e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 73697
Opinion Date : 08/20/2020
e-Journal Date : 09/08/2020
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : People v. Loving
Practice Area(s) : Criminal Law
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Gleicher, Stephens, and Cameron
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Issues:

Motion to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing; MCR 6.310(C); People v. Brown; Whether a guilty or nolo contendere plea was understanding, voluntary, & accurate; People v. Cole; MCR 6.302(A); Waivers of constitutional rights; Brady v. United States; Right to counsel; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20; People v. Williams; Right to self-representation; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 13; Faretta v. California; Request to proceed in propria persona; MCR 6.005(D) & (E); People v. Anderson; People v. Russell; People v. Hicks

Summary

Noting it was not satisfied that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, the court reversed and remanded to the circuit court so that it may comply with the procedure outlined in MCR 6.310(C)(4) and allow him to decide whether to withdraw his pleas, with the assistance of counsel. He pled nolo contendere to armed robbery and carjacking and was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender to 10 to 20 years for each conviction. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the district court failed to comply with the second Anderson requirement and MCR 6.005(D)(1) when securing his initial waiver of his right to self-representation. It noted that the district court did not seek to evaluate his competence and did not advise him about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The district court stated that “representing himself was analogous to [him] acting as his own doctor and performing surgery on himself.” Although this statement “certainly conveyed that proceeding in propria persona was perilous, the district court did not explain the risks that accompanied it.” It also did not make any findings about whether defendant made a “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel before [it] granted [his] request to represent himself.” Further, although defendant “had the opportunity to consult with appointed counsel as required by MCR 6.005(D)(2), the district court granted [his] request to represent himself without advising [him] in accordance with MCR 6.005(D)(1) regarding ‘the charge, the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense, any mandatory minimum sentence required by law, and the risk involved in self-representation.’” Moreover, at the subsequent proceedings, “the district court and the circuit court did not advise [him] ‘of the continuing right to a lawyer’s assistance,’ and did not invite [him] to ‘reaffirm that a lawyer’s assistance [was] not wanted,’ despite being informed that [he] was representing himself.”

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