Modification of parenting time; A de novo hearing; MCL 552.507(5) & (6); The best-interests threshold; Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Shade v. Wright; Waiver; Hodge v. Parks; Whether the proposed modification affected the children’s established custodial environment (ECE); Lieberman v. Orr; Marik v. Marik; Pierron v. Pierron; Children’s best interests; MCL 722.23(c) & (j); Fletcher v. Fletcher

The court held that defendant-mother was not entitled to relief on her claim the trial court did not comply with the requirements for a de novo hearing, that the trial court did not err in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to the best-interest factors, and that its findings as to factors (c) and (j) were not against the great weight of the evidence. Thus, it affirmed the order granting plaintiff-father’s request to modify parenting time. The court first found that defendant failed to show the trial court did not comply with MCL 552.507(6). The record revealed “that the trial court reviewed the referee’s recommendations and the hearing transcripts; the trial court stated its disagreement with the referee’s findings and explained in detail why it disagreed with those findings by referring to evidence presented at the referee hearing. The trial court ultimately made an informed decision based on the arguments from both parties and all the necessary and relevant evidence pertaining to” factors (c) and (j). The court added that, even if the trial court erred, defendant failed to adequately explain “why the alleged error was outcome-determinative.” While she relied primarily on Lieberman in contending that the parenting time modification changed the children’s ECE, she did not show “a ‘substantial’ modification of parenting time because the modification reduced defendant’s parenting time by only approximately 18%,” compared to 40% in Lieberman. Further, unlike in Lieberman, the change here “did not modify the children’s schools.” Thus, the court concluded that the parenting time change here did not affect the children’s ECE and as a result, the trial court did not err in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard as to the best-interest factors. Finally, it determined that the evidence did not clearly preponderate against the trial court’s findings that factors (c) and (j) favored plaintiff.