Prosecutorial misconduct; Jury selection; Discrimination; Batson v. Kentucky; People v. Knight; Whether the prosecution’s remarks denied defendant a fair trial; People v. Brown; People v. Thomas; People v. Ericksen; Presumption that jurors follow their instructions; People v. Mullins; Possession of a controlled substance analogue; MCL 333.7403(1); People v. Hartuniewicz; Prejudice; People v. Unger; Cumulative error; People v. Cooper; People v. Dobek; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Deadlocked jury instruction; M Crim JI 3.12; People v. Sullivan; People v. Hardin; People v. Bookout; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v. Washington; People v. Solmonson; Failure to raise a futile objection; People v. Ericksen

The court held that the prosecution did not commit misconduct, that the trial court did not err in giving a deadlocked jury instruction, and that defendant’s counsel was not ineffective. He was convicted of possession of a controlled substance analogue. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the prosecution improperly used a peremptory challenge to remove the only African-American individual from the jury venire. “Two jurors stated they would not follow the law and find the defendant guilty in the above scenario; the prosecutor excused both.” In addition, it rejected his claim that the prosecution denied him a fair trial by repeatedly eliciting testimony that he was on probation at the time of his offense, noting the statements were based on the evidence. It also rejected his contention that the prosecution improperly elicited testimony that defendant admitted to using Suboxone and cocaine, which was not relevant to the charged possession offense. Evidence that he “used Suboxone around the time in question was relevant to establish his knowledge that Suboxone was in his house and was directly responsive to the defense claims. Although [his] cocaine use was not relevant, this brief comment did not render [his] trial unfair.” It further found that any improper statements were either cured or not prejudicial, and that cumulative errors did not prejudicially infect his trial. The court next rejected his argument that the trial court’s deadlocked jury instruction was erroneous, noting it “did not constitute a substantial departure because the court ‘did not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or unreasonable intervals.’ Sending the jury home at the end of the day is not coercive.” Finally, it rejected his claim that his counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct and by failing to challenge the deadlocked jury instruction, finding his claims meritless. Affirmed.