Habeas corpus; Michigan’s sentencing scheme; Alleyne v. United States; People v. Herron (MI App.); People v. Lockridge (MI & MI App.); Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.508(D)(3); Robinson v. Woods; Whether petitioner’s Alleyne claim was procedurally defaulted based on appellate counsel’s failure to raise Alleyne on direct appeal; Wilson v. Sellers; Amos v. Renico; Ineffective assistance of counsel excusing a procedural default; McFarland v. Yukins; Martinez v. Ryan; Evitts v. Lucey; Strickland v. Washington; Mapes v. Coyle; Failure to make an argument that would have been overruled under then-existing law; Lucas v. O’Dea; Shaw v. Wilson (7th Cir.); Lobbins v. United States; Prejudice; Evans v. Hudson; Mayo v. Henderson (2d Cir.); Joseph v. Coyle; The merits of the Alleyne claim; Barton v. Warden, S. OH Corr. Facility

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that petitioner-Chase’s appellate attorney was constitutionally deficient in failing to raise an Alleyne claim on direct appeal, even though Michigan had yet to change its sentencing scheme to conform to Alleyne’s requirements, thus excusing the procedural default on which the district court relied to deny Chase’s habeas petition. He was convicted in state court of kidnapping, sexual assault, unlawful imprisonment, and felonious assault. He was sentenced under the old Michigan sentencing guidelines scheme that allowed judge-found facts to raise his mandatory minimum sentence, violating his Sixth Amendment rights under Alleyne, which was issued three days after he was sentenced. He argued that his counsel’s failure to raise the Alleyne issue on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, excusing the procedural default. The district court denied his habeas petition, concluding that the merits of his Alleyne claim would not have been “obvious” at the time the appellate brief was prepared. The issues before the court were whether Chase’s appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise an Alleyne claim on direct appeal, and whether Chase could show cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural default. It held that his appellate attorney should have known that even though Herron was binding precedent in Michigan at the time of the appeal, the sentencing scheme was unconstitutional and should have argued the issue on direct appeal. Additionally, Herron was already being challenged at the time of the appeal. The court held that “the change in Michigan law was ‘clearly foreshadowed,’ and Chase’s appellate attorney’s failure to raise this claim was constitutionally deficient.” The court also held that Chase established prejudice where there was “more than a reasonable probability that, had Chase’s appellate counsel raised an Alleyne claim, he would have received a new sentencing proceeding.” His claim was found meritorious where it was undisputed that “‘the sentencing court used judge-found facts in this case to calculate Chase’s guidelines minimum sentence range[.]’” The court reversed the district court, conditionally granted a writ of habeas corpus, and remanded with instructions to remand to state court for sentencing proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion and the U.S. Constitution.