborate Guzman’s claim about abuse by his stepfather was not supported by substantial evidence, and that applicants for withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(3) must show “that a protected ground was at least one reason for their persecution[.]” Guzman claimed that he suffered persecution at the hands of his stepfather, who had considerable political influence and would react violently should Guzman return to Mexico. The IJ and the BIA did find that Guzman was a member of a protected group, “relatives of his father or children of his parents,” but ruled that he failed to explain why he could not obtain corroborating affidavits from family members, and that he “did not show that his stepfather ‘abused him because he was the child of his biological mother and father.’” The BIA adopted the IJ’s opinion and reasoning. The court first held that the IJ and BIA failed to correctly apply § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)’s corroboration requirement. It concluded that the IJ was not required to provide Guzman notice of the specific corroborating evidence that would be required to support his claim, under Gaye. However, joining its sister circuits, the court held that the IJ did err at the merits hearing by the requiring affidavits without giving Guzman an opportunity to explain why they were not reasonably available. It also held that the IJ’s and the BIA’s determinations that evidence to corroborate Guzman’s claim about abuse by his stepfather “was reasonably obtainable was not ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” It held that he gave adequate explanations as to why he had not obtained affidavits or letters where he explained that he had no communication with his sister, his mother was unable to write, and it was unlikely that his other relatives would have the necessary information. The court also held that in a “mixed motive,” case, applicants for withholding of removal under “§ 1231(b)(3) must demonstrate that a protected ground was at least one reason for their persecution,” and the court remanded the case for the BIA to apply the correct standard.