The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (MCL 37.2101 et seq.); Prima facie case of race discrimination; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green; MCL 37.2202(1)(a); Hazle v. Ford Motor Co.; The Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act (MCL 37.1101 et seq.); Prima facie case of disability discrimination; MCL 37.1202(1)(a); Peden v. City of Detroit; “Disability”; MCL 37.1103(d); Cancer as a disability; Causation; Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI; Pretext; Major v. Newberry; Inconsistent explanations; Howard v. BP Oil Co., Inc. (11th Cir.)

While the court held that plaintiff established his prima facie case for both race and disability discrimination, it concluded that he was unable to show that the reasons defendant-Village offered for not hiring him were pretext for discrimination. Defendant decided not to hire plaintiff, “a Hispanic male with cancer,” for its police chief position and instead hired M, “a Caucasian, nondisabled male[.]” As to race discrimination, the court found the case similar to Hazle. The “unique circumstances surrounding the decision to hire Chief [M] over” him could lead to an inference of discrimination. Defendant set out its hiring process and then “when faced with the fact that plaintiff was the only remaining candidate, departed from the process and hired Chief [M], who was not a member of a protected class and had not applied for the position. If otherwise unexplained, this decision, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, could lead to an inference that” it was based on impermissible factors. As to disability discrimination, defendant and the trial court stated that “he was not able to establish the causal relationship between his disability and the adverse employment decision.” But, pursuant to Sniecinski, given that a prima facie “case under the McDonnell Douglas test creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination, causation is presumed.” Nonetheless, the court disagreed with plaintiff that “defendant’s inconsistent reasons” for its decision created a material fact question as to pretext. Plaintiff relied on Howard, and this case seemed similar on its face. But there was a substantial difference – defendant’s manager “had a legitimate reason for not wanting to hire plaintiff, which was not the case in Howard. Plaintiff had a disciplinary record” and evidence suggested he was informed before his interview that he would not be hired due to this, which indicated “that defendant’s reasons were consistent.” It was also clear that his “interview left several members of the council dissatisfied. Finally,” Hazle required him “to prove that defendant’s reasons were not just pretext, but pretext for discrimination,” which he was not able to do. The court affirmed summary disposition for defendant.