Quiet title & breach of contract; MCR 3.411(B)(2); MCR 3.411(C)(2) & (3); Statute of frauds; In re Rudell Estate; MCL 566.106 & 108; The doctrine of partial performance; Dumas v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Zander v. Ogihara Corp.; Promissory estoppel; Klein v. HP Pelzer Auto Sys., Inc.; Failure to cite supporting authority; Hooker v. Moore; Equitable estoppel; Lakeside Oakland Dev., LC v. H & J Beef Co.; Conagra, Inc. v. Farmers State Bank; Unjust enrichment; Bellevue Ventures, Inc. v. Morang-Kelly Inv., Inc.; Karaus v. Bank of NY Mellon; Fraud in the inducement; Samuel D Begola Servs., Inc. v. Wild Bros.; Custom Data Solutions, Inc. v. Preferred Capital, Inc.

The court held that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to the Settipani defendants as to plaintiff’s quiet title, promissory estoppel, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud in the inducement claims. Thus, it reversed and remanded. The case arose from a dispute between plaintiff and defendants as to ownership of real property. Defendant-Momena Settipani and plaintiff resided together at the property. Plaintiff claimed that while he lived at the property, he made numerous improvements to it. He claimed that while he was out of town, defendant-John Czelada transferred title to the property to Momena as the sole owner. After this, she tried to evict plaintiff. He argued that the trial court erred when it dismissed his claims of quiet title and breach of contract because it erroneously construed the statute of frauds (SOF). The court agreed. The trial court determined that plaintiff failed to establish his superior interest in the property. It held that he “could not, as a matter of law, have a superior interest because the [SOF] barred his claim.” The court disagreed. The trial court erred in concluding that the alleged oral contract between Momena and plaintiff “could not be performed within one year. As alleged by plaintiff, the oral contract between plaintiff and Momena was to share an interest in the [property at issue] once plaintiff made all monthly payments to John. Although unlikely, there was a possibility that plaintiff could have paid a lump sum amount to John, or otherwise paid the purchase price within one year. . . . Thus, the contract could have been performed within one year, and the” trial court should not have rejected the partial-performance exception to the SOF. The trial court also held “that the part-performance doctrine did not apply because plaintiff failed to present any evidence that he actually partially performed on the alleged oral agreement. However, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract and quiet title under MCR 2.116(C)(8)[.]” Plaintiff claimed that he paid $39,000 toward the purchase of the property, and “that he made permanent improvements to the property.” Thus, the court held that he sufficiently pled “an oral agreement, and partial performance under that agreement, such that summary disposition should not have been granted” to the Settipani defendants on these claims.