Felonious assault; People v. Osby; People v. Bosca; People v. Jackson; Battery; People v. Meissner; Dangerous weapon; Intent to injure or place in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery; People v. Harrison; People v. Kanaan; People v. Reeves; Due process; Right to remain silent; Miranda v. Arizona; People v. Solmonson; People v. Clary; People v. Shafier; People v. Dennis; People v. Allen

Holding that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s felonious assault conviction, and that the prosecution’s questions and statements as to defendant’s silence did not result in plain error, the court affirmed. He argued that the prosecution’s questions and comments as to his invocation of his right to remain silent after his arrest resulted in plain error affecting his substantial rights. The court disagreed, concluding that this case was factually similar in many ways to Allen. It also held that the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed an assault. “There was ample record evidence that” he pointed a loaded firearm at victim-P. P testified that defendant pointed a firearm at him. An officer (H) testified that defendant admitted to pointing a firearm at P, and another officer (W) “testified that he recovered a loaded firearm that was in a holster attached to the steering column in” his vehicle. P identified that gun “as the firearm that defendant pointed at him on M-53. [P] also testified that he was afraid of being shot by” him. Thus, a rational trier of fact could determine that he “committed an assault by performing an unlawful act that placed another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” Also, the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the assault with a dangerous weapon. P “testified that defendant pointed a firearm at him, [H] testified that defendant admitted to pointing a firearm at [P], and [W] testified that he recovered a loaded firearm that was in a holster attached to the steering column in defendant’s vehicle.” Thus, a rational trier of fact could determine that he “possessed a dangerous weapon when he committed the assault.” Finally, the evidence was sufficient that he “possessed the intent to injure or place [P] in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” P testified that he “pointed a firearm at him shortly after they exchanged gestures expressing their displeasure with each other’s driving. Moreover, defendant testified that he held his firearm up to the window in an attempt to get [P] to ‘back off.’ Thus, a rational trier of fact could infer from defendant’s statements and actions that, by pointing his loaded firearm at [P], he intended to place [him] in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.”