Divorce; Whether the consent judgment awarded a surviving spouse’s annuity as part of a share of the other spouse’s pension benefit; MCL 552.101(4); Hudson v. Hudson; Interpreting a divorce judgment as a contract; Kendzierski v. Macomb Cnty.; Qualifying domestic relations order (QDRO)

Concluding that it was bound by Hudson, the court rejected defendant-ex-wife’s argument that MCL 552.101(4) compelled a determination that the parties’ consent divorce judgment entitled her to elect an annuity as part of her share of plaintiff-ex-husband’s pension. Further, the judgment made it clear that she was to “receive a coverture fraction payable over” his lifetime. Thus, the court affirmed the order determining that the judgment did not award her a surviving spouse’s annuity. She argued that she was statutorily entitled to such “annuity benefits because MCL 552.101(4) provides that surviving spouse annuity benefits are automatically included with the assignment of any rights to the opposing party’s pension unless” the divorce judgment expressly states they are not included. The court disagreed, noting that it addressed the statute’s application under similar circumstances in Hudson, where it rejected a party’s argument that it “entitled him to choose the option of a single life annuity to be paid over the course of his lifetime, determining that the annuity options in the form QDRO merely provided a mechanism of payment of the retirement benefit. The Court concluded that ‘the option . . . to choose the terms and conditions of payment is not a “component” as that term is defined in MCL 552.101(5).’” Here, as in Hudson, defendant could not “be given 33% of the option (a survivor’s annuity) she wishes to exercise, and the statute does not apply to the question concerning her right to elect the form of payment of the benefit she will receive under” the judgment. Her argument that it “compels a determination that she is entitled to elect an annuity option as a ‘component’ of plaintiff’s pension, when the” judgment only entitled her to a percentage of the pension benefit, was foreclosed under Hudson. The judgment’s plain language made “clear that the parties did not intend that defendant be able to take this benefit in the form of an annuity payable over her lifetime.” It stated if she predeceased him, “her benefit is to be paid to her estate, or if none, then to the children of the parties’ marriage.” Had the parties “contemplated a surviving spouse annuity there would have been no need for the language in the Consent Judgment providing what is to occur with defendant’s benefits were she to predecease” him. There was also disclaimer language strongly suggesting that she “affirmatively waived any interest in a survivor’s annuity.”