Auto negligence; Action for noneconomic losses suffered as a result of a motor vehicle accident; Whether plaintiff was more than 50% at fault; Negligence; Campbell v. Kovich; Causation; Haliw v. Sterling Heights; Proximate cause; Ray v. Swagger; Rodriguez v. Solar of MI, Inc.; MCL 500.3135(1) & (2)(b); Comparative negligence; Riddle v. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp.; MCL 600.6304; Huggins v. Scripter; Rebuttable presumption of negligence created by violation of a statute; Johnson v. Bobbie’s Party Store; MCL 257.649; McGuire v. Rabaut; MCL 600.6304(1)(b) & (2)

The court held that because there was “evidence from which reasonable persons could conclude that defendant’s negligence was a cause of the accident,” proximate cause was an issue for the trier of fact, as was comparative negligence. Thus, it found that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition based on its finding that plaintiff was at least 51% at fault, reversed the order granting defendant summary disposition, and remanded. Plaintiff sought to recover noneconomic losses suffered as a result of a motor vehicle accident. She argued “that, because she presented evidence raising genuine issues of material fact as to whether she was more than 50% at fault for the accident, the question of comparative fault should have been presented to a jury.” It was undisputed that she “had a duty to come to a complete stop at the stop sign, and she testified that she did come to a complete stop.” The court determined that given “the configuration of the road, reasonable jurors could disagree with the court’s finding that plaintiff had to expect defendant to cut across the solid white lines separating the exit ramp lane from the other” lanes. Also, because the trial court did not expressly address defendant’s fault, it was difficult to tell whether it considered any of defendant’s acts negligent. Further, the trial court appeared “to have been swayed by defendant’s argument that nothing she did after she came down the exit ramp lane was relevant because pulling forward at a stop sign without properly yielding to oncoming traffic with the right of way is a traffic violation.” But this argument erroneously assumed “that defendant did not have a duty to act as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.” The court held that she “was entitled to assume that plaintiff was going to stop at the stop sign.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, she did stop at the stop sign. Even if she “negligently proceeded to drive forward, a reasonable juror could conclude from defendant’s testimony that she saw plaintiff’s car in her side and rearview mirrors, and that she could have avoided the accident had she simply stayed in the exit ramp lane rather than merging into plaintiff’s lane, but she negligently failed to do so.”