Uninsured motorist (UM) coverage; Whether a moped was a “motor vehicle” under the UM coverage section of the policy; Applicability of the narrow definition of a motor vehicle; Stanton v. City of Battle Creek; Distinguishing Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of MI v. Stark; Insurance contract interpretation; Rory v. Continental Ins. Co.; Use of a dictionary to define terms not defined in the policy; Vushaj v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of MI; Principle that exclusionary clauses are strictly construed in the insured’s favor; Hayley v. Allstate Ins. Co.; Construing provisions against the drafter; Raska v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of MI

Concluding that the parties intended a narrow definition of “motor vehicle” to apply, the court held that a moped was not a motor vehicle under the UM coverage section of the policy at issue. Thus, the exclusion on which defendant-insurer (State Farm) relied did not apply. Plaintiff-insured sought UM benefits under her policy after her son was severely injured when the moped he was riding was struck by a vehicle driven by one of the other defendants. The trial court ruled that a moped was a motor vehicle and thus, plaintiff was excluded from UM coverage under the policy. She argued on appeal that it erred in doing so, and the court agreed. The policy did not define the term motor vehicle in the UM coverage section, so the court looked to dictionary definitions, which vary. One dictionary defined the term “as ‘an automotive vehicle not operated on rails.’ This broad definition would likely encompass a moped.” But another dictionary defined it “as ‘an automobile, truck, bus, or similar motor-driven conveyance.’ This narrower definition of ‘motor vehicle’ would seemingly not encompass a moped.” The court had to determine whether the parties intended a broad or a narrow definition of the term. Several tenants of Michigan’s contract-interpretation jurisprudence persuaded it that they “intended to use a narrow definition. First, the contract provision at issue is an exclusionary clause, and it is well established that ‘[e]xclusionary clauses in insurance policies are strictly construed in favor of the insured.’” In addition, to the extent that the provision “could be fairly read as applying either a broad or narrow definition of ‘motor vehicle,’ the provision ‘should be construed against its drafter and in favor of coverage.’” The court noted that, under “the narrow definition, a ‘motor vehicle’ is ‘an automobile, truck, bus, or similar motor-driven conveyance.’ An automobile, truck, and bus all have large engines intended for highway use. A moped, on the other hand, has a small engine making it unsuitable for highway use, though it is sometimes driven on streets.” Thus, the court concluded that a moped was not a “motor vehicle” under the UM coverage section of the policy, “and the trial court erred by interpreting the contract otherwise.” The court noted that its reasoning mirrored that of the Supreme Court in Stanton. While the trial court relied on Stark, that case was distinguishable and did not apply. Reversed.