Action under 42 USC § 1983; Alleged Fourth Amendment violations; McCallum v. Geelhood (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Place; Probable cause; Peffer v. Stephens; United States v. Carter (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Yancey v. Carroll Cnty.; Totality of the circumstances; Gardenhire v. Schubert; Qualified immunity; Vakilian v. Shaw; Butler v. City of Detroit; Kisela v. Hughes; Ashford v. Raby; Ziglar v. Abbasi; Pearson v. Callahan; False arrest; Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake; Halasah v. City of Kirtland (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Malicious prosecution; Sykes v. Anderson; Sampson v. Village of Mackinaw City (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Meeks v. City of Detroit (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Whether a defendant was personally involved in unlawful conduct; Burley v. Gagacki; “Mirroring” a suspect’s electronic files; United States v. Ganias (Ganias I & II) (2d Cir.); United States v. Aboshady (1st Cir.); Municipal liability; Failure to train; City of Canton v. Harris; Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights; Hagans v. Franklin Cnty.; Final policymaking authority; City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik; Jones v. Clark Cnty.; Miller v. Calhoun Cnty.; Adair v. Charter Cnty. of Wayne

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court did not err by granting summary judgment for defendants-McCabe and Oakland County, but did err by granting qualified immunity to defendant-Elges on plaintiff-Tlapanco's unlawful search and seizure, unlawful arrest, and malicious prosecution claims. Plaintiff was charged after a young high school girl faced threats of blackmail on a social media application. It was discovered that he was the wrong person, and he sued defendants, alleging unlawful search of his apartment and seizure of his electronic devices, unreasonable arrest and imprisonment, unlawful search and seizure by copying the data on his devices after dismissal of the case against him, malicious prosecution, and county liability based on failure to train and McCabe’s decision to copy his data as a final policymaker for the county. The court first concluded that a reasonable juror could find that Elges violated plaintiff’s rights to be free from warrantless searches and seizures, arrest without probable cause, and malicious prosecution. While there was “no indication that Elges acted intentionally or deliberately, a reasonable jury could find [he] recklessly disregarded information in his possession negating probable cause that the username ‘anonymous,’ and by extension Tlapanco, was responsible for hacking [the victim] or sending the messages.” As such, there was “a genuine issue of material fact whether the statements of material fact or omissions in Elges’s affidavit were made recklessly.” Further, a reasonable jury could find that he “lacked probable cause to arrest Tlapanco and that the right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly established.” A reasonable jury could also “find that Elges violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution and that a reasonable officer would have been aware of the violation.” But McCabe was properly granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity as “there was no clearly established Fourth Amendment right against investigators retaining a forensic mirror of electronic devices after returning the physical devices.” Finally, plaintiff’s “exclusive reliance on McCabe’s deposition testimony regarding his second-in-command duties within” the county sheriff’s office was insufficient to “provide evidence that McCabe had final policymaking authority to establish particular search and seizure practices for” the county. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.