Attorney fees & expenses under the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA) (MCL 213.51a et seq.); Whether MCL 213.66(2) limits attorney fees to the work that proved successful; Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Commodities Exp. Co.; Escanaba & Lake Superior R.R. Co. v. Keweenaw Land Ass’n, Ltd.; In re Hahn Drainage Ditch (Unpub.); Michigan Dep’t of Transp. v. Randolph; Indiana MI Power Co. (IMPC)

Holding that the trial court erred by limiting the award of attorney fees and expenses under the UCPA to the issues of nonjoinder and subject-matter jurisdiction, the court reversed the order awarding defendant-Community Mills $34,600.40. It remanded for determination of “the full amount of fees and expenses incurred by Community Mills while defending against the improper acquisition, as well as the costs incurred while pursuing its lawful recovery of attorney fees and expenses under MCL 213.66(2).” It also may pursue additional fees and costs incurred as a result of the appeal. “The trial court has discretion to determine whether the actual attorney fees” it incurred were reasonable. Plaintiff-IMPC sought to condemn real property owned by Community Mills to rebuild and upgrade an existing transmission line. Community Mills argued that the trial court improperly reduced its requested reimbursement award of $71,409.14 for attorney fees and expenses incurred in defending against IMPC’s action. The court held that Escanaba “confirms what the statutory language makes clear—MCL 213.66(2) does not limit the recovery of fees and expenses to those directly related to the defect that made the acquisition improper. In order to place the property owner in as good a position as before the attempted taking, all reasonable fees incurred in defending against the improper acquisition must be reimbursed.” It also agreed with Hahn “that the trial court’s approach was reasonable under the facts of that case. Because the property owner had obtained recovery of attorney fees in the second action, it was appropriate . . . to limit recovery of fees in the first action to legal services relating to the procedural defect. The trial court’s ruling correctly prevented the property owner from obtaining a double recovery of attorney fees.” Here, however, when the trial court “decided the amount of reimbursement in the first action, the second action was still pending.” The court noted that given “that a double recovery of fees and costs is not permitted,” IMPC’s concerns about following MCL 213.66(2)’s unambiguous language were unfounded. Further, “the recovery of attorney fees under MCL 213.66(2) is subject to the requirement that the fees be reasonable.” But the court reiterated that the statute “does not limit attorney fees to the work that proved successful. Nor is recovery precluded for legal services that, in hindsight, were ultimately unnecessary if those services were reasonable at the time they were rendered.”