Waiver of the right to counsel; People v. Williams; Faretta v. California; People v. Anderson; People v. Russell; People v. Adkins (After Remand); MCR 6.005(D)(1); Plain error review; People v. Cain; Judicial impartiality; People v. McDonald; People v. Jackson; People v. Stevens; Jury instructions; M Crim JI 2.20; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the trial court’s commentary & its conduct that allegedly pierced the veil of judicial impartiality; People v. Schrauben; People v. Vaughn; Trial strategy; People v. Trakhtenberg; People v. Dunigan; Failure to raise a futile objection; People v. Ericksen; Factual predicate; People v. Hoag; Sentencing; Proportionality & reasonableness; People v. Lockridge; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Dixon-Bey; The two-thirds rule; People v. Tanner; Carrying a concealed weapon (CCW)

The court held that defendant was not entitled to a new trial because the trial court did not fail to obtain a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Also, as to his claims challenging the trial court’s impartiality, the court concluded that he was not deprived of a fair trial or denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in his sentencing. Defendant was convicted of CCW and sentenced to three to five years. The court held that he failed to show plain error affecting substantial rights arising from his unpreserved issue as to waiver of his right to counsel. He “adamantly sought to represent himself in the trial court and attempted to prevent advisory counsel from assisting him. The trial court substantially complied with the Anderson requirements as well as MCR 6.005 and obtained a knowing, voluntary, and understanding waiver.” He next claimed that “the trial judge pierced the veil of judicial impartiality by misrepresenting to the jury that defendant believed that the ‘process was treasonous’ when defendant accused the trial court of being a ‘terrorist treasonous person.’” Further, he contended “that the trial court’s commentary constituted improper testimony.” Although the court questioned “the necessity and extent of the explanation offered by the trial court to the jury, under the totality of the circumstances,” it did not determine that he was deprived of a fair trial. It appeared that “the trial court did not deliberately misrepresent defendant’s view of the extent of the treason and its application, but rather, attempted to explain defendant’s position in view of its expressions in documentation filed with the court and at multiple court hearings.” Affirmed.