Motion for an adjournment on the first day of trial; People v. Coy; People v. Steele; MCR 2.503(C); Sufficiency of the evidence; People v. Harris; People v. Nowack; Identity; People v. Yost; Safe-breaking; MCL 750.231; Larceny; People v. March; Larceny in a building; MCL 750.316; Possession of burglar’s tools; MCL 750.116; People v. Wilson; People v. Dorrington; Items contrived & adapted for breaking & entering; In re Forfeiture of One Front End Loader; Admission of an officer’s body camera video; Authentication; MRE 901; People v. Muhammad; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 13; MCL 777.43(1)(d); People v. Couzens; People v. Nelson; MCL 777.43(2)(a) & (c); People v. Gibbs; Use of “or”; Paris Meadows, LLC v. Kentwood; Restitution for the costs of a dismissed jury pool; People v. Juntikka (On Remand); MCL 769.34(6); MCL 780.766; People v. McKinley; MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii); People v. Konopka (On Remand)  

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for an adjournment on the first day of trial, and that there was sufficient evidence to support his safe-breaking, larceny in a building, and possession of burglar’s tools convictions. Further, admission of an officer’s body camera video was proper because it was authenticated by the officer’s (Y) testimony, and the court upheld the 10-point score for OV 13. However, the trial court erred in ordering restitution for the cost of a dismissed jury pool. Thus, it affirmed his convictions and his sentences as a second-offense habitual offender to 7 months to 25 years for safe-breaking, 2 to 6 years for larceny in a building, and 47 months to 15 years for possession of burglar’s tools. But it vacated the restitution order and remanded for correction of his judgment of sentence. The court held that the trial court did not abuse “its discretion by denying yet another request for adjournment. Defendant’s fourth (and final) trial attorney was appointed in [7/18] and received two adjournments of the trial date in order to prepare.” Further, defendant waited until the day of the trial to seek another adjournment. The court found that he failed to show the approximately two-month period “between his most recent attorney’s appointment and trial was an insufficient amount of time to prepare.” It next held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that he was the person who took victim-W’s personal property from his home “without permission and with the intent to steal that property. There was also sufficient evidence that defendant was the person who broke into [W’s] safe with the intent to steal the contents of the safe.” His admission to Y that he took the items from W’s home and broke W’s “safe was direct evidence of his identity.” Further, Y discovered him in a mobile home near W’s home, and defendant directed Y to a bedroom where W’s property was found. “Defendant was the only individual in the home at the time of” Y’s investigation, and he told Y “he was the only individual involved in the crimes.” As to the burglar’s tools conviction, the evidence allowed “the jury to conclude that the items defendant used were ‘contrived and adapted for breaking and entering.’” But the trial court did not have “the statutory authority to order restitution to the court on the basis of the dismissed jury.”